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Notes 
During the course of the research project, there were changes in a number of 
organizational names and administrative boundaries (and associated names):   
 
• The Ethiopian Agricultural Research Organization (EARO) the Ethiopian Institute 
of Agricultural Research (EIAR). 
 
• The Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC) became the 
Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency (DPPA) 
 
• The woreda of Gera Keya was divided into two new woredas: Menz Gera Midir 
and Menz Keya Midir.  Unless otherwise indicated, research took place in both of 
the new woredas.  The older name will be used here when work crossed the two.  
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Glossary 
Belg Short rainy season, generally lasting two months somewhere 
between February to June, depending on region 
 
Birr   Ethiopian currency; at time of writing 9 Birr = 1 US$ 
 
Certified Seed Formal sector-produced seed which meets specified standards of 
variety purity, and physical, physiological and sanitary quality. 
 
Chercheri   Retailer 
 
Delala   Broker 
 
Farmer Variety Genetic materials broadly-defined as local or traditional 
varieties, or landraces. 
 
Formal seed system System producing certified seed, including official research 
system, seed  parastatals, and commercial seed companies.  
 
Gelbach  Farmer collectors (for grain/seed) 
 
Informal seed system Seed channels that include farmers’ own stocks, local exchange 
networks, and local seed/grain markets (=local, traditional, 
farmer system) 
 
Meher Main, longer rainy season, generally three to four months 
between June and October, depending on region (also called 
kremt) 
 
Kekabi   Village-level broker, lit. ‘donkey ear’ 
 
Modern Variety A variety developed and released by formal research system 
(sometimes also called ‘Improved Varieties’) 
 
Quintal  100 kg 
 
Sebsabi  Collector 
 
Tabia   Tigray term for Farmers’ Association (=kebele) 
 
Woreda  District, level below Zone 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Introduction 
 
This report assesses the effects of emergency seed assistance in Ethiopia. Such aid has 
been given at least since 1974, making Ethiopia a country with some of the earliest 
distributions and likely the most continuous emergency seed-related initiatives.  
 
While analyses of food aid in Ethiopia have been abundant, overviews of seed aid are 
non-existent, with modest site-specific cases appearing only within the last three years. 
This seed assistance information gap seems a crucial one for an aid practice which has 
been ongoing for more than three decades and which unfolds in some of the more 
marginal farming zones and among more vulnerable populations.   
 
Intervening in seed systems represents serious business.  Seed is the input at the heart 
of agricultural production and determines what farmers grow and if they will harvest.   
Further, as seed is often replanted, even short-term seed-related interventions can have 
effects over many seasons. The design of emergency seed aid interventions is also 
particularly challenging as such interventions are complex and context-specific, and, 
following a disaster, time may be short for anticipating needs of  the next season.  
 
For all these reasons, it seems illogical (and unwise) that seed-related assistance to date 
has received so little attention within the governmental and non-governmental aid 
communities in Ethiopia. In short, seed aid suffers from being a humanitarian orphan.  
Seed aid is often given simply because food aid is given: Alternatively, seed provision 
may be lumped together with the diverse pool of non-food items, and emphasis put on 
efficient procurement and transport procedures.  Far from being a logistical exercise,  
(i.e., buying and distributing seed), effective seed aid operations demand considerable 
expertise of (inter alia), regional agro-ecology, livelihood strategies and markets. 
While good seed aid can help, poor assistance can make farmers even more vulnerable. 
 
Aims and Methods 
 
The aims of this investigation have been practical ones: 
 
• to assess the effects of seed-related assistance; 
• to promote ‘better implementation practice’ for the acute and chronic stress zones; 
• to help shape general policy and specific guidelines for targeted and effective seed 
security support (as distinct from food security support). 
 
The report has asked a basic set of questions: 
 
• What is the history of seed aid in Ethiopia? 
• What policies shape seed aid practice? 
• What forms of seed aid have been delivered? 
• Has seed aid been needed? 
• What have been the short-term results of seed aid? 
• What have been the longer terms results of seed aid? 
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Investigations have pursued three general strategies.  Researchers collected 
information from different stakeholders in the seed aid process:  from national and 
regional policy makers, including donors; from governmental and non-governmental 
aid implementers (GO/NGO); from seed supply providers (formal sector and local seed 
grain/traders); and from farmer aid recipients.  The work embraced long-term and 
short–term analyses, documenting seed aid history as well as the diversity of 
contemporary implementation. Third, analysts reviewed the national and region policy 
environments which have shaped seed aid practice.  
 
In terms of field investigations, four sites were identified for intensive case study.  
 
• Miesso and Chiro woredas in West Hararghe (Oromiya) 
• Raya Azebo woreda in Southern Tigray (Tigray) 
• Humbo woreda in Wolaita (SNNPR) 
• Gera Keya woreda in North Shoa (Amhara) 
 
The first two of these sites represent ‘classic’ seed aid scenarios, where chronic 
drought stress has led to low crop production and repeated emergency aid.  The latter 
two sites have also received repeated aid, though their primary stresses are different: 
high population density and land degradation.   
 
While this Executive Summary presents broad conclusions and recommendations, 
specific conclusions and recommendations are listed at the end of each report chapter.   
 
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
1.   History and Overview of Seed Aid 
 
Emergency Seed Aid has been implemented in Ethiopia for at least 34 years and has 
been near continuous since 1982.  Conservative estimates suggest $US 15,000,000 per 
year of seed aid has been delivered by governmental and non-governmental 
organizations.  Over a 34-year period, this translates to $US 510,000,000 or about 
ETB, 4,650,000,000 spent for emergency seed-related assistance. 
 
Three broad types of seed assistance have been identified in use in Ethiopia:  besides 
emergency aid for a crisis or acute stress, seed is provided for chronic stress contexts 
(‘aid for chronic stress’), and for medium to higher potential areas where production is 
being intensified (that is, more ‘developmental aid’).  These three are poorly 
distinguished conceptually, and often not distinguished at all in terms of what is 
offered ‘on the ground’.  There seems to be little governmental strategy tailored to 
addressing these different seed assistance contexts; In particular, seed assistance 
strategies for the most vulnerable, those in chronic stress areas, appears to be the least 
well-conceived.  This is despite concrete data which show that the lion’s share of 
recent ‘acute’ seed aid has been delivered in the chronic stress (safety net) zones.      
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At present: 
• Acute seed aid (repeated year after year) is being implemented mostly in chronic 
stress areas; 
 
• Acute (emergency) aid  is being used as an important vehicle for moving new, 
modern varieties (which, when used alone, is a developmental type of assistance); 
 
• The seed system support component for chronic stress areas (including safety net 
areas) is near-completely undefined. 
 
The box below lists the broad types of approaches in use. 
 
Emergency Seed Aid 
• Direct Seed Distribution (DSD) 
• Revolving Seed Funds 
• Seed Vouchers (SV,  also sometimes called ‘coupons’)  
• Seed and Fairs  (SV+F,  also sometimes linked to Livelihood Fairs) 
• Seed Swaps  (grain for seed, which is then redistributed) 
• Cash for Seed  (in relief context) 
 
Development Seed Programs 
• Agricultural packages:  seed and fertilizer  (for repayment) 
• Modern varieties alone  (for free or repayment) 
 
Special Seed Assistance for Chronically-Stressed   
(within safety net other poverty alleviation programs) 
• Seed given in food security-related programs 
• Seed given in HIV/AIDS  victim support programs (instead of food aid) 
 
 
Moving Forward: Recommendations (overview) 
 
1.1 National reflections on seed security strategy need to be planned so as to 
distinguish recommended seed system support: for emergency, for chronic 
stress and for developmental contexts.   Frameworks need to be sharpened so as 
to give strategic guidance to on-the-ground implementation. 
 
1.2 Recognizing the considerable overlap between acute and chronic stress 
contexts, specific reflection should be given to programs which link ‘relief to 
development’ (or ‘developmental relief’), starting in the emergency phase and 
continuing through recovery and beyond.  This reflection should explore what 
approaches are already known and proven, and which ones need to be further 
tested.  
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2.  Policies Shaping Seed Aid 
Emergency policy, seed policy and agricultural development policies potentially all 
shape seed security approaches and this policy set was respectively reviewed.  Policies 
articulating overall government strategy for achieving seed security are not apparent.   
In terms of specific thrusts, The GoE’s strategy of seed assistance for development is 
strongly expressed through a number of technology transfer programs, including the 
National Extension Improvement Program (NEIP) and its successors.   In contrast, 
strategies for seed security in acute stress and chronic stress contexts remain 
inadequately differentiated.   
 
Few specific policies appear to shape seed aid specifically, except a provision  to relax 
regulations of seed quality in situations of acute need. Emergency seed aid remains an 
‘orphan’ within policy. 
 
Emergency seed aid in Ethiopia is not generally used to promote the seed industry 
(whose mandate is development as the commercial sector remains limited).  Package 
programs presently absorb most of public-sector seed production, which is dominated 
by maize and wheat.  The formal seed industry produces ‘other crops’ (non-
maize/wheat) only in small quantities.  Multiplication sites are concentrated in the 
intermediate and higher attitudes and there is little emphasis on lowland crops.  This 
has implications for seed aid, as most of emergency delivery takes place in drought-
prone areas. 
 
Seed aid tends to be affected most by policies designed for other reasons.  Food 
security policy presently leans heavily on agricultural intensification through modern 
varieties.  This promotion affects the shape of seed aid directly in terms of the GoE’s 
preferred choice of approach (Direct Seed Distribution) and use of emergency as the 
vehicle to distribute modern varieties.   
 
Moving Forward: Recommendations (policy) 
 
2.1 Seed security needs to be put on the emergency, chronic stress and 
development agendas as a central theme in its own right.  This needs to happen 
at the policy level, as well as in practice, and from national planning and all 
along the chain down through to the district (woreda) and farmer association- 
level implementation.   
 
2.2  Special seed security expertise (seed system expertise) has to be made available 
with the MoARD, starting at the national level.  
 
2.3 Crop development for chronic stress areas needs far more attention. 
Chronically-stressed areas are often “low-potential”, and need types of 
technologies that recognize the high levels of risk and large distances from 
markets and infrastructure. 
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2.3.1 One priority is to review technologies that perform under stress and 
under farmers’ management for high-risk conditions (i.e. low inputs).  
Full packages should not be assumed in these cases.   
 
2.3.2 A second priority is to address the barriers to the development of 
technologies for stress conditions.  More resources need to be directed 
to research for lowland ecologies, 
 
2.3.3 Related to the above (2.3.2), seed production for lowland crops needs to 
improve and become more demand-responsive.  
 
2.4 In terms of emergency aid, seed security issues must treated distinctly from 
food security issues.  For this to occur, the integration between emergency and 
technical agencies needs to improve.  Presently, the DPPA does not deal with 
seeds, while MoARD generally does not engage with emergencies.  The current 
restructuring in the MoARD may offer an opportunity to forge clearer lines of 
communication between DPPA and MoARD, delineating responsibility so that 
key decisions are not lost in the “no man’s land” between both organizations.  
 
 
More specifically in reference to emergency aid: 
 
2.4.1 Seed aid has to be given a separate identity, distinct from food aid  
practice . 
 
2.4.2 Seed aid has to be removed from the ill-defined cluster of ‘Non-Food- 
Items (NFI).  Seed-related interventions demand explicit concepts, 
expertise and planning.  The shopping list of NFI often translates into 
simplistic supply-side operations (for instance, tallying the amount of 
seed aid which should be given). 
 
3.  Seed Security Assessment 
Achieving seed security is quite different from attaining food security, despite their 
obvious links. One can have enough seed to sow a plot but lack sufficient food to eat, 
for example, during the ‘hungry season’ prior to harvest. Conversely, a household can 
have adequate food but lack access to appropriate seed for planting. Despite these 
important differences between food security and seed security, determinations of seed 
security have been invariably based, implicitly or explicitly, on food security 
assessments. This results from a lack of appreciation and understanding of seed 
security issues.   
 
For farm families to achieve seed security: seed has to be available, farmers need to be 
able to access to it, and the seed quality must be sufficient to promote healthy seed 
system functioning.  This has to happen in the short and in the long-term 
 
At present, there are no seed security assessments conducted at any level in Ethiopia.   
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More National Level Assessments 
 
At national level, determinations of need for seed aid are not done directly.  Rather, 
food and crop supply assessment missions, food security assessments, or no 
assessments at all are used to justify seed–related responses.  So seed need is 
extrapolated from food security assessments, or ‘assumed’ from food security 
assessments.   
 
The trigger used to signal a “need for seed aid” is most often a “harvest failure”.  A 
drop in harvest is directly linked to a lack of seed.  Concrete examples drawn from 
across Ethiopian crops and regions show that even a severe production shortfall  does 
not necessarily translate to a seed shortfall.  
 
While since 2005, there have been initial moves (spurred by the Agricultural Task 
Force) toward more holistic seed security assessments, the proposed changes exist 
mostly on paper, and in rough (not sufficiently defined) indicator formats.  The current  
variables for ‘best-worst’ scenarios are not sufficiently honed for seed security 
insights, and the formats for determining seed assistance (‘emergency needs 
requirements’) encourage a pre-determined  response: that seed is needed and that seed 
availability is the problem. 
 
Regional and Woreda (District) Level Assessments 
 
Seed security assessments at the governmental  local (woreda) level are not conducted.    
 
Seed security assessments by NGOs are not conducted. 
  
Seed need estimates at the woreda level are projected for two different factors. 
‘Possible seed shortage’ is inferred from yield loss thresholds. The desire to acquire 
modern varieties for the zone also strongly shapes seed need assessments.  Hence, seed 
need requests in emergency appeals can be particularly inflated so as to obtain modern 
varieties.  
 
Moving Forward: Recommendations (seed security assessments) 
 
Seed security assessment tools need to be refined for Ethiopia, capacity needs to be 
built, and incentives must be put in place to ensure such tools are used. National level 
organizations (such as the Agricultural Task Force) should be the prime drivers behind 
this. 
 
3.1 Overall national formats for assessing seed security status should shift  from 
those which calculate simplistic ‘seed needs’ to frameworks which recognize 
different types of seed security problems, and which tailor responses 
accordingly.  These problems might include diverse constraints of seed 
availability, seed access and seed quality, which are distinguished by their 
presence in the short and in the long term.   
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3.1.1 The ‘best to worst’ scenario formula and the emergency needs 
assessment formats should be reviewed—to shift to seed security 
perspectives;  
 
3.1.2 The Crop and Food Assessments missions (and other more ‘national 
formats), should be revised to contain a specific seed security 
component. 
 
3.2 Precise seed security indicators need to built into early warning system 
programs. These might start by focusing on harvest/seed tables and key 
indicators for seed/grain  market fluctuations.    
 
3.3 Seed security assessment capacity needs to be built at regional and woreda 
levels .  Technical tools are already in development to help agricultural officials 
move forward on seed security assessments.  These include harvest/seed tables, 
and field ‘seed system security assessment’ (SSSA) guides.  An explicit 
technical process needs to be put in place to: 
 
o raise awareness of seed security versus food security issues 
o set up woreda level seed security indicators 
o train woreda level staff in seed security field assessments  
 
3.4 More generally, a political environment for ‘real seed security assessment’ has 
to be established.  This is no easy task.  Technical advances in methods alone 
will not lead to more accurate assessments. 
 
Without strong seed security frameworks and indicators (as national guides) and 
without strong leadership ensuring that seed security assessment is given focus (as 
distinct from food security and other Non-Food Item assessment), seed aid assistance 
in Ethiopian will likely remain supply-driven rather than demand or problem driven 
 
4.  Implementation: Government and NGO Aid Givers 
 
Historical records show seed aid to be continuous in areas considered as stress zones.  
For example, in one site of study, investigations found seed given 13 times in a period 
of nine years. 
 
The emergency seed aid approaches used are strongly shaped by institutional 
philosophy, rather than by concrete problems encountered on the ground.  Hence, seed 
aid approaches used in a given zone directly depend on which implementers are 
present.  The GoE generally uses Direct Seed Distribution (DSD) (assuming that seed 
availability is the problem).  NGOs have taken the lead in testing non-DSD 
approaches: cash, vouchers, seed vouchers and fairs (assuming that seed access is the 
problem).  Some NGOs still also favor DSD, particularly to promote new varieties. 
 
Two themes shape novel trends in seed aid programming: a) approaches to empower 
farmers within the seed aid process; and b) approaches to link relief response to more 
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developmental initiatives. ‘Developmental relief’ work presently encompasses: support 
to small scale business enterprises during the relief phase; support to local traders as 
beneficiaries in relief (via the SVF system), and introduction of new varieties as part of 
relief aid. Using a ‘developmental relief’ perspective might be particularly important 
for chronic stress contexts. (The direct technical approach would need to be tailored to 
high risk contexts among vulnerable populations.)   
 
Seed aid targeting is little differentiated from food aid targeting.  In one effort to 
encourage that seed received is actually used by farmers, one NGO asks that recipients 
to sign a ‘contract’ to plant and not sell aid.  Similarly, evaluations are few and far 
between.  Seed aid is often treated as a logistical exercise (that is, distribute seed).  
Little learning is taking place on even the short-term effects of seed aid. There are a 
few exceptions.  
 
 
Moving Forward: Recommendations (GO and NGO Implementers)  
 
4.1 Seed - related responses have to be better matched to actual seed security 
problems encountered on the ground. This can be encouraged by building 
capacity to conduct seed security assessments (section above); and also by 
building capacity among implementers to effect a greater range of response 
options. 
 
More specifically:  developing greater response capacity will involve:  
 
4.1.1 establishing two-way learning for a  among practitioners of the 
intricacies of different approaches (GO-NGO and among NGOs) 
4.1.2 explicit-in-field training on approaches for implementation;  
4.1.3 awareness raising within government and donor circles of the variety of 
response options; 
4.1.4 harnessing financial support for more targeted action; 
4.1.5 getting policy support for more targeted action. 
 
 
4.2 The complete gap in seed aid implementer guidelines for Ethiopia also needs to 
be addressed. An initial set of issues for inclusion in guidelines has been 
suggested by seed security experts (Box below).  The list needs to be expanded 
and might best be discussed in national fora, with strong regional 
representation and representation from key stakeholder groups.  Such 
guidelines would be indicative, and non-binding, so debate and consensus are 
important for achieving subsequent advances on the ground.  
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SEED RELIEF GUIDELINES FOR ETHIOPIA: (proposed items) 
• Seed security assessment needs to be effected prior to intervention. 
 
• The type of aid response should be matched to the seed security problem at hand. 
 
• Implementing organizations need to have agronomic expertise (seed aid is not just a 
logistical exercise).  Such aid intervenes at the heart of a farming system. 
 
• IF seed is to be provided, minimally:  (examples) 
1. adapted crops and accepted varieties need to be put on offer 
2. the quality should be at least as good as what farmers normally use 
 
• Modern varieties should be introduced in crisis periods only after a well-programmed 
set of steps has been followed *.  
 
• Monitoring and evaluation (M+E) should be built into all seed relief interventions. 
This M+E is to promote learning by doing, and to improve practice. Such a 
commitment to follow-up should be a pre-condition to receipt of funds. 
 
• If seed aid in any one zone continues for multiple seasons (3 or more) a review process 
should take place.  The review should either:  a) clearly justify the continuance of 
emergency aid; or b) stop the aid and plan an explicit exit strategy. 
 
• Implementers should be held accountable for the products they deliver (whether from 
formal sector or from traders). Processes need to be devised for ensuring this 
accountability. 
*  Procedures detailed in Box 4 in the full report 
 
 
 
 
5.  Implementation: Traders 
 
Seed/grain traders are key for stabilizing farmers’ seed systems during both normal 
and stress periods.  Farmers routinely rely on markets to fill seed gaps and traders may 
be sought as suppliers for select emergency operations (both in DSD and SVF 
implementation).  Traders at all levels (from collectors to large-scale traders), 
distinguish between seed and grain routinely, but to different degrees according to crop 
and according to their intended customer base.  When presented with specific requests 
for seed (from local clients, government or exporters), traders can refine their seed 
management practices and often negotiate premiums to obtain better quality seed and 
sell better quality materials.  
 
Traders’ assessments give strong insights into what happens to seed systems in periods 
of stress.  For example, traders in West Hararghe recounted their extensive business 
experience, across periods of drought, severe insect and pest attack and civil strife, 
Traders (from small- to large-scale) asserted that there was no time, not a single 
season, when sufficient seed was not available directly within the region or within 
reach of the region for all key crops.  Seed did not need to be brought in from outside 
as a form of aid. 
 
Executive Summary 
  xv 
While in times of stress, seed availability is not generally a problem, traders do cite 
other signals, which indicate seed system stress. These signals can be quickly and 
easily monitored at regional and more local levels.   
 
o Volume changes in seed supply 
o Seed price fluctuations 
o Changes in geographic sourcing of seed 
o Changes in the scale of seed loans 
o Seed quality shifts (both positive and negative) 
 
In terms of precise trends, unexpectedly, larger traders in West Hararghe, increased the 
volumes of seed sold during stress periods (sometimes tripling volumes), aiming to 
capture increased demand.  Prices also increased from 50-100%, with the rises due 
mostly to increased transport costs.  
 
Traders were also directly linked to NGOs and relief programs, particularly involving 
seed vouchers (with or without fairs).  Experience showed that incentives can be put in 
place which encourage traders to improve seed (versus grain) management within a 
small number of seasons, so as to improve the quality of supply.   
 
Moving Forward: Recommendations (traders) 
 
Given that local markets and traders are the backbone of farmer seed supply, much 
more attention should be given to ensuring that these markets can supply the kinds of 
seed farmers need.  . 
 
5.1 Seed/grain traders could be powerful partners in helping to move new modern 
varieties widely within and among farming communities.  Methods should be 
tested for directly linking formal sector seed supply with informal trader 
seed/grain sellers.  Among the items that might be tested and evaluated: 
 
5.1.1 Distribution of variety samples (to stimulate demand); 
5.1.2  Sale of small packets of seed; 
5.1.3 Sale of modern varieties in bulk.  
 
5.2 Seed/grain traders are potential partners in improving the seed quality per se of 
sowing materials put on offer to farmers.    While the quality of farmer seed 
overall is often shown to be quite adequate, procedures for (inter alia) 
segregating among varieties and reducing percentage of sub-standard grains  
could give farmer clients a better return for their purchases. Awareness-raising, 
capacity building and incentives might all be possible measures for 
encouraging gradual seed/grain quality improvements.  
 
Executive Summary 
  xvi 
6.  Implementation: Farmer Recipients 
Farmers receive seed aid repeatedly.  The average household sampled received seed 
aid 3.35 times, with a high of 10 separate seed aid receipts. There is little evidence that 
recurrent seed aid decreases their vulnerability.  
 
Seed aid supplied about half the seed a household actually planted, for the crop 
supplied, in any given emergency season.  This was the case across all four regions 
sampled.  This figure for seed aid should be interpreted as elevated for three reasons:  
 
o Aid was frequently given specifically to introduce a new variety or even a new 
crop, so farmers may not have had parallel local stocks;   
 
o Seed is distributed in some regions as a ‘third’ season, after the normal rains 
(so farmers already had sown their stocks in the ‘season before’). Chickpea, in 
particular, is often given for such late planting. Many farmers consider this a 
crop of ‘last resort’ and do not have their own stocks. 
 
o Seed aid usually provided one or two different crops, but farmers generally 
grow a range of species.  Therefore, seed aid’s contribution to overall 
household seed supply is less than 50%. 
 
Fourteen percent of aid recipients relied on seed aid for 100% of their sowing needs 
(for the crops distributed).  Even in an emergency season, seed aid recipients obtained 
over 30% of their seed from their own stocks, with another 12% coming from markets.   
 
Seed aid provides a mix of Modern Varieties (MVs) and Farmer Varieties (FVs).  
Across all regions (with 578 cases examined) 60% of seed aid cases involved MVs and 
40% FVs.  The balance of MV/FV varied between sites:  in the Tigray site, 58% of 
cases involved FVs; in the Amhara site, only 2% involved FVs. In places such as 
Humbo and Gera Keya, seed aid largely serves to promote MVs.   
 
The large majority of farmers (95%) indicated that seed was available in their 
respective regions in periods of stress (in concordance with traders’ assessments, 
section 5).  However, farmer preference for aid approaches was not directly linked to 
the problem identified (i.e. seed availability, seed access, or seed quality). Rather 
preference varied by region and the way that an approach (DSD, cash, voucher, or 
SVF) was actually implemented.  Generally those wanting to buy their own seed (and 
preferring voucher or cash approaches) highlighted that they preferred having a choice 
of crops and varieties.  Generally, those preferring the DSD approach found 
transactions with traders difficult, or sought access to modern varieties. 
 
Overall, no conclusive patterns were identified of long-term changes linked to 
emergency seed aid (for instance possible changes in seed sourcing practice, or in 
farmers’ relationships with others).  In some 400 interviews, obtaining new varieties 
was the single clear positive impact identified; and widespread dependency, from 
farmers, traders, and aid implementers, was cited as the single clear negative impact. 
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Moving Forward: Recommendations (farmer aid recipients) 
 
6.1 Even though farmers are ‘recipients of assistance’, it is important they be treated 
as active, not passive actors in this aid process.  Procedures need to maximize 
farmers’ ability to strategize even during an emergency, and especially in 
vulnerable areas.   
 
More specifically:  this might include  
 
6.1.1 Farmers should have right to say ‘no’ to any one type of crop and 
variety, especially if it has been not previously used in system  (such as 
many modern varieties). A range of crop and variety options should 
routinely be put on offer. 
 
6.1.2 There should be vigorous efforts to get seed aid out early.  Early 
knowledge of what crops and varieties might be on offer increases 
farmers’ flexibility to respond to changing conditions (e.g. rainfall). 
 
6.1.3 Overall standards for fair dealing with farmers should be reviewed, no 
matter what the approach.   
 
This might involve: 
o maximizing information to farmers on expected procedures in 
advance; 
o increasing competition among providers (traders and sellers);  
o setting up procedures for farmer feedback to refine aid processes; 
o setting up transparent procedures for allowing farmers to redress 
grievances: —in cases where the aid process  or aid product is 
significantly substandard.    
 
--------------------------- 
Concluding Comments:  There are multiple and significant challenges to improving 
seed-related assistance in Ethiopia, particularly in the emergency and chronic stress 
contexts.  Changes are needed at the policy, national planning and strategy levels, as 
well as in the areas of regional, zonal and district implementation. Changes and 
refinements will involve Government, NGO, as well as donor modifications. 
 
Capacity building and political will need to be reinforced to put seed security issues on 
the agenda as separate from food security issues.  Promoting seed security 
assessments; better matching seed system-related responses to actual constraints on-
the- ground; and generally shaping Ethiopian-specific guidelines for ‘Better Practice in 
Seed Relief’, are among the central activities recommended.  The aim for future seed 
system-related assistance is to move away from three decades of supply-driven aid and  
to move toward  more targeted, effective and problem-solving programs. 
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I: INTRODUCTION 
Rationale for Report 
Why focus on seed aid? 
This report aims to assess the effects of emergency seed assistance in Ethiopia. Such  
humanitarian aid has been given at least since 1974,  making Ethiopia a country with 
some of the earliest distributions and likely the most continuous emergency seed-
related initiatives.  
 
While analyses of food aid in Ethiopia have been abundant (e.g. Clay et al., 1997; 
Sharp, 1997; H.K. Desta, 2003; Quisumbing, 2003), broad overviews of seed aid are 
non-existent,  with modest site-specific cases appearing only within the last 3 years 
(Mburathi et al., 2004; Bramel et al., 2004). This seed assistance information gap 
seems a crucial one for an aid practice which has been ongoing for 34 years, which has 
been implemented across most regions of the country, and which repeatedly unfolds in 
some of the more marginal farming zones and among more vulnerable populations.   
 
The aims of the investigation have been practical ones: 
 
• to assess the effects of seed-related assistance; 
• to  promote ‘better implementation practice’ for the acute and chronic stress zones; 
• to help shape general policy and specific guidelines for targeted and effective seed 
security support (as distinct from food security support). 
 
Worldwide, but particularly across Africa, seed provision to quicken recovery of 
agricultural systems following disasters has become an increasingly important activity 
of governmental and non-governmental relief agencies.  Its rationale has been an 
enlightened one:  right after a crisis (for example, drought, flood, short-term conflict), 
farmers should be given the means to produce their own crops for food or sale.   In 
theory, such aid promotes farmer dignity and contains elements of sustainability as 
farmer production should be restored, and subsequent food aid limited.  Also, in 
theory, such aid makes solid economic sense: given 10 kg of sorghum seed, a farmer in 
Hararghe can potentially realize 1000 kg of production: this is a good return on a 
humanitarian aid investment.  
 
This report aims to put seed aid practice in the prime spotlight. Nationally, within 
Ethiopia, several diverse trends suggest an urgent need for such a seed aid review.  The 
Government  of Ethiopia (GoE) is increasingly concerned about dependencies due to 
repeated aid  and national decision-makers are  reviewing strategies for addressing 
constraints particularly in chronic stress areas (Anonymous, 2003).  Simultaneously, 
there is a strong national push towards agricultural intensification and especially for 
diffusing research-proven technologies towards some of the harder- to- reach areas (i.e. 
those often targeted by repeated delivery) (Abate, 2006).  These review activities are 
also taking place at a time when the aid and development communities are looking 
towards a broader combination of measures to tackle food and livelihood insecurity 
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within Ethiopia, including support to production, market-based measures and provision 
of social “safety-nets” (GoE, 2004b).  
 
Internationally, this longer-term seed aid review builds on complementary and quite 
recent initiatives suggesting the need for seed aid reflection and critique.  Since 2003, a 
number of key seed assistance policy makers have been extensively reviewing their 
shorter-term seed aid activities with the aim of improving their effectiveness.  The 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) has revised it basic 
“Guiding Principles for Seed Relief”  (Sperling et al., 2004b).  The Office of Foreign 
Disaster Assistance of The United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID/OFDA), has funded a set practical security and seed aid briefs (Sperling et al., 
2006a), and increasingly calls for post-implementation evaluation, including in 
Ethiopia (e.g. Brandstetter, 2004; Gregg, 2004).  
 
Two phrases commonly heard in Ethiopia, by officials and humanitarian practitioners 
alike, suggest that the general ‘problem’ of seed aid assistance, and particularly of 
assistance in chronic stress areas, has entered common knowledge.   
 
1)  “It is not the rains in Ethiopia we need to worry about, but whether it rains in 
America and Canada.” 
 
[meaning:  it does not really matter how the harvests yield locally; more important is 
the supplies of external aid.] 
 
 
2)  “In Ethiopia, most of the emergency aid is just failed development” 
 
[meaning: disaster-related aid is being given in the short-term because fundamental 
production and developmental  problems are not being sufficiently addressed]. 
 
 
It is now past time to give seed aid practice the close scrutiny it deserves. 
 
Caveat: moving beyond delivery logistics 
This review of emergency seed assistance in Ethiopia starts with a caveat.  Intervening 
in seed systems during and immediately post crisis periods, represents truly serious 
business.  Seed is the input at the heart of agricultural production.  It determines what 
crops and varieties will farmers grow, when and if they will have a harvest, and partly 
influences how much they will have to eat.  Given that seed can also be replanted, the 
effects of seed aid may endure for many seasons after the emergency intervention 
ends.   
 
The design of emergency seed aid interventions is often particularly challenging. Seed 
interventions are complex and context-specific, especially so following a disaster; time 
is usually short as seed is needed before the next planting season; and the implementer 
agency best placed to respond may lack experience in local seed systems and seed 
security analysis. 
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For all these reasons, it seems illogical (and unwise) that seed-related assistance has so 
far been little highlighted or analyzed within the governmental and non-governmental 
aid communities.  In short, seed aid suffers from being a humanitarian orphan.  Seed 
aid is often given simply because food aid is given: hence seed insecurity in a region  
is most often ‘assumed’ via food security assessments.  Alternatively, seed provision is 
frequently lumped together within the diverse pool of non-food items NFI.  NFI may 
include inputs related to health, nutrition, water, sanitation, as well as agricultural 
needs, and their lumping together suggests that their successful delivery mainly 
involves efficient procurement and transport procedures.  Far from being a logistical 
exercise (that is, simply buying and distributing seed), effective seed aid operations 
demand considerable expertise of (inter alia), regional agro-ecology, livelihood 
strategies, and markets.  Substantial evidence also shows that ineffective seed aid can 
damage vulnerable farming systems and local economies in multiple ways.   
 
The purpose of this report work is to ‘go beyond listing the problems’ and to provide a 
solid platform for moving towards improvements in seed-related assistance.  This 
includes seed-related assistance to address acute stress situations and to address more 
chronic stress situations.   
 
Finally, this report may well be the first one analyzing the effects of chronic as well as 
acute seed aid. Lessons from Ethiopia can help inform the design and delivery of seed-
related assistance in other chronic stress contexts and other chronic aid delivery 
contexts.  
 
The Scope of the Seed Aid Analysis 
Basic Questions 
This report asks a set of basic guiding questions: 
 
• What is the history of seed aid in Ethiopia? 
 
• What policies shape seed aid practice? 
 
• What forms of seed aid have been delivered? 
 
• Has seed aid been needed? 
 
• What have been the short-term results of seed aid? 
 
• What have been the longer terms results of seed aid? 
 
Investigations conducted 
To gain insight into these rather fundamental questions the investigations have pursued 
three general strategies.  First, researchers have collected information from different 
stakeholders in the seed aid process:  from national and regional policy makers, 
including donors; from governmental and non-governmental aid implementers; from 
seed supply providers (formal sector and local seed grain/traders); and from farmer aid 
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recipients.  Second, the scope of work has embraced both the long-term and short –
term analyses, documenting the history of over three decades of seed aid 
implementation as well as the diversity of contemporary practice.  Third, analysts have 
reviewed the national and regional policy environments in which seed aid has been 
shaped, and have compared policy guidance with what unfolds on the ground.  Hence 
this report on seed aid in Ethiopia aims to be a comprehensive one.   
 
The types of investigations conducted for the seed aid review fall into six major types.     
These are introduced in Table 1 below, with short notes on the scope and methods used 
in each. Greater detail appears in subsequent sections, where findings associated with 
each thrust are presented.       
 
Table 1  Investigative thrusts used in analysis of long-term seed aid in Ethiopia  
Type of Investigation Commentary 
 
Seed Aid Policy Analyses Review of major policy documents related to 
emergency  relief, seed policy  and agricultural 
development  (laws, proclamations, secondary 
materials) 
 
Interviews at national and regional levels, with:  
• seed sector officials 
• emergency agency professionals 
• academics/policy research NGOs 
• donors 
• humanitarian practitioners 
 
Documentary Review of Seed Aid Practice Review of project reports spanning 35+ years 
Consultation of MoARD data bases 
Governmental and Non-Governmental 
Organization (NGO) Implementers  
 
 
Interviews in both Addis Ababa and four major 
regions. Consultation of project and program 
records  
 
Gov’t focus: zonal and woreda: emergency, 
agricultural and food security officials 
 
NGO:  15+ detailed  intra-program analyses 
 
Seed Suppliers Interviews  (formal sector 
and local seed/grain traders interviews , 
including market analysis) 
Interviews along the full seed chain in two sites: 
Gera Keya and West Hararghe.  Includes: farmer 
producers, collectors, retailers, medium level and 
large traders 
Farmers Seed Aid Recipients  
 
Interviews and Focus Groups 
400  interviews conducted in four major 
regions:Amhara, Oromiya, SNNPR and Tigray 
 
Focus Groups Discussions at each prime woreda 
site 
 
Secondary Information collection MoARD, DPPA  records, seed system literature, 
Ethiopia agriculture research reports 
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Site Choice  
For in-the-field analyses (of seed suppliers, aid implementers, farmer aid recipients), 
several sites were selected for more intensive inquiry. These were selected by the 
research team, in close consultation with experts in the Ethiopian Agricultural 
Research Institute (EIAR) and regional Agricultural Research Institutes, major aid 
implementers, as well as food security and aid experts in the regional Bureaux of 
Agriculture and the DPPA.   
 
To ensure for valid cross-site comparisons, but also to promote opportunities for 
extrapolation of findings, regions and specific woredas (districts) were chosen along 
the following criteria. 
 
o locales had to be sites of  repeated seed aid  (over long-term,  with frequency) 
o locales had to be afflicted by different types of stresses (drought, civil conflict, 
frost,  green famine) 
o locales had to embrace multiple aid implementers (so as to compare/contrast 
approaches in one site) 
o there had to be solid body of secondary information – so that the regional and 
systems were well documented  (farming systems, socio-economics, 
livelihoods) 
o there had to a strong local commitment to examining seed aid openly 
o the sites, as a whole, had to represent distinct farming systems 
o the sites, as a whole, had to represent different regional administrations 
 
 
At the first stages of selection West Hararghe (Oromiya), Wolaita (SNNPR), North 
Shoa (Amhara), and the South Zone of Tigray were identified as valuable zones for 
gathering detailed information.  The entire research team then traveled to each zone to 
hold formal launch meetings with key government and Non Governmental 
Organization (NGO) officials, and to hone in on the choice of woredas for intensive 
follow up. After local consultation, the following woredas were selected as the final 
field sites. 
 
• Miesso and Chiro woredas in West Hararghe (Oromiya) 
• Raya Azebo woreda in Southern Tigray (Tigray) 
• Humbo woreda in Wolaita (SNNPR) 
• Gera Keya woreda in North Shoa (Amhara) 
 
The first two of these sites represent ‘classic’ seed aid scenarios, where chronic 
drought stress has led to low crop production and repeated emergency aid.  The latter 
two sites have also received repeated aid, though their primary stresses are different 
(high population density and land degradation).  A wide range of crops have been 
distributed across these sites by the government and different NGOs, using diverse 
approaches – Direct Seed Distribution (DSD), seed vouchers, and cash for seed.  
 
 
Figure 1 shows the location of the sites of investigation.  Brief descriptive characters 
for each site appear in Table 2. 
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Figure 1  Map of Ethiopia showing location of research sites for farmer surveys and 
intensive study of seed aid (▲): 1 – Miesso and Chiro, West Hararghe (Oromiya); 2 – 
Raya Azebo, South Tigray; 3 – Humbo, Wolaita (SNNPR); 4 – Gera Keya, North Shoa 
(Amhara). 
 
Table 2  Salient characteristics of sites chosen for intensive seed aid analysis   
Amhara Region: Gera Keya 
 
• Land degradation, frost, hail, 
waterlogging, some drought 
• Seed aid  since at least 1985 
• Barley, wheat and beans 
• Implementers: GoE, FAO, World Vision 
Ethiopia (WVE) 
• Only DSD 
Oromiya Region: West Hararghe  
(Chiro and Miesso) 
• Moisture stress/drought 
• Seed aid at least since 1984 
• Sorghum, maize + haricot bean main crops 
• Many implementers:  BoARD/DPPA; 
CARE, International Rescue Committee, 
Hararghe Catholic Secretariat, Ethiopian 
Red Cross Society (ERCS), GOAL 
• DSD, vouchers, seed vouchers and fairs 
SNNPR: Wolaita- Humbo 
 
• ‘Green famine’ small land size, drought 
• Seed aid at least since early 1990’s 
• Maize, beans, sweet potatoes, enset 
• Implementers: WVE,  International 
Medical Corps, Concern, Christian Relief 
and Development Association (CRDA) 
• DSD, Seed Vouchers and Fairs. 
Tigray: Raya Azebo 
 
• Moisture stress/drought 
• Seed aid since mid-1980s 
• Teff, chickpea, maize. 
• Implementers: BoARD, REST 
• DSD, cash for seed (revolving fund) 
 
3
1
4
100 0 
2 
200 km 
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The Structure of the Report 
This report is divided into eight major sections.  After this introduction, Chapter II 
presents some of the basic introductory concepts needed to understand the elements of  
seed security, and gives an overview of the kinds of approaches used to date to address 
possible security constraints.  Chapters III and IV give overviews of seed aid in the 
Ethiopian context: chapter III focuses on the history of seed aid and gives a more 
global analysis of how emergency seed problems have been conceived and requests 
triggered.  Chapter IV describes the policy environment shaping seed aid to-date,  
drawing elements from emergency, seed  and developmental policies and programs.  
Chapters V, VI and VII, then shift to implementation concerns and what happens on 
the ground.  They describe the processes of seed aid practice and some of the effects of 
such practice on farmers’ crops , seed acquisition and seed security strategies. Chapter 
V and VI  specifically look at the ‘supply side of aid ’:  what the governmental and 
non-governmental agencies have to share, as well drawing on the insights of local 
seed/grain traders who are key seed suppliers and supporters of local seed systems in 
normal and stress periods.  The last substantive chapter, VII, turns to the purported 
beneficiaries, or the ‘demand side of seed aid’ The views and practices of farmer seed-
aid recipients figure prominently.  The final chapter, VIII, summarizes the main 
conclusions and broad recommendations for moving forward. In addition, more 
detailed summaries as well as more specific recommendations appear at the end of 
each individual chapter.   
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II: BACKGROUND TOOLS: SEED SECURITY AND 
SEED AID RESPONSE 
Before addressing seed aid and seed security issues specific to Ethiopia, this section 
presents select key concepts and background material necessary for interpreting the 
analysis.  The concept of seed security is introduced in some detail and the types of  
seed aid approaches used to support such security are then presented.1 
The Concept of Seed Security 
Farm families are seed secure when they have access to seed (and planting material) of 
adequate quantity, acceptable quality and in time for planting. Seed security is best 
framed within the broader context of food and livelihood security. Helping farmers to 
obtain the planting materials they need will enable them to produce for their own 
consumption as well as for sale. 
 
Achieving seed security is quite different from attaining food security, despite their 
obvious links. One can have enough seed to sow a plot but lack sufficient food to eat, 
for example during the ‘hungry season’ prior to harvest. Conversely, a household can 
have adequate food but lack access to appropriate seed for planting. Despite these 
important differences between food security and seed security, determinations of seed 
security are invariably based, implicitly or explicitly, on food security assessments. 
This results from a lack of appreciation and understanding of seed security issues. 
 
The concept of seed security (and its inverse, insecurity) is often nuanced by two broad 
sets of parameters: duration (are the problems short or longer-term?) and the different 
features needed to ensure security (if there are concerns, what types of diverse 
problems might farmers encounter?).  These are discussed below.  
 
Distinguishing Acute from Chronic Seed Insecurity 
Seed security concerns can be short-term, that is ‘acute’ or longer-term and longer-
lasting, that is ‘chronic’. 
Acute Seed Insecurity 
Acute seed insecurity is brought on by distinct, short-duration events that often affect a 
broad range of the population. It can be spurred by the failure to plant in a single 
season, dramatic loss of a harvest, or by high levels of infestation of seed stocks. While 
during normal times households may variously be identified as seed secure, semi-
secure, or always seed-short, during an acute event such as a flood or short civil 
disturbance all households may be affected.  Those farmers who recover quickly, with 
or without one-off seed-related assistance, are often those who have suffered only 
acute stress.  Acute food stress (and the need for food aid) is not necessarily followed 
                                                 
1
 This section draws directly from L. Sperling, H.D. Cooper and T. Remington,  (forthcoming, 2008) 
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by seed stress (and the potential need for some form of seed aid).  Seed systems can be 
very resilient, and, for some crops (e.g. sorghum), farmers’ require only small amounts 
of seed. 
Chronic Seed Insecurity 
Chronic seed insecurity is independent of acute stress or disaster, although it may be 
exacerbated by it. Chronic seed insecurity may be found among populations who have 
been marginalized in different ways – e.g. economically (poor, little land, little labor); 
ecologically (with degraded land); or politically (in insecure areas, or on land with 
uncertain tenure arrangements). Populations that suffer chronic seed insecurity may be 
continually short of adequate seed to plant; may have difficulties in acquiring seed off 
farm due to lack of funds; or may routinely use seed of low quality or unwanted 
varieties. Such households experience built-in vulnerability to seed system calamities.  
Reflections on the relationship between acute & chronic insecurity  
Acute and chronic seed insecurity will very often exist together during an emergency. 
Indeed, in cases where emergencies are recurrent events, for example in drought-prone 
areas, acute situations are nearly always superimposed on chronic problems that are 
rooted in poverty. 
 
 
Distinguishing the Dimensions of Seed Security: a Framework  
The concept of seed security per se embodies several fundamental aspects.  
Differentiating among these is crucial to promote those features that foster seed 
security as well as to anticipate the ways in which such security might be threatened.  
 
The Seed Security Framework (Table 3) outlines the fundamental elements of seed 
security: seed has to be available, farmers need to be able to access it, and the seed 
quality must be sufficient to promote healthy seed system functioning.  
 
Table 3  Seed Security Framework: Basic Elements 
Parameter Seed Security 
Availability Sufficient quantity of seed of adapted crops are within reasonable 
proximity (spatial availability), and in time for critical sowing periods 
(temporal availability). 
Access People have adequate income or other resources to purchase or barter for 
appropriate seeds  
Quality Seed is of acceptable quality and of desired varieties (seed health, 
physiological quality, and variety integrity) 
source: Remington et al.(2002) 
 
Availability is defined narrowly as whether sufficient quantity of seed of target crops is 
present within reasonable proximity (spatial availability) and in time for critical 
sowing periods (temporal availability). It is essentially a geographically-based 
parameter, and so is independent of the socio-economic status of farmers. 
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Seed access is a parameter specific to farmers or communities. It largely depends upon 
the assets of the farmer or household in question: whether they have the cash (financial 
capital) or social networks (social capital) to purchase or barter for seed.  
 
Seed quality includes two broad aspects: seed quality per se, and variety quality. Seed 
quality consists of physical, physiological and sanitary attributes (such as the 
germination rate, and the absence or presence of disease, stones, sand, broken seed or 
weeds). Variety quality consists of genetic attributes, such as plant type, duration of 
growth cycle, seed color and shape, palatability and so on. 
 
In using the framework, it is important to emphasize that the distinction between 
availability and access is dependent on scale. At some level, if one is willing to pay 
enough to transport seed from far enough away, potential seed is always available. 
Likewise, the concepts of availability and quality are interrelated. If sowing material is 
available which will mature to harvest, but which is of low quality or of unwanted 
crops or varieties, one might identify the security constraint as a seed quality problem, 
but one could also question whether appropriate ‘seed’  is available at all. 
 
More Refined Analyses Leading to More Targeted Responses  
Using the two aspects of seed security outlined above, Table 4 gives examples of more 
targeted responses to seed insecurity.  So, for example, if ’seed availability’ is assessed 
as the problem, seed-based interventions, such as seed importation (for acute shocks) 
or development of community-based seed production enterprises (for chronic stress), 
may be appropriate.  In contrast, a diagnosis of a problem of ‘seed access’ might 
wisely trigger a more holistic analysis of livelihood strategies.  In the acute phase, 
providing farmers with cash or vouchers to get their desired seed might be the best 
response to address problems of access. However, an identification of access problems 
on a chronic basis should lead practitioners to look well beyond seed and seed security 
constraints. The inability to access a certain necessary good on a repeated basis is 
usually equated with problems of basic poverty. Initiatives to help farmers generate 
income and strengthen their livelihood base would be essential here.  
 
Table 4  Seed System Problems and Broadly Appropriate Responses 
Parameter of the 
problem 
Acute (short-term ) Chronic (longer-term ) 
Unavailability of seed Direct distribution of seed 
(possibly for sale) 
Support development of seed 
production, incl. commercial 
enterprise, where viable 
Poor and vulnerable farmers do 
not have access to seed 
Cash or voucher disbursement 
 
Seed fairs with vouchers or cash 
  
Poverty-reduction programs: e.g. 
support development of 
Income-generating activities 
Agro-enterprises  
Current Major Response Options Being Used in Emergency 
Finally, as an introductory tool, this section sketches the types of seed-related 
interventions currently being implemented.  Such interventions  are distinguished 
between those which deliver direct forms of aid (and generally assume ‘a lack of 
available seed’) and those which are market-based and give recipients cash or vouchers 
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to procure seed themselves (and hence assume ‘lack of access’ as the driving need). 
Responses might also focus on seed quality issues, both varietal quality and seed 
quality per se (health, germination rates, and purity), although these tend to be medium 
or longer-term interventions (Table 5).  
 
 
Table 5  Typology of current seed system interventions 
 Description / Rationale Constraints to which they  
should be targeted 
Direct aid 
1. Direct Seed 
Distribution 
Emergency Seed 
Provision 
‘Seeds and tools’ 
Procurement of quality seed from outside 
the agro-ecological region, for delivery to 
farmers. The most widely used approach 
to seed relief.  
Short term response to address problems 
of seed availability especially in 
situations of total crop failure and/or 
long-term displacement of farmers.  
Response sometimes also used to 
introduce new crops + varieties that are 
usually supplied by the formal sector 
2. Local procurement 
and distribution of seed 
Procurement of quality seed from within 
the agro-ecological region, for delivery to 
farmers. A variant of 1. 
Short term response to address problems 
of seed access or highly localized 
problems of seed availability 
3. Food aid 
‘Seed aid protection 
ration’ 
Food aid is often supplied in emergency 
situations alongside seed aid so that the 
farming family does not need to consume 
the seed provided. Where local seed 
systems are functioning, but the previous 
harvest was poor, food aid can similarly 
protect farmers’ own seed stocks. 
Short term response accompanying direct 
seed distribution to address problems of 
seed availability  
 
Market-based aid approaches 
4. Vouchers / Cash to 
farmers 
Vouchers or cash can provide poorer 
farmers with the means to access seed 
where it is available, from local markets, 
or the commercial sector. Vouchers or 
cash enables farmers to access crops and 
varieties of their choice.  
Short term response to address problems 
of seed access especially in situations of 
local seed shortages and local markets or 
farmer-farmer barter normally used 
5. Seed Fairs Seed fairs provide an ad hoc market place 
to facilitate access to seeds, or specific 
crops and varieties, from other farmers, 
traders, and the formal sector. Usually 
used in conjunction with vouchers to 
provide poorer farmers with purchasing 
power. 
Short or medium term response to 
address problems of seed access 
especially for subsistence crops, and 
where local markets normally used 
Seed production and varietal development 
6. Seed Production 
Community-based, local 
seed production  
Farmers are trained and/or contracted to 
produce seed, distinct from their regular 
production activities, often based on 
formal seed standards. Some approaches 
focus on improving quality attributes, 
others are designed specifically to 
facilitate the movement of new ‘improved 
varieties into local systems; still others 
are conceived as basically income-
generating or profit-making enterprises.  
Medium or long term response to address 
problems of seed quality (of local 
materials) or, access or availability of 
new varieties. 
 
 
7. Provision or 
development of better 
varieties through small 
packets, participatory 
varietal selection, or 
participatory plant 
breeding 
Important where farmers need access to 
new genetic material. 
Medium or long term response to address 
problems of seed quality (genetic/ 
varietal attributes).  
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Important within the emergency seed assistance field is that for many years, Direct 
Seed Distribution (DSD – also known as “Seeds and Tools”) has dominated seed aid 
response.  Use of a DSD approach would imply that a lack of seed (non-availability) is 
the problem encountered on the ground. In practice, DSD approaches also often 
involve promotion of Modern Varieties as their central element.  Such a seed security 
response implies that ‘problems of seed quality’ have been identified. In brief, the 
main seed security response option, used worldwide, and as we shall see, also in 
Ethiopia, assumes that seed availability and seed quality are the key constraints in 
acute stress contexts. 
 
Voucher and cash approaches, linked to seed-related assistance, have been promoted 
mostly within the last five years (with the seed voucher approach having been first 
used in Kenya in 2000, and moving to Ethiopia shortly thereafter).   Both these forms 
of assistance tend to be based on the assumption that seed is available in a given 
context, and that farmers simply need enhanced means to buy it.   So, in theory, use of 
these latter approaches would imply that the aid implementers have diagnosed the seed 
security problem as being one of access one.  
 
One can continue down the Table 5 item by item and shortly realize that, in theory,  
each approach currently in use carries with it set of distinct assumptions of what  
specific seed security problem might be encountered (availability, access, seed/varietal 
quality) and whether this problem is  a short (acute) or long-term one.  In practice, we 
will see that these approaches are almost always used in absence of any real diagnosis 
of the seed security problem and are chosen for reasons delinked from on-the ground 
analysis.  For example, one implementer might always favor DSD (and know only 
how to conduct this); and another implementer might always prefer cash (as this 
coincides with his/her institutional philosophy).  This indiscriminate use of seed-
related responses is making the seed aid field much less effective than it can be:  
problems are not being solved, and unintended effects, such as dependencies, are being 
promoted. 
 
The main message of these background tools is two-fold.  First, effective seed aid 
response has to be linked to an understanding of seed security issues.  Second seed 
security issues cannot be directly inferred from food security frameworks and 
assessments. 
 
It is within this context of  a potentially broad number of supply-side options, and with 
the recognition that each could potentially respond to a well-defined set of seed 
security constraints,  that we turn to specific issues of seed aid in Ethiopia. 
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III: THE HISTORY OF SEED AID IN ETHIOPIA 
Overview 
Seed aid in Ethiopia has been delivered at least since 1974, that is, from the time when 
the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) was first established (Shimeles 
Adugna, pers. comm., 2006). Seed aid also seems to have been near continuous since 
1982.  As suggested by one World Food Program representative, from the mid-1980’s 
onward, food insecurity in Ethiopia has been assumed, with “five to six million people 
chronically food insecure ….no matter what happens” (Shaver, 2004). With food 
insecurity, the need for seed has been routinely also been taken as a given.   
 
Table 6 gives a long-term snapshot of seed aid delivery, taking examples from the  
centralized records (found in Addis Ababa) which present country-wide overviews.  
Remarkable is the large range of crops delivered via seed aid, (for example, chickpea, 
lentil, horsebeans, sorghum, teff, barley, peas, haricot beans) suggesting that crop 
choice is somewhat tailored to agro-ecological zone.  Early records also show seed for 
aid variously being sourced from local markets, private traders, the Agricultural 
Marketing Corporation (AMC), as well as from the Ethiopian Seed Corporation (now 
Ethiopian Seed Enterprise - ESE).  Unlike in many other Africa countries, seed aid in 
Ethiopia is not uniquely tied to the Ethiopian seed industry, although some 
implementers do often prefer to promote modern varieties and commercial seed via aid 
relief (for example, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations - 
FAO).  The aid situation in Ethiopia, where there is a partial de-linking of aid away 
from the seed industry, means that there is potential to source a diversity of crops to 
meet regional needs, and also to seek out locally adapted varieties of these crops.  
Hence seed aid in Ethiopia includes farmer varieties, modern varieties released within 
Ethiopia, as well as occasional cases of modern variety importation, for such crops as 
vegetable seed, Irish Potato and hybrid maize (See also Chapter V, on implementation 
programs.)   
 
The formal sector, ESE, does provide some stocks for emergency use.  For example, in 
for the period July 2003 to July 2004, “Relief Serving Organizations” purchased 
26,107.26 quintals of ESE’s total 208,670 quintals of production, or 12.5% of its total 
seed stocks (Ali Adam, pers. comm., 2004).  However, ESE professionals suggest that 
even within the last five years, as Ethiopian policy pushes for agricultural 
intensification, the volume of such formal seed sector purchases for seed aid has been 
declining (ESE, communication Sept 14, 2005).  By its own accounts, ESE does not 
maintain stocks of the drought-tolerant, short-cycle varieties that are often sought by 
NGOs working particularly in emergency operations in drought-prone zones.  Further, 
both ESE and select NGOs report that donors are often reluctant to distribute varieties 
that demand inputs as part of emergency response, and in some cases, donors prohibit 
the distribution of specialized crops such as hybrid maize, altogether.  As ESE tends to 
specialize in wheat and maize, and promotes varieties primarily for the better potential 
regions, its role as a seed supplier for acute stress areas inherently remains limited. 
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Table 6  Seed Aid in Ethiopia:  Summary 1974 to present 
 
Year 
 
 
Type of Assistance 
 
Region 
 
Crop 
 
Total Amount 
 
Organization 
 
Source of Information 
(most reports available in UN-EUE library, Addis 
Ababa) 
 
1974 
 
 
   
DSD  (with Oxen) 
 
Tigray and Wollo 
 
 
not specified 
 
n/a 
 
Tiers Fund 
 
Shimeles Adugna,  first head of the Relief and 
Rehabilitation Commission-  First year RRC was 
established,- seed aid given 
1983-1984 
 
 DSD  (maybe with 
fertilizer inputs) 
 
 
Wollo and parts of 
south and 
southwest 
not specified  “agricultural 
inputs for 50,000 
[farmers]” 
 
(This is a request: 
not clear if  it was 
implemented) 
FAO/WFP special task force Special Task force Document: FAO/WFP 
“Exceptional International Assistance Required in Food 
Supplies, Agriculture and Animal Husbandry for African 
Countries in 1983/4.  Situation Report No. 2” 
 
 
 
1985-86 
 
 
seed and tools 
 
‘seed swap’ whereby 
17765 MT of US 
wheat sold to AMC to 
purchase  local seeds 
available in country 
 
‘food for seed’ 
programs 
 
Agricultural packages 
 
 
 
 
countrywide crop not 
specified—but 
swap relief food 
for local grain, to 
be then used as 
seed 
 
Some seed 
bought from 
AMC   (teff)  
and Ethiopian 
Seed Corporation 
(which provided 
wheat and maize) 
 
CARE- dist. 
maize and 
sorghum seed in 
Hararghe- 
 
haricot and 
chickpeas 
sourced from 
private traders 
 
Sorghum from 
local markets 
 
in 1986 some 
33,000 MT of 
seed given to 
drought victims 
among with 1.3 
million hand tools 
and 19,000 draft 
oxen 
 
 
Seed given could 
cover 10-15% 
national 
requirement, 
 
More than $US 
43 million spent 
in Agricultural 
Recovery 
 
 
RRC distributed food 
 
US and CRDA NGOs-  
(Christian Relief and 
Development Organization)  
 
also operating were : 
Ethiopian Red Cross (ERCS) 
League of Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies 
(LICROSS)  
 
International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC)  
 
World Vision International 
report:  The Ethiopian Drought/Famine Fiscal Years 1985 
and 1986 
 
By the staff of the USAID Office Americin Embassy, 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.  Mimeo 94 pages 
 
USAID written report, , but with  broad country overview 
 
 US statistics plus , individual  NGO statistics 
 
 
 
report: Provisional Summary of Emergency Contributions 
Received in 1986.  Ethiopia  (Un-EUE document 1630.73) 
 
Donors for Agricultural Inputs: 
USAID,  AEA Canada,  Band Aid,  UK, France, CRDA,   
EEC, IFAD, Ireland, CRS, Oxfam UK, Sweden, China, 
CIDA, Menschen, 
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Year 
 
 
Type of Assistance 
 
Region 
 
Crop 
 
Total Amount 
 
Organization 
 
Source of Information 
 
 
1986 
 
 
DSD 
 
 
Wollo 
 
also: 
Hararghe, Tigray, 
Eritrea 
included:.   
maize 
sorghum 
teff 
barley 
wheat 
haricot bean 
chickpea 
lentil 
sesame 
Horse beans 
 
some seed from ESC (wheat) 
some food-for-seed swaps 
some purchase on market 
 
(as above,  33,000 MT seed) 
 
 
RRC 
 
CRDA 
 
Oxfam 
 
SCF 
Ministry of Agriculture/ UN Office for Emergency 
Operations in Ethiopia:  Seed Coordination Meetings-   
1986: comments 
 
Knowledge of ‘suitable seed to  specific areas should be 
gathered at central place (ESC/MOA)’ 
 
Assessment of how much seed should be done through 
RRC early warning figures 
 
but,  type of seed- should be advised  through ECS/MOA 
 
there should be trials and multiplication of  drought 
resistant varieties 
 
Scheduled a field evaluation 1986:  several cases of 
unsuitable varieties and many cases of seed being 
distributed late.  
1985-89 
 
(CRDA 
reports) 
 
(also data 
1990, 1991 
appended) 
Seed and Tools  
country wide 
 
 
 
CRDA 
 
1985   99,655 tools and 6,000 MT seed (crop not specified) 
 
1986 16,700 metric tons of seed,  437514 tools  in 12 of  Ethiopia’s  14 
adminisitrative regions- esp. Wollo 
 
1987  67,531 quintals of seed distributed to 28 implementing agencies in 
12 of Ethiopia’s 14 administrative regions 
 
In order of importance,  seed given of:  wheat, chickpea, sorghum and 
teff then maize, barley, peas, haricot beans, lentils and horse beans plus 
169,690 hand tools 
 
1988 130,134 quintals  seed  (9085 during the Belg ) and 121, 049 
quintals  of 17 varieties of seed during the Meher  plus 339,131 pieces. 
of 10 different types of tools—to drought-affected farmers in 11 
administrative regions 
 
1989  33,438 quintals of 15 types of seed  and 192,594 pieces of 12 
different tools.  distributed in all administrative regions but Tigray 
 
1990  18,028 quintals of seed 
          96,055 pieces of tools 
 
1991   12,813.50 quintals of seed 
report: “5-year review of CRDA General rehab program 
1985-1989  (year 1990)” 
 
CRDA assisting with Logistics  as MOA “do not have 
the capacity to purchase, transport and co-ordinate the 
distribution of  agricultural inputs in a timely manner” 
 
1988- some evaluation  of seed aid given: 
gave 15 kg per beneficiary – met 63% of needs, 
 
CRDA coordinates the General Rehabilitation 
Programme (GRP): includes 29 member churches and 
agencies 
 
Expernditure: Agricultural Rehbilitation: CRDA 
 
Year       Million Birr 
1985         5,965,710 
1986       17,193,560 
1987         8,487,947 
1988        15,504,648 
1989          4,669,916 
Total       51,821,781           
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Year 
 
 
 
Region 
 
Type of 
Assistance 
 
Crop/  Total Amount 
 
Organization 
 
Source of Information 
1987 
 
 
 
“Peasant Sector” 
 
Shewa 
Sidamo 
Welo 
Gamo Gofa 
Hererge 
Keffa 
Illubabor 
Wellega 
 
 
 
“Settlements” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DSD 
 
(developmental 
aid?) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Peasant Sector”: tons 
 
Teff               2.2      
Maize          40.1 
Sorghum        0.7 
Wheat          75.5 
Peas               0.2 
Haricot bean  0.2. 
Chickpea       2 .2 
________________ 
Total          121.1 
 
 
“Settlements”: Tons 
 
Maize           12.5 
Sorghum         3.8 
Wheat           17.6 
Peas                1.4 
Haricot bean   0.5 
_______________ 
Total              35.8 
 
FAO Crop Assessment Mission Report Ethiopia (Nov-
Dec 1988).  Rome Dec 1988. 18pp + Annexes 
 
Seed Sourced from Agricultural Inputs Supply Co. 
(ALSCO) 
 
Crops focused on Maize and Wheat.  This is likely 
developmental aid. 
1988 
 
 
 
“Peasant Sector” 
 
Shewa 
Sidamo 
Welo 
Gamo Gofa 
Hererge 
Keffa 
Illubabor 
Wellega 
 
 
 
“Settlements” 
 
DSD 
 
(developmental 
aid?) 
 
“Peasant Sector”: tons 
 
Maize            8.8 
Sorghum        0.1 
Wheat          30.4 
________________ 
Total            39.3 
 
“Settlements”: Tons 
 
Maize             3.6 
Sorghum         2.4 
Haricot bean   0.9 
Soyabean        0.3 
_______________ 
Total              7.2 
 
FAO Crop Assessment Mission Report Ethiopia (Nov-
Dec 1988).  Rome Dec 1988. 18pp + Annexes 
 
Seed Sourced from Agricultural Inputs Supply Co. 
(ALSCO) 
 
 
Crops focused on Maize and Wheat.  This is likely 
developmental aid. 
 
 
 
1992 
 
 
 
DSD 
 
(especially in Tigray 
and Wollo) 
  
5,870  MT 
response to FAO’s 1992 Emergency 
Appeal 
 
FAO-OSRO  
 
 
United Nations 1993 Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal: 
Ethiopia 
 
January 1993: Special Emergency Programme for the 
Horn of Africa (SEPHA) 
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Year 
 
 
Type of Assistance 
 
Region 
 
Crop 
 
Total Amount 
 
Organization 
 
Source of Information 
1993 
 
 
DSD 
 
“provision of seeds” 
for: 
Tigray, MNetekel 
Wello, Arsi, 
Hararghe 
North Shewa, 
Sidamo, Wellega, 
Illubabor, Keffa, 
Assosa, Gambella 
Imported 
seeds: 
emphasis  on 
hybrid maize 
and sorghum 
to be supplied 
by state farms 
 
Also :  import 
request for 
high-quality 
vegetable 
seeds, and high 
yielding Irish 
Potato 
varieties 
 
Local  
purchases:  
barley, teff,  
pulses and 
oilseeds- from 
other regions: 
Gojjam, 
Sidamo and 
Wollega 
 
 
$19,341,000 funds 
requested by FAO 
 
January-June 1993 
 United Nations 1993 Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal: 
Ethiopia 
 
January 1993: Special Emergency Programme for the 
Horn of Africa (SEPHA) 
 
This was an appeal--  it is not clear how much was 
eventually supplied 
 
 
1993/4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DSD “drought-affected 
areas” 
(not clear 
which crops)  
but included: 
the distribution 
of improved 
varieties that 
are no longer 
resistant or 
prevalent 
diseases (e.g. 
Enkoy and 
Dashen Wheat 
varieties) 
 
and grain of 
local landraces 
used as ‘seed’ 
26,000 MT of ‘Seed’  
(quotations in doc) 
MOA, although FAO-
OSRO contributed 6,050 
MT or 23% 
Project Proposal for the establishment of national seed 
reserve 
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Year Type of Assistance Region 
 
 
Crop Total Amount Organization Source of Information 
 
1995 
 
 countrywide  
(with only root 
crops given in 
regions 2 and 5) 
 emergency 
REQUEST 
 
13,127 MT seeds and 
40, 978 MT of 
fertilizer  
 
includes also training 
on root crops 
propagation and 
production 
 
 
Also, for West 
Hararghe, for those 
displaced by ethnic 
conflict, who are 
returning:  165.5 MT 
seed and 2814 sets of 
hand tools 
 
Relief and Rehabilitation 
Commission 
The Relief and Rehabilitation Commission:  16 Dec 
1994:  Relief and Rehabilitation requirement Assistance 
for 1995 
 
 
 
1995 
Main season 
CARE- Chiro 
 
DSD 
 
 
 
 
 
DSD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
East Shewa:   East 
and West Haraghe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Miesso 
Short-cycle maize, sorghum and haricot 
bean—on loan basis. 
 
  
 
MOA: 5.4 MTt short-maturing seeds 
(not specificed ).5 mt of pesticide 
(sevin) on loan basis 
 
CARE: 7.5 MT maize, 17.8 MT 
sorghum 
 
3 MT haricot bean improved seeds 
CARE Final crop assessment : 1995 East Shewa, East and West 
Hararghe 
 
CARE Ethiopia’s Food Information Systems 
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Year 
 
 
Type of 
Assistance 
 
Region 
 
Crop 
 
Total Amount 
 
Organization 
 
Source of Information 
 
2001 
 
 
Seed and Tools 
for: 
 
Amhara 
Tigray 
Oromiya 
SNNPR 
Afar 
Somali 
 
For Amhara: 
wheat 
barley 
Irish Potato 
vegetable seed 
 
 
For Tigray: 
wheat 
barley 
Irish Potato 
vegetable seed 
 
For Oromiya: 
maize, barely, 
haricot beans, 
vegetable seed, 
sweet potato 
cuttings 
 
amount requested: 
 
$US 4,217,000. 
 
 
 
FAO 
 
 
report:  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations: November 2000.  Special Relief Operations 
Service: TCOR 
 
Ethiopia January-Dec 2001.  “Agricultural and Livestock 
Relief and Rehabilitation Requirements for the Drought-
affected Populations of Ethiopia 
 
 
 
see also:  report (anon): Non-food Aid Humanitrian 
Requriements for 2001.  (UN-EUE document 162-180). 
 
 
 
2002 
 
 
 
DSD 
 
countrywide 
assessment of seed 
need--  
 
sweet potatoes 
and vegetable  
seeds 
 
$2,349,888 
(requested) 
 
GoE 
+ FAO 
 
(via UN Office for the 
Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs) 
UN Strategy Paper, Ethiopia November 2002 
2003-4   Emergency seed 
appeal   
$  US  6,117,490 
 
2004-5   Emergency seed 
appeal    
$  US   9,149,565 
 
2006   Emergency seed 
appeal:   
$  US  4,866,466 
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Numeric Trends in Seed Aid 
It is difficult to calculate the magnitude of emergency seed aid in Ethiopia and assess if 
absolute volumes are increasing or decreasing.  What is certain is that seed aid has 
been near- constantly delivered for 34 years and, that the number of implementers has 
augmented particularly within the last five years, as both agricultural and non-
agricultural NGOs regularly implement aid, in addition to the GoE’s own  emergency 
seed programs. The difficulty in making absolute seed calculations is three fold. 
Fragmented delivery documentation  
First, documentation is relatively scarce.  The library of the United Nations Emergency 
Unit in Ethiopia (UN-EUE) contains some important early accounts of seed aid 
delivery as do the headquarters and regional offices of NGO implementers. The 
CRDA, for instance, had particularly thorough  records.  Government records, whether 
from Federal or from Regional offices (e.g. Ministry of Agriculture, zonal Bureau of 
Agricultural Development), tend to be fragmented, and mostly are available only for 
the last five years.  Seed aid records are retained only for short periods.  Finally, 
different implementers do not always coordinate information sharing.  Government 
and NGO records are not always amalgamated, even in the same decentralized zone.    
Under reporting of seed-specific aid  
Seed delivery is often lumped together in ‘general relief supplies’ or with the 
heterogeneous group labeled Non-Food Items (NFI: tools, oxen, fertilizers, pesticides, 
etc): hence it is not itemized specifically.  Seed may also be given as an adjunct to food 
aid shipments, and not be reported separately. 
Failure to distinguish emergency from non-emergency seed aid 
The most important reason for not being able to isolate emergency seed aid trends is a 
conceptual one, and has important implications for shaping practical seed aid 
interventions.  Emergency seed aid delivery is usually not distinguished from two 
other types of seed-related aid: seed assistance given for chronic stress areas (now 
included as part of the Ethiopian safety net programs) and seed assistance given within 
a larger cadre of developmental assistance.  This is discussed directly below. 
 
What is certain is that the money involved in seed aid operations is impressive.  For 
the three-year period 2003-2005, government emergency appeals requested an average 
of $US 8,078,791 per year, with $4,866,466 being requested in 2006, a period after 
good harvests 2  (Lautze, 2006).  These government appeals are in addition to the 
substantial funds directly accessed by NGOs. A conservative calculation (including 
Government and NGO seed aid deliveries) would suggest at least $US 15,000,000 per 
year over the last 34 years, including in such extreme drought-affected years as 1986, 
when at least $43,000,000 in agricultural recovery (mostly seed) was distributed in 
rural areas.  With a total cross-year figure of $US 510,000,000 in emergency seed 
(about  ETB 4,650,000,000 Birr), one would expect to see marked changes in rural 
agricultural productivity, due to seed aid emergency assistance  
                                                 
2
 Seed was being requested for select flood/conflict affected regions (Amare Mengistu, pers. comm., 
2007)  
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Broad Types of Seed Aid Given 
Three broad categories of seed aid are given in Ethiopia.  Seed is given for emergency 
response, for developmental reasons, and often as a component of poverty or chronic –
stress alleviation programs.  While this report distinguishes them conceptually, these 
three broad types are mixed together during periods of implementation, lacking clear 
definition of goals, strategy or priority content.  Table 7 loosely summarizes what 
might be found within each type of seed aid category.  Comments on each are 
presented below. 
 
Table 7  Broad types of seed-related assistance given in Ethiopia 
Emergency Seed Aid 
 
• Direct Seed Distribution (DSD) 
• Revolving Seed Funds 
• Seed Vouchers (SV,  also sometimes called ‘coupons’)  
• Seed and Fairs  (SV+F,  also sometimes linked to Livelihood Fairs) 
• Seed Swaps  (grain for seed, which is then redistributed) 
• Cash for Seed  (in relief context) 
 
Development Seed Programs 
 
• Agricultural packages:  seed and fertilizer  (for repayment) 
• Modern varieties alone  (for free or repayment) 
 
Special Seed Assistance for Chronically-Stressed   
(within safety net other poverty alleviation programs) 
  
• Seed given in food security-related programs 
• Seed given in HIV/AIDS  victim support programs (instead of food aid) 
 
 
Emergency seed aid  
Emergency seed aid in Ethiopia embraces a varied set of approaches (Table 7).  There 
is no evidence that the use of these approaches is linked to specific seed security 
problems per se.  Rather, choice of use each approach seems to be most closely linked 
to the a) institutional philosophy of the implementer; b) donor guidance or stipulations 
and; c) capacity to implement any one type of response (see chapter V)3.   
 
Developmental Seed Aid  
The content of developmental seed aid in Ethiopia has been well documented 
elsewhere (Howard et al., 2003, and see Chapter IV).  The government has long been 
promoting modern varieties, and use of certified seed, often along with fertilizer and 
                                                 
3
 Chapter IV of this report, “Implementation on the ground: The supply side: insights from GO/NGO 
seed aid givers” summarizes perceived strengths and weaknesses of each seed aid option. 
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pesticide complements. Such ‘package programs’ have been designed for the better-off 
contexts but are also often been implemented in high stress regions. 
 
An unusual finding from an emergency seed aid perspective is the degree to which 
developmental needs shape the content of what is requested in emergency programs.  
Within the course of fieldwork, there was substantial evidence that local-level officials  
are using emergency requests as the prime vehicle for helping farming constituencies 
get access to modern (or research-derived) varieties (Chapter V).  Because formal 
extension and the formal seed sector do not serve the marginal areas on a routine basis,   
‘emergencies’ prove the stop-gap measure through which poor or geographically 
distant populations get access to public research sector development products.  
Certainly, there should more cost-effective and targeted ways of distributing modern 
varieties than blanket seed aid distributions during times of  high stress. 
 
Seed Aid as component of chronic stress-poverty alleviation programs 
(including safety net programs) 
Finally, the least defined of the broad types of seed aid is that associated with poverty 
alleviation programs.  Seed is a common component in safety net programs, in general 
food-security-related programs, and even in those associated with HIV/AIDS victim 
support.  Yet, despite that these programs are often focused on the most vulnerable 
populations, and often in regions of marginal productivity, the seed aid strategy is 
neither explicit, nor tailored, nor consistent (nor well documented), as how best to 
reach some of the ‘hardest to support.’     
 
In brief, after multiple interviews with implementers at many levels, it appears that the 
seed aid strategy for chronic stress contexts is pretty much a ‘black box’.  
Implementers can recite well the food package involved, but when it comes to seed, 
the delivery content changes by site and is rarely articulated.  In fact, in multiple cases, 
officials were unclear if seed aid was or was not a component of the safety net program 
implementation in their own sites. 
 
This vague thinking associated with a vital seed input (which has effects for seasons to 
come) is odd, given the extent of implementation.  A compelling analysis of a recent 
GoE emergency seed appeal  shows that about ¾ of the woredas requesting seed 
assistance are indeed those targeted  for safety net interventions (143 out of the total of 
203 woredas seeking assistance; Table 8) (Lautze, 2006).  Hence it is much more 
common for seed aid to be given within safety net zones than within non safety net 
zones.  Further, of the 203 woredas seeking emergency aid assistance in 2006, only 29 
(14%) did not seek assistance in 2003, 2004, or 2005 (Lautze, 2006).  The problems 
being faced are clearly chronic ones-- and the seed aid assistance strategy adopted 
should be tailored to the specific needs of this chronic stress context. 
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Table 8  2006 Emergency seed appeal, by Safety Net and Non-Safety Net Woredas 
Woredas needing seed assistance 
Region  Total 
Safety Net 
(PSNP) 
Woredas 
Non Safety 
Net 
Woredas 
Total 
Safety Net 
Woredas 
Safety Net 
Woredas 
requesting 
seeds (%) 
Tigray 28 24 4 30 80% 
Gambella 6 n/a* 6 n/a n/a 
Oromiya 53 43 10 51 84% 
Amhara 56 52 4 53 98% 
Dire Dawa 1 1 0 1 100% 
Afar 3 n/a 3 n/a n/a 
Somali 24 n/a 24 n/a n/a 
SNNPR 24 23 1 57 40% 
Benishangul 
Gumuz 8 n/a 8 n/a n/a 
Harari 0 0 0 1 0 
Total 203 143 60 193 74% 
Source, Lautze (2006)  (*- Safety Net program not operating in some regions) 
 
Seed Needs Assessment at the National Level: 
The Inadequacy of ‘Harvest Declines’ 
In this last section, we move from the supply side of seed aid (what is delivered and 
implemented) to looking at how the demand for seed aid for the ‘needs’ is assessed.  
 
This theme of needs assessment (also linked to ‘diagnosis’ of the seed security 
concerns) is a key one, and will be addressed in several sections of the report.  Here, 
we investigate the overview frameworks which are used in making seed need 
determinations.  In Chapter V (GO/NO implementers) and Chapter VI (seed/grain 
traders), we examine the processes by which calculations are more precisely made in 
practice, tracing seed needs calculations from the woreda level up. 
 
 Seed Needs Assessments:  general methods (or lack thereof) 
Seed security assessments, worldwide, are rarely given explicit attention.  Seed 
security and food security are often conflated as being ‘nearly the same one’ and seed 
security assessments are invariably based, implicitly or explicitly, on food security 
assessments.  Thus, in practice, one of four strategies is routinely employed for 
‘assessing’ seed security, none of which is sufficiently accurate or timely for assessing 
seed security among vulnerable farming populations:  
 
• No assessment is done at all—and seed need is assumed. 
• Food security assessments are effected—and seed need is assumed. 
• A crop production fall (decline) is measured—and seed need is assumed. 
• Lengthy surveys of farming and rural production systems are completed—and 
the results are analyzed and written up—after emergency seed has been delivered 
 
(Sperling et al., 2004a) 
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As mentioned previously, food security and seed security are linked, but also are quite 
distinct.  Households can have enough seed to sow a plot, but little to cover their large 
food needs. Conversely, households can have adequate food, but lack access to the 
seed they need to make their plots productive.  So food insecurity does not necessarily 
equal seed insecurity, and vice-versa, seed insecurity does not necessarily translate into 
food insecurity.  Assessments which target in on the key indicator features of both are 
required. 
 
General assessments:  based on food and crop supply assessment missions 
Within Ethiopia, seed needs assessments are most closely linked to the MoA/FAO 
Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions (CFSAM) (H. Kebede, Amare Mengistu, 
pers. comm., 2007).  These missions take place twice yearly (monitoring each of the 
two major seasons) and have been ongoing in Ethiopia at least since 1994, Focusing on 
crop production (yield assessments), the missions broadly aim to project total grain 
production estimates and assess grain market functioning  so as to calculate possible 
emergency food requirements.   
 
The methodology for the CFSAM has been formally published (FAO, 1995) and is 
under revision.  It is not the purpose of this seed aid report to make a formal analysis 
of the food assessment approach.  Simply, here, we reiterate the major point: seed need 
assessments within Ethiopia are extrapolated from crop production surveys, yield loss 
assessments and ultimately food need assessments.  This is in spite of the fact the 
CFSAMs do not focus on seed explicitly (H. Josserand, pers. comm., 2007).    
 
The limits of using ‘harvest loss’ as the prime seed need assessment indicator. 
The most common trigger for justifying the delivery of seed aid, within Ethiopia and 
beyond, is a broad observation that there has been a ‘harvest failure’.  ‘Harvest failure’ 
or ‘production shortfall’; is invariably then been linked with the conclusion that ‘seed 
is not available’ (and then that it needs to be brought in from elsewhere).  Many of the 
seed need guidelines used in Ethiopia, state that if production decreases 50%, seed aid 
‘should be dispensed.’  The issue is how to start to move forward towards more 
accurate assessments. 
 
Drawing on basic agronomic knowledge, and refining it with in-the field reality, recent 
research has closely examined seed needs as they relate to possible harvests (Sperling 
et al., 2006b). Findings show that the per cent of a normal harvest required to meet the 
sowing needs in the next season is the inverse of the multiplication rate. Small seeded 
crops generally have high multiplication rates and thus only a very small proportion of 
the harvest is needed as seed. For the dominant small grain crops of dryland Africa -- 
millet and sorghum – typically less than three percent of the harvest is needed for seed.  
 
Examples, drawn from the field sites within this report, illustrate the relation between 
harvest and seed availability more specifically (Box 1), drawing on contexts of  
drought-prone, flood- frost prone and ‘green famine’ regions (more lush regions with 
miniscule landholdings).  The message from all these tables is consistent:  that a 
production shortfall is not necessarily equal to a seed shortfall, not even in a bad year, 
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and not even when multiple re-sowings may be needed.  For many crops analyzed in 
the Ethiopian contexts (for example, common bean, faba bean, maize, sorghum, 
peanut, wheat, teff) harvests can drop as much as 80-90%, and enough seed is 
potentially on offer.  We are cautious and add ‘potentially’ as the quality of seed in the 
harvest has to be adequate and farmers have to be in the position to save sufficient 
stocks till sowing time.  This may be particularly challenging in regions with just one 
agricultural season per year.   
 
The point is, as a tool, sowing needs/harvest indexes could provide a keen indicator as 
to whether a potential seed security problem is emerging or not. Such sowing 
need/harvest calculations would also be easy to effect countrywide. Many woreda level 
officials most likely could have such information easily available, through first-hand 
knowledge or via consultation with local agricultural experts, including Farmers’ 
Association leaders. 
 
 
Box 1  Sowing needs in relation to harvests (why a production shortfall does not 
necessarily equal a seed shortfall). 
 
 
 
 
This box examines seed needs as they relate to possible harvests.  These calculations take 
only minutes to complete, with much of the base information at the ready disposal of 
agronomists and farmers working in a given region. 
 
Example A from North Shoa gives the basic framework.  One has to have an idea of the 
average areas sown to a crop per household and how much seed farmers use or the density 
of seed sown.  The return for these crops (i.e. multiplication rate) will then give an estimate 
of yields.  Seed needed for sowing can then be matched against yields (or harvests). 
 
A.  Crop/seed basics: North Shoa, Gera Keya  
Crop Wheat Teff 
Surface Area per household (ha) 0.25 0.50  
Seeding rates (kg/ha) 160 35 
Sowing needs (kg) 40 17.5  
Multiplication rates 11.25 34.28 
Harvest (kg) 450 600 
% Harvest to meet sowing needs 8.9 2.9 
 
Example B, from Wolaita, repeats the exercise, but is drawn from actual survey data. 
 
B.  Crop/seed basics Wolaita    (actual survey data) 
Crop Beans Maize 
Surface Area per     Household 0.24 0.28 
Seeding rates (kg/ha) 50 30-35 
Sowing needs (kg) 12 9.1 
Multiplication rates 12 17 
Harvest (kg) 144 550 
% Harvest to meet sowing needs 8.3 5.9 
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Moving towards seed system security assessment methods 
Current seed security calculations within Ethiopia focus on tallying up seed needs.  
The emergency formats used  encourages a supply-driven approach, which assumes, 
by format design, that seed is not available and that it will need to be purchased and be 
brought into a region (see Table 9, for recent 2005 revision of emergency assessment 
formats). This seemingly reductionist approach is in spite of several recent and 
important conceptual advances in Ethiopia.   
 
Emergency scenario construction 
As of 2004-2005 government “scenarios for projecting emergency seed seeds” are 
aiming to divide between ‘best’, ‘mid’ and ‘worst’ case scenarios (Table 10).  This is a 
laudable step forward.  At this initial stage, several comments are suggested, to move 
towards greater realism and usability. The very large number of indicators used makes 
it difficult to get the ‘whole picture’ of a seed security situation.  Some of the 
indicators listed are not directly seed security related at all, for instance, “prevalence of 
human diseases”, “man-made disaster”, or “livestock situation.”  Third, the degree of 
Example C, from Tigray expands the range of crops.   
 
C.  Crop/seed basics Tigray     
Crop Teff Chickpea 
Surface Area per     Household 0.6 0.25 
Seeding rates (kg/ha) 30 100 
Sowing needs (kg) 18 25 
Multiplication rates 44 14 
Harvest (kg) 792 352 
% Harvest to meet sowing needs 2.3 7.1 
 
 
 
Example D moves to even greater precision (and is drawn from intensive PhD work). It 
factors in actual farmer sowing rates for sorghum (taking account that they may have to 
resow) and contrasts yields for a ‘good’ versus a ‘bad’ year.  
 
D.  Crops/Seed Basics, sorghum - West Hararghe   (PhD field data) 
Crop Chiro   (highland) 
Miesso  
(lowland) 
Surface Area per  Household (ha) 0.5 0.75 
Sowing needs (kg– for area) 7-8 11-12 
Harvest/yield – good year (kg) 1250 1600 
% Harvest to meet sowing needs: good year 0.7 0.75 
Harvest/yield – bad year (kg) 400 260 
% Harvest to meet sowing needs: bad year   2.0 4.6 
 
In all the above, less that 10% of a harvest is needed for a farmer to have enough seed.  So 
harvests can ‘fail’—but seed may still be available. 
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differentiation within indicators for each scenario doesn’t always link to the purported 
differences with the broad scenarios: e.g. supply of input credit may or may not alter a 
best-, mid-, or worst-case scenario.  Seed security specialists working closely with 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD) experts could likely refine 
this currently somewhat crude instrument rather efficiently.  It needs to become a more 
useful ‘thinking’ instrument particularly for national decision-makers, and a more 
convincing communication tool geared towards possible donors. 
 
MoA/FAO field missions 
Another notable and parallel development within Ethiopia is related to the demand for 
more specific seed security assessments as they relate to comprehensive on-the-ground 
missions. As of September 2005, after an Agricultural Task Force Meeting, both 
MoARD and The FAO recognized that separate comprehensive seed security 
assessments were required (Amare Mengistu, pers. comm., 2007).  An initial checklist 
was drawn up to look at seed systems and seed security in some detail within the 
consultancy terms of reference for broad field mission (see Box 2).  Unfortunately, the 
Terms of Reference (TOR) cannot be implemented under the current quite short rural 
missions format, for several reasons. Practitioner testimony suggests these missions 
tend, by necessity,  to be often car based (projecting crop yields from beyond the 
vehicle windows)  Methods for assessing each of these thrusts have yet to be outlined 
and standardized in full;  and third, capacity for assessing this novel seed security 
thrust has not yet been built within Ethiopia.    Unfortunately also, we see that even 
with a more enlightened seed security checklist,  the ultimate goal of the seed security 
assessment process seems again, at this early stage,  conceived towards the calculating 
of seed tallies, that is, the end goal is the amount of seed needed to be bought and 
distributed  (see Box 2, areas in bold). 
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Table 9  Emergency seed requirement assessment format 
Region_________Zone___________Woreda_________Season_________year____________ 
 
Seed 
Type 
Variety Amount 
(Qt) 
Unit price 
(Birr/Qt) 
Total 
price 
(Birr) 
Loading/unloading 
& transportation 
cost (Birr) 
Amount 
of seeds 
per HH 
(kg) 
Total 
beneficiary 
HHs 
Total area 
to be 
covered 
9ha) 
Sowing 
date 
(dd/mm/yy) 
Deadline 
for arrival 
(dd/mm/yr 
*Source 
of seeds 
            
            
            
            
            
            
..... 
 
 
 
*   If the source is local put “local” but if the source is not local put the name of the source place 
What are the main reasons for applying for emergency seeds assistance 
 
1.___________________________________________________________________________ 
2.___________________________________________________________________________ 
3.__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 (source: Anonymous, 2006) 
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Table 10  Formulation of scenario for project of emergency seed needs 
Indicators Best scenario Mid-Scenario Worst scenario 
On-set of Meher Normal Mixed Late to very late 
Distribution of Meher season  Satisfactory Below normal Poor and cause moisture stress 
Cessation of Meher rain The rain stops at normal time Early withdrawal Very early termination from normal time 
Outbreaks of crop pest/diseases Only regular pests prevail Unusual occurrence for short time Severe outbreaks and persists for long time 
Flood/hail/water logging None Some areas Wide areas 
Man-made disaster None None May be some 
Market price of farm products Show improvements over last year Unchanged from last year Prices fall and farmers lose purchasing 
power 
Status of seed quality No major problem Delay in harvest affected seed 
quality 
Due to forced maturity huge problem 
occurs. shriveled and rotten seeds due to 
use of grain 
On-set, cessation, performance or rain 
during Belg 2005 
Normal Below normal failure 
Supply of inputs credit for Belg 2005 No shortfall Some shortfall in remote areas Huge shortage in several Belg areas due to 
price and supply limitation 
Meher effects on Belg 2005 No significant adverse effects 
prevail 
Little efforts occur Substantial adverse effects 
Livestock situation Normal Some More 
Prevalence of human diseases None Insignificant Some disease outbreaks in lowland areas 
and resettlement areas 
Per capita crop production and local food 
supply 
As usual Below average Unsatisfactory 
Forced seed consumption In very highly vulnerable areas Severe in Meher dependent highly 
vulnerable areas 
Severe in both Meher and Belg areas 
including vulnerable areas 
Seed availability of preferred varieties Available in better rainfall areas Limited availability Only mixed or bulked grains available 
Seed stocking Fair Inadequate Absent 
Crop production prospects for Meher 2004 Normal or close to normal Below normal Much below normal 
Crop production prospects for Belg 2005 Normal to close to long term 
average 
Below Average Close to total failure 
Prospects for emergency seed needs Minimum requirements plus some 
extra needs 
Minimum requirements plus 
substantial unpredictable needs 
Minimum requirements plus huge 
additional unpredictable needs 
(source: National Disaster Management Agricultural Task Force, 2005) 
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Box 2  Contingency Planning for Year 2005.  National Disaster Management Agricultural 
Task Force   (bolding added) 
 
So in brief, there have been important moves within the last two years for putting seed 
security assessments on the national agenda, as distinct from food security 
assessments.  Much of the progress, however, has not gone beyond the stage of ‘need 
identification’.  
 
In terms of concrete steps for moving forward, some Ethiopian professional have quite 
clear ideas.  As affirmed cogently by one FAO expert helping to lead the overall 
agricultural emergency assessments: 
 
• We need a comprehensive, simply handy seed security assessment tool or method. 
 
• The tool needs to be tested on the ground, not only with experienced seed security 
specialists, but also with the lay practitioners who will also use it. 
 
• The tool will then need to be promoted--  and  capacity to use it widely built 
 
(Amare. Mengistu, pers. comm., 2007) 
 
Certainly, given the fast-evolving state of seed security methods and assessment 
procedures worldwide (CIAT/CRS, 2007), the methodological pre-conditions for 
moving forward in Ethiopia are already in place. Existing tools embrace methods to 
assess both acute and chronic stress contexts.  They are also sensitive enough to 
identify gradations in seed security.   
 
Section 2.3  Current projection of seed-insecurity situations       (excerpt) 
 
 Describe local system and how farmers normally acquire seeds 
 Identify how disasters affect the households and local seed systems 
 Assess the farm/local coping strategies to combat seed insecurity and 
assess if there is any sign of losing these coping strategies including status 
of off-farm activities incomes 
 Assess if the seed shortage is absolute (lack of availability or total seed 
shortage in area) 
 Identify is the seed shortage is acute (caused by recent current disasters ) 
chronic (long terms and structural problems) or complex (combination of 
both factors) 
 Assess if the problem is lack of seed or need for specific crop variety 
 Inquire effects of disasters on seed quality 
…… 
Estimate/project the emergency seed needs (types of crops, variety, quantity, 
estimates costs and time for seed supply). 
History of Seed Aid 
 31 
Early Warning System Indicators 
Addendum, and from a more national perspective, seed security indicators can, and 
need to be built early warning system programs.  National data to predict seed security 
(or seed insecurity) are, again, linked to but different from, food security indicators per 
se.  Sowing needs to harvest loss calculations could serve as one important signal.  
Seed prices of key crops found on markets could serve as another (noting that seed 
pricing spikes are different from food pricing spikes) (Table 11). 
Table 11  Seed Security Framework; Possible Global Early Warning Indicators 
Parameter More Macro Seed Security Indicators 
Seed Availability Production shortfall versus Seed Need  Calculations 
Seed Access Prices of Seed/Grain key crops on market 
• For crops normally sold on markets 
• Focus on key local varieties (per region) 
• Distinguish between normal price spikes at sowing and ‘unusual’ 
Quality (proxy?   in global bases?   qualitative variable/) 
 
 
Other indicators, which can be used at regional levels (and via working with seed/grain 
traders) include: 
 
• volume changes in seed supplies 
• changes in seed sourcing areas 
• changes in scale of seed loans 
 
These are discussed in Chapter VI. 
 
Without strong seed security frameworks and indicators (as national guides), seed aid 
assistance in Ethiopian will likely remain supply-driven rather than demand or 
problem driven.  
 
Separate expertise within MoARD to lead seed security issues 
Finally, there is a need to establish seed security expertise squarely with the MoARD 
and linked closely with the DPPA.  This expertise does not necessarily refer to formal 
seed sector specialists who may focus on commercial crops and varieties, and devote 
their major efforts to certified seed.  Seed security experts need to have the capacity to 
conceptualize and strategize support all the seed systems which farmers use, informal 
(local and traditional) as well as formal.  In fact, in a country like Ethiopia, where 
upwards of 95% of seed may be sourced form local systems, the particular capacity to 
understand how informal systems function, and how integrated systems might be 
catalyzed (which combine informal and formal strengths)  would seem paramount. 
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SUMMARY:  THE HISTORY OF SEED AID IN ETHIOPIA 
Long-Term Trends 
• Emergency Seed Aid has been implemented in Ethiopia for at least 34 years and 
has been near continuous since 1982. 
 
• Conservative estimates suggest $US 15,000,000 per year of seed aid has been 
delivered by governmental and non-governmental organizations combined.  Over a 
34-year period, this translates to $US 510,000,000 or about ETB, 4,650,000,000 
spent for emergency seed-related assistance. 
Broad Types of Seed Aid 
• Three broad types of seed aid have been identified in use in Ethiopia:  in response 
to emergency or acute stress; for developmental reasons; and for chronic stress 
contexts.  These three are poorly distinguished conceptually, and often not 
distinguished at all in terms of what is offered ‘on the ground’.   
 
More specifically:  
 
o There seems to be little governmental strategy tailored to addressing these 
different seed assistance contexts; 
 
o Seed assistance strategies for the most vulnerable, those in chronic stress areas, 
appears to be the least well-conceived.  This is despite the concrete data which 
show that the lion’s share of recent ‘acute’ seed aid has been delivered in 
chronic stress (safety net) zones.      
 
Frameworks for Seed Need or Seed Security Determinations 
• At the national level, determinations of need for seed aid are not done directly.  
Rather, they are extrapolated from food security assessments, or ‘assumed’ from 
food security assessments.  Field analysis shows that food security and seed 
security are linked, but not the same.  Independent, complementary assessments are 
required. 
 
• The trigger used to signal a ‘need for seed aid’ is most often a ‘harvest failure’.   
Concrete examples drawn from across Ethiopian crops and regions, show that even 
a severe production shortfall does not necessarily translate to a seed shortfall. 
 
• While since 2005, there have been initial moves (spurred by the Agricultural Task 
Force) toward more holistic seed security assessments, the proposed changes exist 
mostly on paper, and in rough (not sufficiently accurate) indicator formats.   
 
• Without strong seed security frameworks and indicators (as national guides) and 
without strong leadership ensuring that seed security is given focus (as distinct 
from food security and other Non-Food Items), seed aid assistance in Ethiopian 
will likely remain supply-driven rather than demand- or problem-driven. 
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MOVING FORWARD: RECOMMENDATIONS 
General 
• National reflections on seed security strategy need to be planned so as to 
distinguish recommended seed system support: for emergency, for chronic stress, 
and for developmental contexts.   Frameworks need to be sharpened so as to give 
strategic guidance to on-the-ground implementation. 
 
• Recognizing the considerable overlap between acute and chronic stress contexts, 
specific reflection should be given to programs which link ‘relief to development’ 
(or developmental relief), starting in the emergency phase and continuing through 
recovery and beyond.  This reflection should explore which approaches are already 
known and proven, which ones need to be further tested. 
 
• Seed Security Perspectives need to drive national decision-making, and not more 
simplistic (or reduced) calculation of seed needs alone.   
 
 
Specific 
 
• Special seed security expertise (seed system expertise) has to be made available 
with the MoARD, starting at the national level .  
 
• Seed security assessment tools need to be better refined for Ethiopia, capacity 
needs to be built, and incentives have to be put in place to ensure they are used. 
National level organizations (such as the Agricultural Task Force) need to be prime 
drivers behind this. 
 
• Precise seed security indicators need to built into early warning system programs as 
well as into on-the-ground assessment programs, from woreda up to national levels.     
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IV: THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT SHAPING SEED AID 
 
This chapter reviews how seed aid practices in Ethiopia are shaped by the policy 
environment.  In the case of seed aid, this policy environment is complex, as seed aid 
bridges emergency relief with longer-term development, and is implemented both by 
government and NGOs.  Therefore, relevant policies come from different sectors 
(disaster relief, agricultural development, seed industry) and sources (donors, NGOs, 
different levels of government).   
 
There is no single set of ‘seed relief policies’, but rather a range of policies, strategies, 
and institutions that may influence seed relief.  Further, some policies, while on paper 
connected with seed aid, may little influence how seed aid is actually implemented. In 
exploring the different areas of policy, this chapter considers:  
• How current policies affect the practice of seed aid 
• How policies may differ from different sources (e.g. regional/federal, 
NGO/GO) 
• How the policy environment has (or has not) evolved  
 
The policy environment could play an important role in enabling good seed aid 
practice, leading to less vulnerable seed systems and, in the longer-run, a better base 
for appropriate development efforts.   
 
Sources of Information 
For this analysis, the chapter draws upon policies addressing different sectors and 
themes.  These include: agricultural development; emergency relief; seed supply; and 
regional harmonization.   Besides policies from the GoE, policies from donors, NGOs, 
and Regional States have also been explored – although these were often less formally-
articulated.  This work involved collection of published laws and proclamations, and 
secondary materials from major libraries and agencies.  Interviews with key informants 
were an important source of information.  These sought out current and former 
officials from a range of agencies.  In Addis Ababa, this included the Federal MoARD, 
the Ethiopian Seed Enterprise (ESE), the National Seed Industry Agency (NSIA, now 
part of NAIA), and EIAR.  Interviews with emergency agencies involved officials 
from the DPPA/RRC, the Agricultural Task Force, and FAO’s Emergency Unit, as 
well as major NGOs that work across regions (CARE, CRS, WVE).  Other interviews 
in Addis included donors, academics, and policy/research NGOs (e.g. PANE).  
Interviews at the regional level, particularly with BoARD officials responsible for food 
security, and other practitioners of seed aid, were helpful in understanding how 
policies affect implementation on the ground, as well as regional variation in policies. 
Annex I lists all those contacted for interviews, and their details.  Finally, reviews and 
analyses of various areas of policy offered useful overviews (e.g. Seboka and Deressa, 
2000; Sahlu, n.d.; Mburathi et al., 2004; Bramel et al., 2004; Getachew, 2005; Mulatu, 
n.d.).   
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This analysis explores how policies influence seed aid (or not), and so is more 
interested in how a policy is actually used than what is said in policy texts.  Different 
organizations have their own particular perspectives, and capacities, which affect how 
they interpret and use policy.  Thus, this is an actor-oriented analysis, which considers 
which organizations are influential in shaping policy in action (Keeley and Scoones, 
2003).  
Policy Developments by Sector 
This section summarizes important policy developments in different sectors that 
potentially affect seed aid.  The aim is to highlight major trends, rather than give 
comprehensive detail for all areas.   
Emergency Relief 
Ethiopia had a Food Shortage Committee since the start of the 1970s, and seed aid 
activities started as early as 1974, in response to the crisis in northern Ethiopia.  An 
early warning system, and the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) were soon 
established (GoE, 1974, 1979).  At that time, “being Commissioner of RRC was like 
being a Super-Minister” (Shimeles Adugna, pers. comm., 2007), as the Commissioner 
chaired an Advisory Council attended by Ministers, including Agriculture, Health, and 
Water (Zeleke, 1988).  Many believed at the time that at most a decade of aid was 
needed to return Ethiopia to self-sufficiency in agricultural production (Shimeles 
Adugna, pers. comm., 2007).  Following a detailed review (Office of the National 
Committee for Central Planning, 1988), the strategy for disaster preparedness and 
prevention was revised, seeking better integration with development, recognizing that 
“preparedness measures [are] platforms for development” (GoE, 1989: 9).  This 
strategy suggested 17 different areas to develop for increasing preparedness, including 
strategic seed reserves.  Seed reserves were often proposed as a national preparedness 
strategy (e.g. RRC, 1995; NSIA, 1999).  However, seed reserves have never been 
implemented, possibly due to the challenge of identifying appropriate crop varieties for 
the seed reserve, or possibly because they are not an economically viable option.  
Policy updates in the 1990s recast the RRC as the DPPC (GoE, 1993, 1995). More 
recently, the DPPC has been placed under the Federal MoARD, and restructured as an 
Agency (DPPA) (GoE, 2004a).  
 
The DPPA (and its precursors) issues appeals, so seed aid comes under its umbrella.  
However, it has no expertise on seed, and gets all technical advice from MoARD 
(Mesfin Shiferaw, pers. comm., 2004).  There has long been recognition that seed aid 
needed to be treated distinctly from food aid; for instance, the donors’ Seed Meetings 
in 1986 highlighted the importance of addressing Ethiopia’s incredible agro-ecological 
diversity.  Seed agencies (e.g. NSIA) organized an Emergency Seed Committee in the 
late 1990s, but links with the DPPA remained weak.  In the last few years, the 
emergency agencies have organized National Disaster Management Task Forces for 
‘Non Food Items’, with seed aid advice coming under the Agricultural Task Force 
(ATF).  The ATF is chaired by a MoARD official, and is now the DPPA’s main link to 
the Ministry, and its source of technical advice on seed appeals.  Though the ATF has 
existed at least since 2001, it was not very active before 2005, and mostly met on an ad 
hoc basis (Lautze et al., 2005).  One concern is that the ATF may actually weaken the 
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rather diffuse links between the DPPA and the MoARD regarding seed aid, as it gives 
emergency officials an excuse for not engaging with any details of seed aid.   The 
DPPA devolves all technical, seed-related matters to the ATF, while the latter leaves 
emergency issues to the DPPA.  This separation of roles risks a situation where no 
organization is fully responsible for seed aid decisions.  The DPPA needs more fully to 
engage with issues around seed security, and not simply lump seed in with the rest of 
what it calls ‘Non Food Items’ (NFI).   
 
A second issue arising from emergency relief policy is chronic stress. The recognition 
that repeated ‘emergencies’ often reflected chronic stress, that farmers’ assets were 
declining despite regular aid, and that donors were questioning emergency appeals 
(sometimes pledging only 60% of requests; Brhane Gizaw, pers. comm., 2007) spurred 
a fundamental change in non-relief strategy.  The Productive Safety Net Program 
(PSNP) started in 2004, designating roughly 200 woredas as chronically food-insecure, 
and transferring food or cash to vulnerable households in these woredas in exchange 
for labor to build community assets (e.g. roads).  The assumption is that guaranteed 
annual transfers help prevent asset depletion (Dercon, 2002; Devereux, 2001), enabling 
at least some households to invest their assets and eventually ‘graduate’ to self-
sufficiency (GoE, 2004b).  This PSNP is one of the Food Security components in 
Ethiopia’s current poverty reduction strategy (the Plan for Accelerated Sustainable 
Development to End Poverty, or PASDEP).  The PSNP signals a significant change in 
thinking and practice around aid, distinguishing acute emergencies from chronic 
poverty.  The PSNP is significant not only for its scale (its annual budget is roughly 2 
billion Birr), but also because it establishes a principle that chronic stress needs to be 
treated differently from acute stress, and brings concerns with aid dependency into the 
heart of emergency policy.  The PSNP’s relation to seed aid is a complex (still 
vaguely-defined) one: chronically-stressed PSNP woredas receive both 
‘developmental’ as well as emergency seed aid (but seemingly little geared to chronic 
stress per se).  This is discussed further below in the section on Agricultural 
Development.  
Seed Policy 
The ESE was founded in 1979, obtaining legal status in 1982.  Like most seed supply 
institutions of the time, the ESE did not develop strong links to farmers, but rather 
focused its supply on a few large users (Table 12).  Until the Dergue’s fall in 1991, 
nearly half of all MV seed produced went to State Farms, with the MoA and the 
Agricultural Input Supply Corporation (AISCO) each receiving another quarter, mostly 
to supply resettlement schemes and Service Co-operatives, rather than individual 
farmers.  Directing scarce MV seed to a small number of institutions reflected the 
Dergue regime’s promotion of mechanized State Farms, and peasant collectivization, 
which was at the core of its agricultural development strategy (Belete et al., 1991; 
Cohen and Isaakson, 1988).  Also, this State Farm bias left little MV seed for 
distribution to individual smallholders in normal technology-promotion activities.  
Until ten years ago, extension was also limited in its scope, so most smallholder 
farmers did not have much exposure to different MVs.  
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Table 12  ESE sales of all the seed it produced between 1979/80 and 1991/92, and 
proportion of this production going to State Farms, MoA/AISCO, and NGOs  
Year 
Total seed sales 
from ESE (t) 
Sales to State 
Farms (%) 
Sales to MoA / 
AISCO (%)* 
Sales to NGOs 
(%) 
1979/80 20928 90.8 6.1 3.1 
1980/81 22366 75.1 15.5 9.5 
1981/82 18812 85.3 3.6 11.0 
1982/83 20254 80.3 12.2 7.5 
1983/84 7775 58.9 22.2 18.9 
1984/85 28856 18.6 57.1 24.3 
1985/86 29375 18.1 25.0 56.8 
1986/87 26406 27.7 44.5 27.8 
1987/88 25058 26.6 18.6 54.8 
1988/89 16386 43.4 21.9 34.7 
1989/90 10664 49.0 16.6 34.4 
1990/91 9885 54.2 32.7 13.1 
1991/92 12070 10.3 24.0 65.7 
Mean: 
1979-1992 19142 46.8 24.7 28.6 
Source: Agrawal and Wolde Mariam (1995): (*MoA includes resettlement programs, while AISCO 
began trading in 1984 and mostly served Service Co-operatives rather than individual farmers). 
 
NGOs are also important clients, purchasing over 28% of all the seed the ESE 
produced between 1979 and 1992.  Much of this was for emergency relief, especially 
following the 1984-85 famine.  NGO purchases peaked in 1986, with NGOs receiving 
more than 16,000 tons of ESE seed (Figure 2).   
 
 
Figure 2  Amount of MV seed sold by ESE to State Farms, AISCO/MoA, and NGOs 
between 1979/80 and 1991/92.  Sources as in Table 12. 
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Since the 1990s, much of the ESE’s output has gone to meet (planned) input package 
programs (NSIA, 1999), as has seed from the farmer-based seed multiplication 
schemes (Getachew Desta, 2001; Solomon Gebre-Medhin, 2001).  Seed production 
and supply have never been driven by farmers’ demands for seed, and marketing 
remains very weak.  The location of ESE production farms and contract growers are 
mostly in the higher elevations, reflecting the dominance of wheat and maize in MV 
sales (Sahlu, n.d.).  This means there is nearly no seed multiplication capacity within 
the formal sector for the lowlands (that is, areas generally characterized by significant 
‘moisture stress’, or drought.)   
 
The National Seed Industry Agency (NSIA, now NAIA), established in 1992, gave 
regulatory and policy oversight to the sector. The Seed Law (GoE, 2000) regulates 
commercial seed sales, requiring vendors to meet a range of conditions in order to sell 
seed (e.g. obtaining a certificate, meeting physical quality standards, appropriate 
labeling, etc.).  The only mention of emergency seed in this Law is in Article 26, 
which relaxes germination requirements (allowing seed germinating 10% below 
established standards to be sold) in the event of an “acute shortage in the country.”  
This provision has been used by FAO, and NGOs such as CISP (in Beneshangul), 
buying from the ESE or other vendors (Getinet Gbeyehu, pers. comm., 2006).  
However, local seed/grain traders involved in Seed Vouchers and Fairs (SVF), for 
instance, have generally not been required to meet formal seed standards, whether the 
established or the relaxed standards.  Current policy developments foresee increasing 
seed production and regulation at the regional level, with Seed Testing Labs 
established in several regions.  However, regional seed units rely on Federal authorities 
for training, and are very thin on staff and resources (Ayenew Arega, pers. comm., 
2006).  Some regional labs do not function (Yonas Sahlu and Getachew Desta, pers. 
comm., 2006).  Along with decentralization, regional harmonization is also an issue 
with seed policy, addressing areas such as certification, testing standards, and release 
procedures.  However, some countries will need to dramatically change laws to reach 
harmonization, and there is little movement right now in this area (Aberra Deressa, 
pers. comm., 2006). 
 
This review raises a few points about seed policy: 
 
• The system is largely supply-driven, reflecting a past emphasis on serving a few 
large buyers.  The formal seed market is the weakest link in supply system, with no 
detailed knowledge of demand (Sahlu, n.d.; Mulatu, n.d.).   
 
• The focus of the formal seed sector on a limited range of crops (largely wheat and 
maize) and on varieties adapted to higher potential areas, puts in question the role 
of  the formal seed sector (and formal policy) for both chronic stress and 
emergency contexts.  As of now, ‘seed policy’ in Ethiopia, largely translates to 
seed policy for the agriculturally more productive zones. 
 
• Sales of the largest private sector seed company, Pioneer Hi-Bred Ethiopia, remain 
small (Raymakers, 2002), and the ESE is being pushed to take a more 
developmental and less commercial role (GoE, 2004a).  The relative weakness of 
the commercial seed industry in Ethiopia means that there is less pressure for seed 
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aid to promote it.  (which might be an appropriate response, given the crop and 
variety profiles on offer).   
 
• There seems to be at least one notable exception to the above, in which a 
commercially seed industry in Ethiopia gets its driving force from seed aid 
customers: the escalation of the sweet potato cutting use for delivery in stressed 
regions of the SNNPR.  The usefulness of this program for poor farmers has 
received highly mixed feedback, partly due to the highly variable quality  of sweet 
potato cuttings delivered.  
 
Agricultural Development Policies 
Pre-Dergue policies generally ignored smallholders (Getachew, 2005; Gilkes, 1975), 
though success in integrated rural development projects in the early 1970s such as the 
Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU), and other local-scale extension 
projects, helped convince policy-makers that smallholders had potential to increase 
production (Cohen, 1975).  This led to the Minimum Package Programs, and the 
Peasant Agricultural Development and Extension Program, which promoted input 
packages to smallholders in the 1970s-80s.  Agricultural research was also directed to 
develop technology packages for delivery.  However, the limited scope of extension, 
and its poor links with research hampered impact here (Deressa and Seboka, 1996).  
Also, the Dergue still centred their food security strategy on State Farms and Service 
Co-operatives, directing most seed and other inputs to these sectors, while imposing 
market controls on smallholders (Cohen and Isaakson, 1988; Belete et al., 1991).  Thus 
most smallholders had little access to MV seed, while the policy environment was a 
dis-incentive to production.  Most market controls were lifted soon before the 
Dergue’s fall in 1991.   
 
The current government’s food security policy is Agricultural Development Led 
Industrialization (ADLI), which focuses on increasing smallholder production.  
Demonstrations by Sasakawa/Global 2000 in the mid-1990s convinced policy-makers 
that appropriate crop technologies already existed, but that promotion of these 
technologies was the main priority (Keeley and Scoones, 2000).  The National 
Extension Improvement Program (NEIP) was launched in 1995 and grew dramatically 
to deliver input packages to several million farmers by the end of the decade. Most of 
the seed production from the ESE, as well as from farmer-based seed multiplication 
schemes, is to meet this demand (Solomon Gebre-Medhin, 2001).  There has been a 
great deal of comment on this program (see Howard et al., 2003), much of it beyond 
the scope of this report, but a few points are relevant here.  Marginal areas have 
historically been less served by research, and production increases were less apparent 
in chronically-stressed areas.  Another issue is that some farmers appear to dislike the 
inflexibility of the packages, since it limits their choice.  As one West Hararghe 
BoARD official noted “Farmers get the MV seed only with fertilizer – in a package – 
and don’t like the fertilizer because it doesn’t do well in this area.  But that [fixed 
package] is government policy.”  (Wandalla pers. comm., 2006).  Thirdly, BoARD 
staff must meet ambitious targets for the number of MV packages distributed, 
suggesting that MV promotion sometimes reflects supply quotas rather than farmers’ 
demands.  This drive to promote MV seed has clearly influenced seed aid in some 
places (see Chapter VII).  
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Recent policy development include a renewed interest in farmer co-operatives for 
improved supply and marketing of inputs (including seed), and greater recognition that 
rural livelihoods do not solely depend on farming.  The 2002 update to the Food 
Security Strategy (GoE, 2002) gives more attention to drought-prone areas than 
previously, and clearly distinguishes chronic from more transitory stress.  The strategy 
makes a plea for the development of more drought-resistant crop technologies for 
vulnerable areas. As mentioned above, emergency relief now uses the PSNP to address 
chronic stress, and some of these beneficiaries (perhaps 10%; S. Ashley, pers. comm., 
2006) also receive technology packages, including MV seed.  However, as the 
MoARD’s head of Food Security noted, the available MVs have not changed to meet 
chronic stress in the same way that food aid has.  “Seed interventions could help 
[chronic stress and safety nets] a lot, but we need a change in input packages towards 
stress,” (Brhane Gizaw, pers. comm., 2006).  Despite both the 2002 Food Security 
Policy and the PSNP calling for more MV technologies that are relevant to chronic 
stress areas, it appears that this remains an area for development.   
 
Policies of Practitioners, Donors and Regions 
As introduced in the section “Broad types of Seed Aid Given” in Chapter III, the actual 
approach an organization takes for seed aid reflects the institutional philosophy, 
donors’ preferences, and institutional capacity.  Actual differences on the ground (in 
the emergency situation, agro-ecological context) appear to play less of a role here.  
There are clear differences in approaches among different NGOs, as well as between 
most NGOs and the GoE.  The influence of donors is also apparent in some cases, 
particularly FAO in promoting DSD of new varieties, and USAID/OFDA in 
encouraging SVF.  In Tigray, REST stated that one donor, Entremonde, had 
encouraged them to use cash for aid, while WVE’s use of cash and SVF in Wolaita 
“reflected donors’ interests” (Moise K. and Asfaw M., pers. comm., 2005).  Donors 
may also influence crop choice – for instance, USAID insists on OPV maize, though 
the BoARD in Wolaita wanted to distribute hybrids (which they largely did).  
 
There appears to be little formal regional-level policy on seed, though there is some 
variation among regions.  This is most apparent in Tigray, which forbids free seed 
distributions.  For instance, Tigrayan officials specifically linked  the use of revolving 
funds to “a regional policy to reduce dependence and make seed aid demand-driven for 
farmers to develop a sense of ownership” (Negusse et al., 2006: 7).  Tigray’s recent 
history, which helped forge strong links between farmers and local government, may 
be one reason why its policy seems slightly different.  The relatively small number of 
NGOs operating in Tigray, compared to, say, SNNPR, is also an important difference. 
 
Finally, dependency is a concern across NGOs, donors, and government.  The 
requirement to repay loans in PSNP and NEIP programs reflects this concern.  With 
seed aid, dependency is theoretically addressed with revolving funds, where farmers 
repay seed received at the end of the season.  This proposed practice is seen with DSD 
schemes (GoE or WVE) in Gera Keya, with WVE in Humbo, CISP in Hararghe, and 
with all actors in Tigray.  However, some organizations, such as CARE, do not 
generally require repayment.  While the concern with dependency is very 
understandable, in practice repayment rates have been very low and in some regions 
virtually non-existent.  Implementers also highlight problems with logistics (collecting 
and storing seed) and with the generally low quality of ‘seed returned’ (see chapter V). 
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When seed aid is so frequently repeated, farmers may feel there are few consequences 
for failing to repay seed.  However, failure to repay government loans (e.g. for package 
program) has had some serious consequences in practice:  one OCHA official 
recounted that extension forbade NGOs distributing free seeds to some farmers during 
this 2003 crisis, as they had yet to repay their loans for input packages for the previous 
(drought) season, and that this restriction may have made the crisis significantly worse 
for these farmers (anon, pers. comm., 2004).  
 
SUMMARY: MAIN POLICY FINDINGS 
• Few policies shape seed aid specifically (except to relax regulations of seed quality 
in situations of acute need). 
 
• Policies for supporting seed security in acute stress and chronic stress contexts 
remain inadequately differentiated.  In contrast, the GoE’s strategy of seed 
assistance for development is strongly expressed though a number of package 
programs, including NEIP and its successors.  
 
• The single ‘national’ suggestion for preparedness around seed security, strategic 
seed reserves, has not been implemented. This may be with good reason given the 
diversity of crop and varieties which would be needed, and the unproven  economic 
viability of the operations. 
 
• In terms of general aid appeals and responses, there is a novel trend towards 
addressing chronic stress differently from acute emergencies.  Safety Nets and 
Resettlement are now the primary strategies for addressing chronic vulnerability.   
However, the seed security component within these programs is not well 
articulated. 
 
• Emergency seed aid in Ethiopia is not generally used to promote the seed industry 
(whose mandate is development as the commercial sector remains limited).  
Package programs presently absorb most of  public-sector seed production, which 
is dominated by maize and wheat.   
 
• The formal seed industry produces ‘other crops’ (non-maize/wheat) in small 
quantities.  Multiplication sites are concentrated in the intermediate and higher 
attitudes and there is little emphasis on lowland crops.  This has implications for 
seed aid, as most of emergency delivery takes place in drought-prone areas. 
 
• Food security policy is presently framed through technology transfer via package 
programs, which vigorously promote  Modern Variety packages. This  promotion 
affects the shape of seed aid directly, in terms of the government’s preferred choice 
of approach (DSD) and the use of emergency  aid as the vehicle to distribute MVs . 
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MOVING FORWARD: RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
• Seed security needs to be treated distinctly from food security within emergency 
agencies.  For this to occur, the integration between emergency and technical 
agencies needs to improve.  Presently, the DPPA does not deal with seeds, while 
MoARD generally does not engage with emergencies.  The current restructuring in 
the MoARD may offer an opportunity to forge clearer lines of communication 
between DPPA and MoARD, delineating responsibility so that key decisions are 
not lost in the “no man’s land” between both organizations. 
 
• Crop development for chronic stress areas needs far more attention. Chronically-
stressed areas are often ‘low-potential’, and need types of technologies that 
recognize the high levels of risk (and large distances from markets and 
infrastructure).  
 
o One priority is to review of technologies that perform under stress and under 
farmers’ management for high-risk conditions (i.e. low inputs).  Full packages 
should not be assumed in these cases.   
 
o A second priority is to address the barriers to the development of these 
technologies.  More resources need to be directed to research for lowland 
ecologies.  
 
o Related to the above, seed production for lowland crops needs to improve and 
become more demand-responsive.  
 
• Seed aid remains an ‘orphan’ within policy, though the practice affects the farming 
system, potentially for years to come.  International guidelines for seed aid have 
been recently developed by the FAO (see Box 3, below).  Ethiopian policy-makers 
may wish to initiate a parallel process  to develop seed relief principles specific to 
the Ethiopian context.   
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Box 3  FAO: Basic Guiding Principles for Seed Relief. 
 
1. A needs assessment should underpin any decisions to undertake seed relief and should guide 
the choice among possible interventions. This needs assessment should be holistic, putting seed 
security in the context of livelihood security.  
 
2. Seed relief interventions have to be clearly matched to the context (for example, a crisis caused 
by drought may require very different actions from a crisis caused by war). By supporting food 
production, seed relief should decrease dependence on repeated food aid. 
 
3. Seed relief activities should aim to both (i) be effective with the immediate objective of   
facilitating access to appropriate planting material; and (ii) to contribute to the restoration, 
rehabilitation, or improvement of agricultural systems in the longer term. 
 
4. Ideally, considerations of seed system sustainability should be built into seed interventions 
from the beginning. As a minimum, seed aid should do no harm to farming systems. Thus, 
emergency relief activities should support local seed system development, ideally by 
integrating long-term needs in the design of the project. 
 
5. Seed relief activities should be built upon a solid understanding of all the seed systems farmers 
use and the role they have in supporting livelihoods. The local system is usually more 
important in farmers’ seed security and has been shown to be quite resilient. Depending on the 
context, the focus in an emergency should normally be on keeping the local seed system 
operational. One practical problem is that seed systems are often not sufficiently understood, 
especially in emergency situations. Hence, there is a need for more emphasis on understanding 
seed systems and their role in supporting livelihoods, and on needs assessment.  
 
6. Seed relief interventions should facilitate farmers’ choices of crops and varieties. Seed relief 
interventions should aim to improve, or at least maintain, seed quality and aim to facilitate 
access to varieties that are adapted to environmental conditions and farmers’ needs, including 
nutritional needs. 
 
7. Monitoring and evaluation should be built into all seed relief interventions, to facilitate learning 
by doing and thereby to improve interventions. 
 
8. An information system should be put in place to improve institutional learning and as a 
repository of information gained from cumulative experience. Such information systems should 
be institutionalized at national levels, to the greatest extent possible. 
 
9. A strategy to move from the acute emergency response to a capacity building or development 
phase should be included in the design of the intervention. 
 
These guiding principles were endorsed by the FAO Emergency Coordination Group (Rome, 20 June 2003), based on 
the recommendations of a stakeholders’ workshop “Improving the Effectiveness and Sustainability of Seed Relief” 
(Rome, 26–28 May 2003). The initial draft was prepared by the FAO seed relief discussion group. 
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V:   IMPLEMENTATION - SUPPLY SIDE:  
GO/NGO SEED AID GIVERS  
 
With this section, the report moves towards examining implementation on the ground.  
It focuses on insights of Governmental and NGO seed aid implementers within the 
four regions of intensive field study.  The extent of regional seed aid is considered, as 
well as the range of approaches in use. Implementers also share their own reflections 
on key processes which shape seed-related assistance: inter alia: determining needs, 
targeting, choosing approaches, as well as monitoring and evaluation. 
 
The implementer focus has been on those organizations with significant seed aid 
experience.  Government officials and NGO managers and field staff have generously 
shared their experiences on seed aid trends, process strengths and challenges still to be 
met.  
 
In contrast, there are organizations which engage in seed aid as a one-off activity, who 
have little agriculture expertise and who approach seed aid as a logistical exercise 
(procure and distribute seed). Such fly-by-night seed aid practitioners should be 
banned from the practice—and their comments are not included herein. 
Who and Where 
Governmental and principal NGO implementers at each regional site were enlisted to 
reflect on local seed aid practices.  Focus group discussions in each region initially 
brought all implementers together to help structure the regional analysis and share 
overall observations.  Most of the key implementers were also subsequently 
interviewed in their regional home offices.  Table 13 summarizes the organizations 
most involved in providing on-site analysis (for full list of persons consulted, see 
Annex I).  Select other NGOs shared insights from their headquarter bases in Addis 
Ababa based, including Catholic Relief Services (CRS), CARE, Save the Children UK 
(SC-UK) and World Vision Ethiopia (WVE). 
Table 13  Government and NGO organizations involved in on-site seed aid analysis 
Site Organizations consulted 
 
Tigray: 
Raya Azebo 
 
Govt:     BoARD; Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development 
       DPPA 
       WARDO: Woreda Agriculture and Rural Development Office 
     TARI: Tigray Agricultural Research Institute 
 
Others:  Relief Society of Tigray (REST) 
              Adigrat Diocesan Catholic Secretariat (ADCS)  
North Shoa: 
Gera Keya 
 
Govt:     BoARD (including zonal and woreda level) 
  
Others:  World Vision Ethiopia 
         Food and Agriculture Organization- (local representative)    
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Wolaita: Humbo 
 
Govt:      WARDO 
               Zonal Planning Office 
 
Others:   World Vision Ethiopia (WVE) 
         International Medical Corps (IMC) 
             Concern 
       Christian Relief and Development Association- Ethiopia  
West Hararghe: 
Chiro and Miesso 
 
Govt:      BoARD 
      Zonal Planning Office 
      DPPA 
 
Others:    CARE 
       CISP 
       International Rescue Committee (IRC) 
       Ethiopian Red Cross and International Red Cross 
       Goal 
       Hararghe  Catholic Secretariat (HCS) 
 
SCALE OF AID 
Tables 14, 15 and 16 suggest the scale of seed aid at the local level, the woreda 
(district ) unit of action.  Such data were collected at all sites and can be obtained from 
the site-specific reports.4   Here we give but two examples to suggest the trends. 
 
As the tables show, seed has been implemented on a significant scale within local 
zones.  Once a zone is identified as a stress one, seed aid tends to be continuous, year 
after year, and often season after season, for those areas where two cropping seasons 
are key.  The available data from Humbo show 13 distributions in nine years; the 
available data from Raya Azebo show five distributions in four years.  This continuous 
delivery of seed aid is confirmed also from the recipient view.  Chapter VII, on farmer 
recipients, shows that there are farmers who can recount having received seed aid 10 
times, in the not so distant past.    
 
In terms of the aggregate numbers, and the question on trends in seed aid (is it 
increasing or decreasing?), the tables should be treated with caution.  First, while 
researchers have made substantial efforts, working with implementers to aggregate the 
data, the overall figures are likely incomplete.  There tends to be multiple 
implementers in many of the zones, sometimes several seed aid rounds by one 
implementer per season, decentralized records are not necessarily forwarded to one 
coordination center,  and seed aid records overall are rarely kept for more than a few 
seasons.  Simply, the institutional memory is unusually shallow, especially as staff 
turnover in such jobs also tends to be high. Government implementers also frequently 
complained of coordination problems, even in the same zone. As one Humbo official 
lamented:   
 
“Sometimes NGOs just do anything, government doesn’t even know. At the time 
of maize planting, they may give sweet potatoes” (DPPA official, anon, Humbo 
Focus group discussion, 2005). 
                                                 
4
 contacts for site reports: Tigray - gnegusse@yahoo.com ; North Shoa – wendafrash@yahoo.com; 
Wolaita – anbes2003@yahoo.com; West Hararghe – myberhanu@yahoo.com   
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Second, in terms of assessing trends of need, implementers are adamant that seed aid 
amounts received due not correlate with seed aid needed.  Rather the amount of seed 
aid given correlates with the government or donor funds available during any 
particular season.   So the amount of aid given directly relates to money on offer, and 
not necessarily ‘beneficiary need.’    
 
The continual succession of seed aid in stress zones has been remarked on by aid 
implementers and farmers alike.  On the one hand, both groups work hard to keep the 
aid machine going (filing requests season by season, and lining up to receive 
distributions).  On the other, implementers and farmers have expressed deep concern 
over the dependencies which are developing (see quotations below).  As an example of 
this concern, WVE in Humbo makes farmers sign a contract that they really will plant 
the seed--    so that compelling ‘need’ is determined.  
 
“Seed aid in this area has become like a business” - Official in Humbo) 
 
“Now farmers want vouchers every season” – Official in West Hararghe) 
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Table 14  Period {seasons} in last 8 years when emergency seed aid has been given in the Humbo woreda  
Year  Season Number of 
HH 
Seed Aid Approach Overall 
Cost (Birr) 
Crops Quantity  Donor 
950 DSD 64,156 S/potato 8    million cuttings Gov't 1997 Belg 
56 DSD 4925.85 Maize 400    kg Gov't 
1998 Meher 1000 DSD 58850 S/potato 11.8 million cutting WVE 
Meher 74 DSD 5572.7 Ch/pea 18.5 Qt WVE 1999 
Belg 32 DSD 4925.25 Maize 8    Qt WVE 
Belg 3214 DSD  Maize 401.8 Qt WVE 2000 
Meher 416 DSD  Teff 62.4 Qt WVE 
Belg 1090 DSD  Maize 136.2 Qt WVE 
65 DSD  Maize 8.4 Qt WVE 
2001 
Meher 
169 DSD  Teff 25.4 Qt WVE 
2002 Belg 1800 DSD  Maize 112.5 Qt Gov't 
1736 Seed fair 28001 Teff 129.6 Qt USAID 
1196 Seed fair  Teff 180.6 Qt FAO 
4218 Seed fair  Teff 811    Qt WVE 
431 Seed fair 28001 H/Bean 107.8 Qt USAID 
869 Seed fair  H/Bean 391.0 Qt FAO 
2352 Seed fair  H/Bean 588    Qt WVE 
132 Seed fair  F/Bean 50    Qt WVE 
480 Seed fair 30000 Ch/Pea 120    Qt Gov't 
46 Seed fair  S/potato 92160  cuttings WVE 
260 Seed fair  Cotton 10    Qt WVE 
2003 Meher 
 
529 Seed fair  S/potato 2.4 million cuttings FAO 
1200 Seed fair  Maize 150    Qt WVE 2004 
 
Belg 
 1000 Seed fair  Sorghum 50    Qt Red Cross 
Belg 7732 DSD  Maize 832.5 Qt WVE 2005 
 Meher  DSD  Ch/pea 500    Qt WVE 
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Table 15  Tigray BoARD & WARDO overview through time on what was implemented  
Year 
 
Season Woredas No. Households Reason for seed 
aid 
Seed Aid 
Approach 
Overall Cost 
(Birr) 
Crops given + amt. of 
seed 
Donor 
2002 Meher Raya 
Azebo 
1768 Moisture stress Cash5 150,000 Chick pea FAO 
Meher Raya 
Azebo 
1200 Moisture stress Barley 600 Qt 2003 
Meher Raya 
Azebo 
2400 Moisture stress 
 
 
DSD6 
717,500 
Teff 1850 Qt 
FAO 
2004 Residual 
moisture 
Raya 
Azebo 
 Moisture stress DSD7 504,000 Chick pea 2464 Qt FAO 
Belg Raya 
Azebo  
 1691 (11 FAs) Moisture stress Cash 189,450 Teff Local Market 
Belg Alamata   942 Moisture stress Cash 105,585 Teff and maize 
2006 
Belg Ofla 1095 Moisture stress Cash 123,085 Barley and lentil 
FAO 
 
Table 16  Tigray overview of seed aid implemented through time (source: ADCS records) 
Crops given +source of seed Year  Season Woredas #HH Reason for 
seed aid 
Seed Aid 
Approach 
Overall 
Cost 
(Birr) 
Crops Source Donor 
2003 Belg Gulomekeda 2000 War and 
famine 
Seed 
voucher 
173805.95 Barley, Wheat  
 Bean 
Local vender and 
BoARD 
USAID/ OFDA 
2004 Belg Gulomekeda and 
Saissie 
1500 War and 
famine 
Seed 
voucher 
150500 Barley, Wheat  
Bean 
Local vender and 
BoARD 
USAID/ OFDA 
2005 Belg Gulomekeda, 
Saissie and Irob 
532 War and 
famine 
Seed 
voucher 
79800 Barley, Wheat 
 Bean 
Local vender and 
BoARD 
USAID/ OFDA 
2006 Belg Gulomekeda, 
Saissie  and Irob 
410 War and 
famine 
Seed 
voucher 
72980 Barley, Wheat   
Bean 
Local vender and 
BoARD 
USAID/ OFDA 
                                                 
5
 Due to urgency of the emergency relief it was decided the approach to be cash for seed but still on credit basis (revolving). 
6
 Work for seed programme (soil and water conservation activities). 
7
 Initially cash was given to BOARD, then seed purchased from different sources (local providers, farmers, and some from Gojjam) 
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CHOICE OF APPROACH  
Implementing agencies interviewed employ a range of approaches, including all those 
identified as being the main ones practiced in Ethiopia (see Table 7).  Choice of use of 
an approach seems to be most closely linked to the a) institutional philosophy of the 
implementer; b) donor guidance or stipulations and; c) capacity to implement any one 
type of response.  Seed security assessments are not done (see later section of this 
chapter), so, in the absence of diagnosis and understanding of the seed security 
problem on the ground, emergency seed aid is overwhelmingly supply driven.   
 
Approach Choice by Institution 
 
Organizations tend to specialize in one approach or another, although a select few test 
several delivery options, as their thinking evolves and sharpens.  This tendency to 
specialize means that the profile of approaches used in a zone directly corresponds to 
the implementers present in a zone.  As examples of types of aid approach and 
institutional linking   we sketch the following : 
  
• GoE:  The government prefers DSD-  it allows for large scale delivery, decision-
making is often determined centrally,  and logistics focus on well-known activities: 
procurement and distribution.  In more recent years, the GoE has also insisted, in 
theory, on the use of ‘revolving funds’ as a standard design in seed aid  in an effort 
to stem dependencies . 
 
• CARE:  This NGO generally promotes rights-based approaches and in seed aid 
feels giving farmers choice is paramount.  Much of its seed aid involves promotion 
of cash and vouchers approaches. 
 
• Catholic Relief Services (CRS):  This NGO often favors support for markets-based 
enterprises. Its experience working with seed/grain traders has also led it to believe 
that seed is usually available in stress contexts:  Hence CRS promotes Seed 
Vouchers and Fairs as the preferred seed aid option, as this approach benefits 
farmers, and sellers alike (traders, small farmer entrepreneurs). 
 
• Relief Society of Tigray (REST): This NGO embraces a clear philosophy whereby 
farmer empowerment and citizen choice is key.  Its preferred approach is 
dispensing cash (for seed and other items) directly to beneficiaries.  Beneficiaries 
thus have choice, but also ‘remain accountable’ for the strategies chosen. 
 
• World Vision Ethiopia (WVE).  This NGO has strongly allied itself to initiatives 
on agricultural intensification. Hence, even in its emergency work, WVE often 
promotes modern varieties, distributed via DSD work.  
 
These summaries represent but general tendencies.  Within the last five years in 
Ethiopia, there has been some experimentation in emergency seed aid response. For 
instance, The International Rescue Committee (IRC), and Goal, as well as CARE and 
CRS have experimented with vouchers in seed aid.  Some organizations have also 
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experimented with explicitly linking emergency to development work (see section 
below, ‘Linking Relief to Development’).   
 
The major point here is that the broad approach used in emergency seed aid is 
strongly-shaped by institutional philosophy and not necessarily by specific problems 
on the ground.  In select cases, donors also influence the seed aid content. 
USAID/OFDA for instance, prefers that aid be given that farmers themselves can 
maintain.  This donor also discourages distribution of hybrid maize in high stress 
contexts and often suggests that aid implementers diversify away from maize 
altogether, in sites where the crop has become unusually dominant.   
 
Approach Choice by Seed Security Problem 
 
Current responses are not necessarily matched to on-the-ground problems,  
implementers are working in contexts of relative ignorance, due to the lack of  security 
assessments.  Table 17 suggests useful ways for moving forward to conceptualize 
more targeted options.  The table distinguishes potentially effective response a) by type 
of seed security constraint encountered, and b) by whether the constraint is a short-
term or longer-term one. Certainly the choice of a seed-aid response is not always a 
straight-forward one as real life constraints intervene, such as timing, capacity, and 
scale of need.  However, the choice of a particular response should always be actively 
taken (and default options reviewed), and practitioners might usefully sharpen their 
understanding of what  types  of problems a particular seed-related emergency 
response can or cannot address.    
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Table 17  Types of seed security problems and broadly appropriate responses 
 
Problem Short-term Long-term 
Unavailability of 
seed 
 
 
Where farmers source seed 
predominately through informal seed 
channels: 
Enhance immediate operation of local 
and regional markets (response 
dependent on context: for example, 
offer inventory credit to traders, and 
facilitate improved access to market 
information, including advance notice 
of demand subsidies or of purchase) 
Where farmers source seed 
predominately through informal seed 
channels: 
Support development of local and 
regional markets (encourage more access 
to credit, better established market 
information channels, more effective 
transport and seed storage support.) 
 
Where farmers source seed 
predominately through formal seed 
channels: 
Direct distribution of seed 
Where farmers source seed 
predominately through formal seed 
channels: 
Support development of quality assured 
seed production or supply chains, incl. 
commercial enterprises where viable 
Poor and 
vulnerable do not 
have access to seed 
Cash disbursement 
Voucher disbursement (w/seed fairs) 
 
Poverty reduction programs 
 
Seed of poor 
quality and/or 
lack of 
appropriate 
varieties 
Seed fairs with quality controls  
Direct distribution or sale of samples 
of quality seed (for subsequent 
multiplication) 
Distribution of foundation (pure and 
healthy) seed to a limited number of 
farmers, making use of informal seed 
channels to diffuse the seed to others. 
Programs to improve seed quality (on 
farm and/or in seed and grain markets) 
 
Participatory varietal selection 
 
Participatory plant breeding 
source: Sperling et al., forthcoming  (2008) 
 
RATIONALE FOR APPROACH PREFERENCES 
While seed security problems per se do not drive response, implementers do have 
strong views on why one type of seed aid might be preferred over another.  Table 18 
summarizes implementer views on why they employ a particular approach.  Where 
possible, implementers’ own phrases have been used. 
 
 
Table 18  Implementers’ preferred approaches, and reasons for preferences. 
Organization Seed Aid Approach Preference 
 
GoE-  Humbo Direct Seed Distribution (DSD)—with revolving assed system 
• Allows seed to be purchased in bulk—lowers transaction costs 
• Office of Agriculture determines crops and varieties 
• Can include modern varieties for certain crops (maize and chickpea) 
• Can use local varieties for certain crops (teff, haricot bean) 
• (In theory), seed is not free—but has to be repaid 
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REST- Tigray Cash 
• Given the emergency nature of the intervention, there is no quicker 
and faster modality for intervention. 
• Gives an opportunity for farmers to make their own choice on the kind 
of seed (in terms of crop/crop variety) that are consistent to the local 
agro-ecology, fertility status of land, the period when the rain starts. 
• Farmers have a greater control over the quality of seed they purchase   
• Even if the farmers make mistakes, which are less likely than when 
the trader provide them with the seeds, it remains farmers’ own 
responsibility (and no one else ‘can be blamed’.)  
• There are no known sources for some seeds like “Hanfets,” (mix of 
barley and wheat) 
• Only through this method can farmers get  preferred seeds  
• DSD has problems with poor quality seeds of unknown sources   
• With DSD, there is no system to control the private seed supplies 
• Generally, extra cost for transportation, loading/unloading and storage 
facilities incurred in non-cash response 
 
ADCS- Tigray Seed Vouchers and Fairs (SVF) (on what SVF avoids) 
• Farmers can expend the cash for other purposes like schooling, food, 
closing, and other expenses 
• DSD requires detailed assessment follow up, cost and it leads to 
corruption during purchasing process.  
• Seed bought from outside the region has adaptation problems, though 
it is important when there is no seed in the surrounding area at all.  
• The coupon system can be stopped any time upon mistreatment in 
terms of price, quality and seed/variety type. 
 
CRS 
(Ethiopia) 
 
 
 
 
Seed Vouchers and Fairs  (with Livelihood Focus) 
• Allows farmers to select which crops and varieties they want 
• Has two sets of beneficiaries; farmers, but also small traders (many of 
whom may be farmer-sellers, many of whom are women) 
• Injects money into the local and regional economies-   rather than 
spending the bulk of funds outside the zone. 
 
CARE- West 
Hararghe:  
Vouchers- with select Traders 
• Gives farmers choice in crops and varieties 
• Allows farmers to access much-needed local varieties 
• Works with regional seed/grain  traders to improve seed quality 
overall and hence has lasting effects on local seed system 
• Logistically much easier than DSD, and much easier than SVF 
 
Across  
Governmental 
&  NGO 
organizations 
 
 
 
 
 
Revolving funds (Seed) 
• Repayment rate  is minimal  
• If seed is returned, it is of  low quality (broken with stones, not usable 
as seed), 
• The implementers’ collecting process from farmers is arduous 
• GO/NGO capacity to store ‘collected seed’ is not well-developed or 
strains their current  capacity storage 
 
Revolving funds (Cash- in Tigray) 
• There is no transparent and accountable systems that controls the 
revolving fund for further re-use. 
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While there is a diversity of views, both government and NGO seed aid implementers 
seem to have near-universal consensus on one seed aid practice:  that of  the proposed 
use of revolving funds. For a range of reasons offered in Table 18, implementers do 
not consider revolving funds as a viable operational option.  As summed up by one 
implementer in Humbo: 
 
“We no longer even bother to ask for repayment --- and farmers don’t offer”. So 
now, “we understand each other”. 
 
In terms of implementation, there is great variability in content even within a single 
approach.  DSD has been used to distribute both local and modern varieties; and 
vouchers have been used to help farmers obtain seed from formal sector stockists as 
well as from local seed/grain traders. 
 
Likewise, there is scope for both ‘good practice’ and ‘bad practice’ in processes of 
implementation.  In the course of field investigation, there were numerous accounts of 
DSD procurement being tied to favored interests, of seed arriving late and of targeting 
towards progressive farmers.  Similarly, use of vouchers has opened the way for 
traders (and even community elders) to abuse their roles; charging prices that are too 
high, putting on offer second rate or non-desired seed. The converse also unfolded: in 
both these approaches, supplies were delivered that met farmer-consumer needs in a 
timely fashion.   
 
A point to emphasize is that the strengths and weaknesses of an approach do not just 
lie in its overall structure.  The end-value also depends on how it has been 
implemented. Policymakers and implementers might be cautious about making blanket 
statements about the superiority of one approach over another.  Some approaches have 
clear design advantages for some contexts (particularly in terms of the seed security  
problems they aim to address).  However, their on-ground value also hinges on how 
they are implemented.  Strangely, precise guidelines for shaping field seed aid 
implementation are lacking in Ethiopia, a point highlighted later in this chapter. 
 
Quality issues: a prime point for discussion   
Finally, in terms of overall approaches used, the cross-cutting issue of quality is 
introduced.  Seed quality embraces two aspects; seed quality per se, and varietal 
quality.  Seed quality consists of physical, physiological and sanitary attributes (such 
as the germination rate, and absence/presence of disease, stones, sand, broken seed or 
weeds).  Varietal quality consists of genetic attributes, such as plant type, duration of 
growth cycle, seed color and shape, etc. 8 
The quality of seed delivered through seed assistance is an important concern – for all: 
donors, governments, seed aid implementers, farmers. Poor quality seed, that fails to 
emerge or flower and yield, can leave farm families even more food insecure. In 
unusual cases, it can also introduce longer-risk, as the oft-cited food aid example 
whereby an aid delivery in Ethiopia has been held responsible for introducing the 
invasive and toxic weed, Parthenium hysterophorous, or ‘Congress weed’ (Aberra 
Deressa, pers. comm., 2005; Berhanu Gebre-Medhin, 1992).  Hararghe farmers call it 
                                                 
8
 This section draws from L. Sperling et al. 2006e.    
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feremsis, meaning ‘sign off’ (and leave your farm), and the weed has become a serious 
constraint to farming in the last 15 years.  
 
Issues of seed quality very much shape the types of seed assistance that can unfold. In 
emergency seed procurement, quality issues most often focus on whether the seed is 
healthy and physically pure (as several donors require formal certification prior to seed 
procurement.). Quality stereotypes equate seed coming from the formal sector 
commercial sources as being of high performing varieties with high germination and 
good seed health, and seed coming from the informal sector (home-produced or 
procured from the market) as being of poor quality of low performing traditional 
varieties. Recent field studies show that such labels can be deceptive (Otsyula et al., 
2004).  The quality of formal-sector seed may not be as advertised and emergency-
grade seed overall is of both variable health and genetic quality. Farmer seed and 
market seed has also proven to be ‘objectively’ of good quality, as assessed in 
laboratory analyses (Rubyogo, 2006; Otsyula et al., 2004). 
 
The focus on the seed health parameter of “quality” in emergency has diverted 
attention away from what might be the more important quality issue: the seed on offer 
must be adapted to the stress conditions at hand, and have farmer- acceptable crop 
characteristics.  While relatively few crops and varieties are multiplied by the formal 
sector, those emerging from formal research sectors or on offer from commercial 
companies are assumed ‘good enough’ for emergency distribution, whether or not they 
have been selected for use in the regions of stress or for growing under the 
management conditions practiced by recipient farmers. So in the relief business, there 
are often trade-offs to accessing seed with a given varietal quality versus seed with a 
given health/physical quality (Sperling et al., 2006e).   
 
In commenting on quality in specific Ethiopian field sites, many practitioners have 
given priority to ‘getting the variety right.’  Thus in the Humbo area, officials prefer to 
use local varieties in aid for some crops, but seek maize, chickpea and sweet potato 
from formal systems.  In contrast, implementers in Gera Keya have almost exclusively 
focused on formal sector varieties and hence restrict their distributions largely to 
modern varieties wheat. 
 
Formal seed sector certification is not the only way to promote good seed quality (and, 
as indicated, varieties of such seed may be sub-standard for emergency situations.).  
NGOs, such as WVE in Wolaita ask for competitive bids on seed procured by traders 
from the local markets, specifically so WVE can review seed quality issues.  Within 
the voucher or seed voucher and fair system, seed quality issues are also built into the 
process in several ways. In the CARE approach, NGO personnel screen the traders to 
be involved in the initial procurement: in addition to having a license, traders have to 
agree to separate out varieties, have a warehouse, and maintain specific seed stores.  In 
the CRS approach, local farmer-based seed committees are engaged to assess the 
quality of seed lots prior to their purchase or to recruit seed sellers with locally 
respected seed.  One advantage of empowering local communities to plan and 
implement seed aid programs is that it enables social certification.  Precise individuals, 
identifiable within the community, are held accountable for the quality of seed. 
Further, if farmers do not like what they buy—they will boycott that trader for many 
seasons to come.  Ensuring seed providers are accountable for the product they put on 
offer can be a powerful monitoring tool. 
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Lastly, the ideal clashes with the real, when seed aid implementation is delayed. When 
programming reaches the stage of ‘too late’, local chickpea, from any source available, 
is overwhelmingly the crop/variety of choice in seed aid programs.  Quality issues 
during late implementation may fall by the wayside. 
 
Underlying Themes Guiding Seed Aid Approach Choice 
Underlying the choice of an approach, there are two more recent aid strategy thrusts 
which bear mention:  moves to empower communities in the aid process; and efforts to 
link the relief phase with more developmental gains. 
Empowerment 
This empowerment thrust manifests itself in a) giving farmers choice in selecting crops 
and varieties so as to strategize on their own sowing needs during stress periods and b) 
giving them cash, to allot among seed and non-seed needs post- disaster.  It comes 
from a dual logic:  that farmers have the real expertise and the right to decide what is 
needed or not; and, second; that with rights come responsibilities, so farmers should be 
held accountable for the choices made.   This more empowering or rights-based 
perspective contrasts markedly with some of the more top-down agriculture packages 
programs promoted by the GoE and NGOs throughout the countryside. 
Linking Relief to Development 
The second thrust shaping some types of seed aid comes from the recognition that seed 
aid is often being given in chronic stress areas, and in areas where only modest 
development initiatives may exist.  Some implementers consciously promote 
developmental perspectives under the umbrella of relief.  Whether the process is done 
well or not (and whether the specific programs chosen are the right ones) presents one 
set of questions.  Whether a more ‘developmental relief’ perspective is needed is 
beyond question. 
 
Three types of more developmental relief identified during the fieldwork are 
summarized below.   
 
A) Local level seed enterprise/ Improving seed quality 
 
Some NGOs, during emergency, aim to improve seed quality or stimulate seed 
enterprises by working through local seed systems.  As examples, the International 
Rescue Committee (IRC) routinely sources its bean relief seed from small scale farmer 
producers in the Alemaya area  (Berhanu Amsalu, personal communication).  
Similarly, one of the big traders linked with CARE’s voucher program buys some of 
his emergency supplies from small-scale, community based seed initiatives in the 
Boffa area.  Both these initiatives support fledging small-scale seed enterprises. 
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B) Stimulating local economies 
 
Other NGOs use the seed aid vehicle to support agro-enterprise in the economy more 
generally.  CRS, for example, stresses that local small scale traders and farmers are 
equal beneficiaries in its seed voucher and fair (SVF) programs.  In terms of its seed 
sellers at fairs, CRS gives priority to smaller traders, women traders and even farmer 
traders, in efforts to keep the money circulating within the local region and to give the 
first-cut benefits to those with incipient or small-scale businesses.  (The approach 
contrasts somewhat with CARE’s voucher approach as the latter ends up working with 
somewhat larger traders, due to its procurement stipulations).  (see Chapter VI, on 
Traders.) 
 
C) Introducing modern varieties9 
 
Third, a major aid vehicle perceived as a developmental one focuses on distributing 
modern varieties within DSD programs.  Whether this approach indeed links relief 
with development greatly depends on how the activity is designed and implemented 
during the emergency phase. 
 
Introducing new varieties can play a role in restoring food security in times of crisis. 
Crises may be caused by crop/variety breakdowns (e.g. spurred by plant disease or 
sharply declining soil fertility).  More routinely, crises may be seen as an opportunity 
to introduce new varieties to promote what are considered more ‘modern’ practices to 
strengthen systems plagued by low production. 
 
Regardless of the potential for improving smallholder productivity through new variety 
introduction, it is important to first evaluate possible limits to such introductions in 
crisis times.  In periods of emergency and prolonged stress, small farmers are already 
at levels of increased risk: they are generally poorer, having lost household assets, 
livestock or crops in the field; and cannot afford to waste further often scarce land or 
labor resources. 
 
Emergency seed aid which is considering possible crop/variety introductions has to be 
programmed along a well-planned set of steps.  Among the key elements:  the crop and 
variety have to be ‘proven’  for the context (both adapted and farmer-acceptable);  
farmers have to be given a choice as to whether or not they want to test the new 
materials or not  (and these should be test sizes, not seed amounts to cover large 
surfaces); and  subsequent  monitoring and evaluation has to be  built into the ‘aid 
project’, at least long enough to see field performance and whether farmers want to 
sow such varieties again (see Box 4 for full set of steps).  
 
Disturbingly, as will be seen in a following section on seed assessments, emergency 
seed aid in several regions in Ethiopia is sometimes used as the main vehicle whereby 
farmers get access to modern varieties.   This practice shows a clear confusion of the 
                                                 
9
 This section draws heavily on the published seed security and seed aid practice brief, ”Using seed aid 
to give farmers access to seed of new varieties.” Sperling et al. 2006e 
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between the relief process and much needed- development programs.   It also 
represents a very costly (uneconomical) way of promoting modern varieties, by 
randomly distributing them during high stress periods.  Seed aid should not be used to 
fill in for failed or non-existent development programs.  Selectively making modern 
varieties on offer, within relief programs, can however, make a positive different in 
well-planned cases. 
 
Box 4  Introducing new varieties in acute stress periods: key steps. (source: Sperling et al., 
2006c) 
 
Having given an overview of approaches in use by the GO and NGO implementers at 
the field level, the report briefly reviews salient seed aid-related issues in three key 
implementation realms: targeting, evaluation and needs assessment.  These are 
addressed in order of increasingly complexity, as perceived by implementers. 
 
• Conduct a Seed System Security Assessment 
a. What are the current seed system weaknesses and strengths? 
b. Would new varieties open up promising opportunities: why, how, for 
whom? 
c. What are the potential risks? 
 
• Work with farm communities and other informed personnel to choose possible 
new varieties:    Is there sufficient prior evidence that varieties: 
a. are adapted to the specific agro-ecological zones? 
b. meet farmers’ acceptability criteria  (harvest/post harvest. for 
subsistence/market)? 
c. can be successfully used under farmers’ own management conditions (e.g. 
without fertilizer) ? 
 
• Design introductions so as to minimize risk and maximize farmers’ informed 
choice 
a. Offer ‘test size’ packets:  introductions should be small-scale. 
b. Give farmers choices to use variety or not, and if possible, put several 
varieties on offer 
c. Provide sufficient accompanying information to allow farmers to make 
variety choices and management decisions (planting time, levels of input 
use, crop associations) 
 
• Build in explicit monitoring and evaluation of new varieties: are they 
performing? for whom? where? 
 
• Count on a multi-year process:  
a. Can the new introductions be successfully integrated into stressed farming 
systems?   
b. If yes, is further fine-tuning needed? 
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Implementation Issue I: Targeting 
Targeting of Recipients for Seed Aid 
Targeting (at all levels) presents its own challenges, the scope of which go beyond this 
seed-aid report.  A number of documents on targeting reports exist for Ethiopia, giving 
overall trends, and NGOS themselves often reflect on their site specific conditions in 
the course of follow-up. This section highlights what may be seed specific concerns; 
i.e. issues related to seed aid targeting  which are not necessarily related  food or other 
non-food item delivery.  
Targeting: seed aid specific needs 
In terms of seed aid, three distinct points bear emphasis.  First, a family having food 
shortage does not necessarily have a seed shortage (see Chapter III) While, 
implementers may find it logistically easy to deliver food aid and seed aid as a 
package, such a practice is often uneconomical. Common wisdom suggests that the 
subset lacking seed is much smaller that the subset lacking food. 
 
Second, to use seed, key conditions need to be in place. A household has to have 
access to land (but not necessarily own it); needs labor to ensure sowing is on time  (a 
constraint if one is working first to help others seed their plots) and, in Ethiopia, a 
household often needs access to oxen to prepare the fields. During study 
investigations, farmers frequently complained that while they received seed on 
schedule, but they could not rent oxen—so sowed late, or did not sow at all. For some 
regions of Ethiopia, implementers might consider how a ‘seed and oxen-use voucher’ 
program can be tested systematically. 
 
Third, as modern varieties are often the input delivered in aid, particularly by 
government officials, implementers might reflect which type of household (land 
profile, input access) can or cannot absorb this type of seed aid.   This issue of ‘tied 
seed aid’ (that is aid which is useful only if rigorous conditions are met) should  lead to 
more refined targeting processes.  Types of seed aid should be distinguished   for 
chronic stress recipients, for acute stress victims (flood, intermittent conflict), and for 
developmental recipients (stratifying here also between those who do or do not have 
access to inputs.).   
 
Seed Aid Recipient Criteria 
As with other items, seed aid targeting takes place at two levels: area targeting and 
beneficiary targeting 
 
• Area targeting: Usually done at woreda level by team from office of 
administration, agriculture, DPPA and NGO to identify  the specific seed needy 
area/location within the woreda.  
 
• Beneficiary targeting: This is often done by a committee comprised of  key 
informants, development agents, elders and church leaders.  The committee selects 
beneficiaries using set criteria (e.g. Box 5)  but final approval may be via a 
community meeting.  A  complaint settlement committee at each Farmers’ 
Association may also address issues of any missed targeting (absent beneficiaries). 
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Box 5 summarizes one recent targeting negotiation between FAO and REST  for 
distributing seed in 2005.  The list is one of the more comprehensive lists available, 
although most of the indicators are associated primarily with poverty (and the harvest 
threshold is quite high!).  It is quite challenging and potentially time-consuming to 
target specifically for seed aid.  One procedure used by WVE in Humbo helps 
participants themselves self-select who does or does not need aid.  Simply, farmers 
who take seed aid have to sign a contract that they will plant it and not sell it.   This 
procedure stems from the experience that seed aid often is not used as expected.  It 
may be eaten or sold, as highly valued seed can fetch good prices,   In a concrete 
example again from Humbo, a farmer with 81 Birr of coupons (vouchers) sold to 
another for 60 Birr, and both benefited.  In this case, the seed aid activity proved one 
of income generation).. 
 
Box 5  FAO - REST Agreements : Tigray:  Targeting Seed Aid Recipients (source: FAO, 
2005) 
Implementation Issue II: Evaluation 
Within this study, even the very basic ‘logistical’ evaluation figures were hard to trace 
beyond several seasons:  how much seed was delivered, to whom and where, or how 
many farmers were reached with vouchers across a zone.  Such a shallow institutional 
memory is disturbing given the length of time seed aid has been implemented in 
Ethiopia, the scale on which it has been practiced and the amount of money which has 
been spent.  This lack of monitoring and evaluation also means that very little learning  
(feedback) is taking place in seed aid practice.  
 
Isolated examples of different types of evaluations were located. They are mentioned 
here so that practitioners (and government) might start to share experiences.   In terms 
of real time evaluations (as the event is unrolling), CRS is a prime implementer doing 
Non-negotiable entry points 
A. Families who had little or no harvest (>50% crop failure) as a consequence of 
drought; 
B. Families falling in to the poorest category, 30% of the community; 
C. Families who have "access" to sufficient land for planting (generally minimum of 
0.25ha) not necessarily owned. 
 
Other criteria to be followed in the screening of beneficiary lists 
1.  Priority to elder (>60) and child headed families (<18); 
2.  Priority to women headed households; 
3.  Priority to households with large family size (>6 members); 
4.  Priority to families with chronically ill or disabled members; 
5.  Priority to families with orphaned children; 
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this routinely, during the period when its seed voucher and fairs are taking place. At a 
slightly later stage, after seed delivery CONCERN (Humbo-Wolaita) regularly 
conducts post-season distributions, as does REST (Tigray). REST, in particular, seems 
to monitor the growth cycle quite closely: emergence, flowering, grain filling, and 
harvest. WVE (Humbo) also did a revealing follow-up  after a ‘cash for relief 
distribution’, where money was given to help farmers replace lost assets (c. 2004)   It 
found that farmer recipients had spent most of the aid money given to acquire livestock 
(cows, goats) and that virtually none of the funds had been allotted to seed.  The results 
promote reflection on whether seed aid is priority activity for this context.  
 
Lastly, a few select donors have been the driving force for promoting more extensive 
evaluations within the past couple of years.  The USAID/OFDA, in particular, has 
solicited specific evaluations to compare different types of seed over one season, and 
to look more closely at the effectiveness of its vouchers program,  (Brandstetter, 2004; 
Gregg, 2004). Again, overall, only a paltry number of seed-aid related evaluations can 
be located, for more than three decades of aid.   
 
In brief, there is a real need for integrated monitoring and evaluation, at various levels 
in Ethiopia, through time and across zones, if seed aid practice is to evolve in positive 
ways.  This means that practitioners have to be willing to reflect on went well- or not;  
and donors have to be open to accepting (and lauding reports) which suggest mistakes 
had been made.  Box 6 outlines the diverse types of evaluations which should be 
associated with seed aid programs through time, and the specific types themes which 
need to be addressed within each.   Such evaluation will only take place if the GoE and 
donors promote them, if funds and human resources are made available to conduct 
them, and if the lessons subsequently learned are then fed into evolving policy and 
program design.  No implementer wants to spend time conducting evaluations if the 
results are not subsequently used.   
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Box 6  Seed System Relief and  Evaluation Overview (source: Sperling et al., 2006d) 
Type of 
Evaluation 
Agency’s assessments of 
 
Recipients’ assessment of  
 
 
Real-time   
 
(during 
intervention) 
 
Insights (from diverse perspectives) on: 
 
• products on offer (crop/variety choice, seed quality, seed amounts) 
• the immediate intervention process  (--whatever is signaled as important, e.g.  
length of intervention, incl. waiting time; number and order of farmers served,  
adequacy of support personnel)  
Output 
 
(about one-
month after) 
 Insights on the  efficiency of intervention: its organization and general  logistics 
(from diverse perspectives): 
 
• timing (especially in relation to subsequent planting) 
• targeting ( process and  perceived ‘fairness’ ) 
• choice of locales 
• choice of crops and varieties 
• adequacy of  seed quality on offer (and validity of process guiding quality 
verification) 
• adequacy of preparatory information or sessions 
• scale (numbers served, overall amounts of seed or products delivered or made 
accessible ) 
 
(What worked? What was missing? What modifications should be made in future?) 
 
Outcome 
 
(after first 
season) 
 
 
Insights on first effects of intervention.  
 
Recipient Focus: 
• Yield performance and farmer satisfaction with  crop/varieties obtained as aid 
(qualitative and quantitative variety attributes 
• Importance of seed aid in relation to farmers’ other seed sources 
o what proportion of the aid given was sown and why? 
o what  proportion of the total seed sown came from aid (versus , home-
saved seed, local markets, exchange) and why? 
 
Farming System/Implementer Focus: some key guide questions, 
 
• Was the impact of the disaster on farming systems sufficiently understood to 
guide planning  (looking with hindsight)? 
• Was the general choice of intervention valid (and linked to a specific seed 
security need?) 
• Was the intervention actually needed (what evidence)? 
• Did the intervention strengthen or protect seed security (evidence)? 
• Which broad groups were reached via the intervention (and which not)? 
• Where there any unanticipated positive effects? 
• Where there unanticipated negative effects? 
 
(What worked? What was missing? What modifications should be made in future?) 
Impact  
evaluations 
 
(after several 
seasons) 
Impact of intervention on:  (including possible negative as well as positive effects.)  
 
• Stability of production and food security 
• Crop and varietal diversity (positive and possible negative effects) 
• Household income - local economy. 
• Seed channel functioning , incl: local grain market functioning and  
commercial enterprise development 
• System resilience to possible next set of shocks? 
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Implementation Issue III: Seed Needs Assessment at the Local 
Level 
As the third key theme, we consider seed needs assessments, or what might be  better 
labeled seed security assessments.  Basically the question being asked is whether 
farmers have seed security during a crisis period.  More explicitly, this involves three 
sub-questions:  is seed available? can farmers access it? and is it of the right quality 
(right varieties, with good health and germination potential)?  Assessing ‘seed needs’, 
the more common term, unfortunately carries with it the connotation that the process is 
about seed counting.  It includes an assumption that seed is needed (that seed is not 
available), and that the challenge is to determine how much seed is needed.  
 
The overall framework used in Ethiopia for assessing seed security has been described 
in Chapter III.  Seed security is assessed (or seed need is assumed) based on the Crop 
and Food Supply Assessment Missions, (although experts here confirm that the 
CFSAM method has no seed security component per se; H. Josserand, pers. comm., 
2007).  The overall trigger for seed aid need is near-universal  pronouncement of  a 
‘harvest failure’ or crop production loss.  Again, the usefulness of the ‘harvest failure’ 
indicator has been questioned. (Chapter III) and data clearly show that only in extreme 
cases would a production shortfall necessarily directly lead to a seed shortfall (Box 1).  
 
In this section, the report looks how the processes of seed security assessment unfold 
at the local woreda level.  It is this unit of analysis which subsequently informs all 
those above it, as seed needs are amalgamated from the woreda upwards – to the zone 
or region – and then to the national levels.  If the seed security assessment process has 
weaknesses at this pillar unit of analysis, it has flaws all the way up the assessment 
chain.  While some argue that the woreda is an inappropriate unit of assessment as it 
rarely corresponds to a well-defined agro-ecological zone, the woreda has the 
advantage that it is a concerted zone of action.  Government officers can likely 
accommodate (and know well) any agro-ecological variations.    
 
Seed Needs Assessments: the process officially outlined 
The normative (theoretical) process for security assessment contains a number of basic 
features across zones. 
 
Crop assessment is carried out twice to four times a year i.e. in 'Belg' and 'Meher' 
seasons.   In some cases, there are both pre- and post-harvest assessments.  In others, 
mainly a post-harvest focus.  Depending on the zone, the crop assessment done for 
Belg season might be around May or June and for Meher season at October.  
 
A team from offices of agriculture (agronomist, animal husbandry expert) and DPPA 
carry out this crop assessment by area. Health and education officers might also be 
involved.  Farmers and Development Agents often offer advice as to which areas may 
be most affected as well as insights into specific crop or livestock problems.  In 
Tigray, a level below the woreda, the Tabia, helps monitor and feed information back 
to woreda officials throughout the cropping season. 
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The crop assessment is done using farm questionnaires, physical observation, market 
survey and farm survey.  In some cases specific grain yield loss assessments are 
effected.  From the yield assessment, a food gap is calculated (e.g. 15 kg of some crop 
bases per individual per month).   The food gap then vaguely translated into a seed 
gap. At all field sites this process of translation from food to seed gap remains unclear.   
 
Other select non-crop information may also be collected.   For instance, the market 
price of live animals and milk products may be assessed.  It will then be translated in 
terms of money /income/ a farm household might obtain—and translated again into the 
amount of food which can be purchased. Where safety programs are operational, 
monthly stipends might also be factored into the final ‘food gap tally.’  At no point, in 
any of the field zones, was a specific seed security assessment or even a seed need 
assessment procedure described.  Further, in three of the four zones,  two factors were 
described as shaping the demand for seed:  a) the seed gap (as extrapolated from the 
food gap); and b) the quantities of modern varieties wanted, so as to introduce more 
promising materials into the zone.    
 
In brief, no seed security assessment is effected at the woreda level:  Further, seed 
figures are based on  a) estimates of seed shortage, plus  b)  desired quantities of 
modern varieties which implementers’ hope to acquire via the seed aid process.  
 
Seeds Needs Assessment: process as implemented 
The actual process of seed security/seed needs assessment is somewhat different from 
what is officially described.  In terms of several variations from the norm, government 
officials reported:     
 
“Government asks us if we need seed, -- and we say yes.”  (DPPA: Humbo ) 
[no assessment is made].    
 
“We try to visit a few fields-  but transport is problem and  the needed profile 
of personnel is not available.  (BoARD- Hararghe).” 
 
“Seed aid since I have been here has been going on since 1993.  There have 
been no assessments” (BoARD - Humbo) 
 
Other, more technical challenges became more evident on a routine basis.  Officials are 
not clear what degree of harvest loss might represent a problem for future sowing 
needs (30% loss?  50%?  70%?).  Further, not knowing specific land areas cultivated 
per crop, officials frequently base crop-specific estimates on full hectarge being 
farmed, not on the hectarage of the crop per se. 
 
Two field examples illustrate further problems and challenges shaping seed security 
assessments at the woreda level. 
Miesso: Hararghe    
Officials in Miesso transparently shared records of three seed aid requests and receipts.  
They also projected the 2007 season.  Their comments of the process helped clarify the 
seed aid mechanics. 
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The figures on seed aid below suggest in the Miesso case that most of the seed 
requested was indeed received, for the three seasons indicated.  However, as signaled 
by woreda officials, the amounts requested were relatively small (except in 2003, when 
the full request was not met.)  Officials emphasized that they specifically limited 
requests so that their modest targets would be met. 
 
Of equal interest are the yield loss projections which spurred seed aid.  In all four 
cases, they hover around 60% loss.  However, seed aid requests, when specified in 
terms of households to be served, show a steady increase across the season, going from 
562 to 3048 households, despite the same estimated yield losses across years.  It 
becomes clear that seed aid in this high stress zone in not about yield loss per se, but 
rather about technology transfer. Seed aid is an important vehicle for moving modern 
varieties.  It is local officials who offered this insight.  
 
Table 19  Miesso seed aid requests and receipts in 2003 Meher.  
Crop Seed requested (Qtl) Seed received (Qtl) 
Sorghum 1000 900 
Maize 1250 115 
Teff 100 100 
Chickpea 400 450 
Haricot bean 400 200 
Sesame 6 0 
Notes:   
• The sorghum sourced was local, from traders and farmers (varieties not specified).   Tests with the 
agronomist from local office showed >85% germination.  
• Teff was MV from Debre Zeit station, obtained with FAO money.  
 
Table 20  Miesso seed aid requests and receipts in 2005 Meher.  
Crop Seed requested (Qtl) Seed received (Qtl) 
Maize 256.2 256.2 
Sesame 11.24 11.24 
Notes:   
• Fast-maturing maize planted mostly when early sowings fail, for late planting 
• Sesame is a ‘development’ crop—high value for cash.  
• This aid request was in response to a  60% yield loss before that season, which would put 
51,374 farmers (presumably including all family members) in food deficit. From these figures, they 
planned seed provision for 562 households.  
 
Table 21  Miesso seed aid requests and receipts in 2006 Meher.  
Crop Seed requested (Qtl) Seed received (Qtl) 
Maize 167 167 
Haricot bean 134.3 34 
Notes:   
• Maize was ‘Katumani’ or ‘Melkassa 1’, beans were ‘Mexican 142’ (MV). 
• A production shortfall for beans was why they said they received less beans than requested 
(presumably means MV seed production).   
• yield loss again “not more than 60%:   gave seed aid to 1 011 households.  .   
• FAO-supported Community-Based Seed Enterprise were source of some seed, as they have two 
sites in Miesso woreda 
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This present year (2007), officials again predict a yield loss of 60%, and this time have 
requested seed aid for 3,048 households.  Among the varieties requested is the 
sorghum MV ‘Meko’. 
 
Raya Azebo: Tigray 
Seed Aid requests and receipts in Raya Azebo show a somewhat separate pattern.  
Table 22 summarizes seed requests and seed received for three years. 
 
Table 22 Raya Azebo seed aid requests and receipts  
Year Season Crop Seed requested 
(Qtl) 
Seed received 
(Qtl) 
Meher Teff 250 217.1 2005   
 Meher Chickpea -* 80 
Belg Teff 750 78.4 2006 
 Meher Chickpea 850* 272 
Belg Teff 603 - 2007 
 Meher Chickpea -* 110 
Source: Raya Azebo woreda office (*cases where Meher rains were too late, so chickpea was 
brought in to grow on residual moisture) 
 
In all cases, the seed received was significantly less than that requested  In terms of the 
seed requested, 86%, 32%, 11% and 0% was received, for the varied requests from 
2005-2007.  Reductions in the amount delivered were explained by the limits in the 
overall funding eventually received.   However in two cases, crops not requested 
completely replaced other crops requested (chickpea was substituted for teff).  Perhaps 
there was a complete shift in seed aid strategy in the middle of the season?  Certainly if 
the rains unexpectedly stop, a short cycle crop, such as chickpea, would be needed.  
Alternatively, if the distributions were late, chickpea may have been offered as a stop 
gap measure. 
 
 In terms of the discrepancy between amounts received and requested, officials in 
Addis Ababa recounted that cuts are the norm for this woreda rather than the 
exception. As stated by one member of the Agricultural Task Force, “We have never 
accepted what they have provided: we always adjust their figures”  (anon, 2007).   
 
This tendency to negotiate amounts was confirmed to the research team at several 
points.  As an FAO officer frankly stated, “we are often required to reduce amounts 
requested dramatically, so we get on the telephone to woredas and start to negotiate: 
‘why don’t you reduce this number on this or that’.  Simply, this is not professional  
and we need to rethink this whole seed assessment process.”  (Amare Mengistu, pers. 
comm., 2007.) 
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Seed Needs Assessments at the woreda level  
In sum, in reference to seed security assessments at the woreda level: 
 
1)  There are none.  Food security assessments are conducted. 
 
2)   Seed need calculations are skewed, based on seed shortage being extrapolated from 
‘food gaps’  
 
3) Seed calculations are additionally skewed: based on implementers’ frequent 
practice to use seed aid as the vehicle to acquire new varieties. 
 
4) Maneuvering all along the chain (lack of trust in accuracy of figures and alternate 
agendas) shapes all technical  calculations.  Knowing that figures may be cut, 
initial seed estimates may be inflated. 
 
Some of this information may not be ‘new’  (especially to those on the ‘inside’ of these 
processes).  However, it is past time to address the technical challenges in getting 
rigorous seed security assessments, with the woreda at the node.  Equally important 
will be putting in place political processes, which encourage accuracy. This would 
mean that decision-makers would aim to deliver seed requested, if seed were shown to 
be needed, and if funds were available to cover that need. 
 
 
SUMMARY:  GO/NGO IMPLEMENTER INSIGHTS 
• Historical records show seed aid to be continuous in areas considered as stress 
zones.  In the site of this field study where records were most complete, 
investigations found seed given 13 times in a period of nine years. 
 
• It is not possible to state if the amount of seed aid needed in any one zone is 
increasing or decreasing.  Records are fragmented. As important, seed aid received 
is related only to the level of funds available, not to the level of seed aid 
necessarily needed. 
 
• Emergency seed aid approaches used are strongly shaped by institutional 
philosophy, rather than by concrete problems encountered on the ground.   Hence, 
seed aid approaches used in a zone seed directly depend on which implementers 
are present in the zone.   
 
• The GoE generally uses a Direct Seed Distribution (DSD) approach, sometimes 
coupled with a demand for repayment (labeled as revolving funds). GO and NGO 
implementers near-universally assess the ‘revolving funds’ approach as a non-
viable system: “It just doesn’t work”.  
 
• The NGO implementers have taken the lead in testing non-DSD approaches, cash, 
vouchers, seed vouchers and fairs,  although some NGOs still also favor DSD, 
particularly to promote new varieties. 
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• Two themes shape some of the novel trends in seed aid programming:  
 
o Approaches to empower farmers within the seed aid process; 
 
o Approaches to link relief response to more developmental initiatives.  
Explicitly programming a ‘developmental relief’ perspective might be 
particularly important for chronic stress contexts. 
 
• ‘Developmental relief’ work presently encompasses: support to small scale 
business enterprises during the relief phase; support to local traders as beneficiaries 
in relief  via the SVF system; and introduction of new varieties as part of  relief 
aid.   
 
• Seed aid targeting is little differentiated from food aid targeting.  In one effort to 
encourage that seed received is actually used, one NGO asks that recipients sign a 
‘contract’ to plant and not sell. 
 
• Evaluations are few and far between.  Seed aid is often treated as a logistical 
exercise (buy and distribute seed).  Little learning is taking place in seed aid 
particularly on even its short-term effects. There are a few notable exceptions. 
Overall, the list is paltry in comparison to the thousands of emergency seed 
programs.   
 
• Seed security assessments by NGOs are not conducted. 
 
• Seed security assessments at the local government (woreda) level are not 
conducted.  At best, seed needs are extrapolated from food security assessments.   
 
• Seed need estimates at the woreda level are calculated for two different factors: 
‘possible seed shortage’; and requests to acquire modern varieties for the zone. 
Seed need requests may be particularly inflated so as to obtain modern varieties.  
 
• In sum, seed aid approaches are overwhelming supply-driven.  Need for seed is 
often not determined nor do seed security assessments take place which might  
identify concerns beyond immediate seed availability.  Seed aid is used to meet 
mixed agendas: to help with possible seed shortages and to obtain development 
inputs (new varieties), as these may not be easily obtained otherwise.  
 
 
MOVING FORWARD: RECOMMENDATIONS 
• The overall goals of seed aid in emergency need to be defined—and implementation 
strategies should directly be tailored to those goals. (Implementers should be strongly 
encouraged to stop using seed aid mainly to obtain new varieties.)  
 
• Given that seed aid is mostly going on in chronic stress contexts,  a broader set of 
‘developmental relief‘ strategies needs to be articulated and tested on the ground. 
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• Seed-related  responses have to be better matched to actual seed security problems 
encountered on the ground. This can be encouraged by building capacity to 
conduct seed security assessments (point below); and also by building capacity 
among implementers to implement a greater range of response options. 
 
• Seed security assessment capacity needs to be built at the woreda level.  Technical 
tools are already in development to help agricultural officials move forward.  These 
include harvest/seed tables, and field ‘seed system security assessment’ (SSSA) 
guides.  An explicit technical process needs to be put in place to: 
o raise awareness of seed security versus food security issues 
o set up woreda level seed security indicators 
o train woreda level staff in seed security field assessments  
 
• A political environment for ‘real seed security assessment’ has to be established.  
This is no easy task.  Technical advances in methods alone will not lead to more 
accurate assessments. 
 
• The complete gap in seed aid implementer guidelines for Ethiopia needs to be 
addressed. An initial set of issues for inclusion in guidelines has been suggested by 
seed security experts (Box 7).  These need to be sharpened through wide 
consultation. 
 
Box 7 Proposed guidelines for the implementation of seed relief in Ethiopia.  
SEED RELIEF GUIDELINES FOR ETHIOPIA: (proposed items) 
• Seed security assessment needs to be effected prior to intervention 
 
• The type of aid response should be matched to the seed security problem at hand 
 
• Implementing organizations need to have agronomic expertise (seed aid is not just a 
logistical exercise).  Such aid intervenes at the heart of a farming system. 
 
• IF seed is to be provided, Minimally  (examples) 
1. adapted crops and accepted varieties need to be put on offer 
2. the quality should be at least as good as what farmers normally use 
 
• Modern varieties should be introduced in crisis periods only after a well-programmed 
set of steps has been followed (see Box 4) 
 
• Monitoring and evaluation should be built into all seed relief interventions- to promote 
learning by doing, and improve practice. Such a commitment to follow-up should be a 
pre-condition to receipt of funds 
 
• If seed aid in any one zone continues for multiple seasons (3 or more) a review process 
should take place.  The review should either a) to justify the continuance of emergency 
aid, or  b) stop the aid and plan an explicit exit strategy. 
 
• Implementers should be held accountable for the products they deliver (whether from 
formal sector or from traders). Processes need to be devised for ensuring this 
accountability. 
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VI: IMPLEMENTATION - SUPPLY SIDE:  TRADERS 
 
Seed/grain traders, those who sell in open markets and move supplies within and 
across regions, are critical actors in helping farmers achieve seed security.  During 
normal times, Ethiopian farmers are increasingly using local markets to source some of 
their seed (Dalton and Lipper, 2007).  This may be to top off seed from their own 
harvests; to get new, local or modern varieties which they want to test; to renew seed 
stocks; and, occasionally to fill empty seed stores.10  During crisis times, such traders 
are also critical suppliers of seed to GO and NGO implementers engaged in seed aid, 
as farmers may seek a larger proportion of their seed off-farm.  (Note that we use the 
term “seed/grain trader” to refer to those suppliers who sell crops largely for use as 
grain, but a subset of which can potentially be used as seed  - assuming it is adapted, 
and of farmer-acceptable quality.  
 
This section draws on trader expertise to get additional insight into trends in seed 
security and seed aid assistance.  Via traders, we also aim to understand better what 
happens to seed supply and markets during periods of stress: that is, how do drought, 
floods, civil strife affect seed availability, farmers’ access to seed (including prices) 
and seed quality?    
 
TRADERS AND SEED SUPPLY 
To conduct this work, investigations first sketched out the broad seed/grain supply 
chains in the two select regions of Menz Gera Midir (part of former Gera Keya, in 
North Shoa) and West Hararghe.  Trader interviews were then conducted at the various 
levels of these supply and purchase chains.  It is necessary to differentiate among 
levels of traders for two reasons directly related to seed security.  First, in terms of 
seed quality, one need to find out if traders deal in seed (and potential seed) as well as 
grain. Hence it important to differentiate among: those who collect directly from 
farmers and may keep potential seed separate;  those who bulk grain and seed;  and 
those who source crop materials from further away.  Second, in terms of seed security, 
one needs to understand the degree to which traders can influence overall supply or 
seed availability. Naturally, traders who have large and reliable transport and storage 
facilities (large trucks, well conditioned storage units), define their territory  of 
potential action (i.e. getting supplies) differently from, say a local seller, who brings 
her own-produced seed to markets on a bicycle or donkey.  Bigger traders (regional 
traders or wholesalers) need to be interviewed, as these business people may be able to 
bring seed/grain from areas quite distant.  Likewise, it is also important to work with 
traders who engage in direct transactions with farmers—as they can give insight into 
local seed availability (as well as distinguish what can usefully be planted, and what 
                                                 
10
 While emergency aid reports may often state that   “Farmers ate all their seed”, as a justification for 
the aid request,  field evidence shows that this happens much less often less assumed.  As farmer lore 
comments,  “No one wants his daughter to marry someone who is silly enough to consume all his seed 
stocks.”  
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not).  During the course of investigations 21 extensive interviews  were conducted in 
the Asebe Teferi/West Hararghe area; and 14 in Gera Keya /Menz Gera Midir).    
 
Seed / grain:  do traders know to distinguish between the two? 
Interviews in two regions showed that traders, as a group, can theoretically distinguish 
seed from grain along a number of parameters, but only occasionally manage the two 
clusters separately.  Much depends on the traders’ customer base: where the seed/grain 
products will be sold and what the customer demands.  
 
As Box 8 shows much of traders’ potential management of seed quality (for those who 
calculate seed purchasers as one customer base) focuses on post-harvest actions. This 
involves  selecting out visibly damaged grains and then selecting out non-seed or inert 
material (pebbles, dust). Additionally, some traders give considerable weight to variety 
choice, particularly those who focus on export crops, such as haricot beans, those who 
deal in modern varieties (e.g. of maize, of wheat), and those who deal with varieties 
especially adapted to harsh zones.   As would be expected, trader knowledge on 
specific variety names varies greatly according to his/her proximity to a farming 
community and scale of operation.  Those working directly with farmers nearly always 
distinguish among named varieties.  Even the big traders (wholesalers) however, 
including those residing in towns, may group varieties together by visual 
characteristics, such as red or white sorghums, or by geographic origin: e.g. sorghum 
from Miesso versus sorghum from Jijigaa.  So while the biggest traders, for the non-
commercial crops, may not recall specific varietal labels, they all showed a strong 
sense of variety adaptation within broad zones.  Maybe this is because those traders 
interviewed work within stress regions.    
 
Interestingly, specific seed knowledge, and specific seed management practice seems 
to change dramatically in cases when seed per se is demanded. Government officials 
sometimes contract farmers to multiply modern varieties (maize, wheat) or highly 
adapted local ones (sorghum).  Within West Hararghe, even at the lowest level of 
routine seed acquisition, a ‘collector’, the person who buys directly from farmers, may 
pay 5-10 Birr/quintal premium for good seed of local crops, such as sorghum.  For 
export crops, such as the white haricot beans, traders higher up the chain pay as much 
as a 33% premium for pure, clean seed/grain, 4 Birr versus 3 Birr for kg  (or 100 Birr 
premium per quintal).  So, while seed may not take the lion’s share of a traders’ 
business, it is something of a market niche traders address explicitly. (In terms of the 
scale of a traders’ food versus seed business: one trader interviewed suggested a 95/5% 
food/seed divide for his business, and another 99/1% food and seed, respectively). 
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Box 8 SEED/GRAIN TRADERS  How they potentially distinguish between Seed and 
Grain  (comments from West Hararghe). 
 
• Visual appearance (physical properties): seed has to look mature, not broken, not 
attacked by insects/pests discolored varieties removed.  Seeds of a certain size might be 
sought, or specific shape. 
 
• Selection before sale: inert matter may be removed (such as dust, sand pebbles, grain). 
 
• Variety type:  in some cases specific varieties are sought by traders (when for export 
or modern varieties); varieties might also be rigorously clustered by zones of  
adaptation  (e.g. highland and lowland sorghums),  or by  maturity dates (e.g. short and 
longer-term maize);  minimally, seed traders sort varieties by color classes, although 
some traders, also distinguish varieties clearly within color classes (e.g. within  white 
teff, more and less drought tolerant).  Trader knowledge of varieties differs greatly by 
crop. 
        
• Defined, proven sources (provenance): It is those crops grown and sourced locally, 
which are generally considered to have ‘seed potential’.  Beyond an agro-ecological 
zone,  general only more commercial crops or modern varieties (of maize, wheat, 
beans) are considered by traders to have seed potential.   
 
• Seed Treatments: larger traders may use phostoxin (fumigant), not normally used for 
food. 
 
• Germination Tests:  limited, but found with some traders. Also, caution  to choose 
seed that has not started to germinate (not has contact with moisture). 
 
• Conditions of Storage: Not  in pits for sorghum, maize, barley. 
 
• Length of storage:  one year or less, for crops such as bean and wheat. 
 
 
 
Levels of traders and the seed/grain distinction 
To interpret traders’ potential seed and grain expertise, but also to understand better 
traders’ ability to supply large amount of seed, it is also crucial to gain insight into the 
broader seed/grain market flows.  Sketches of such flows were traced for two sites, 
West Hararghe and Menz Gera (with diagrams and accompanying notes appearing 
below).  
 
Several general comments are in order. First, at the level closest to farmers, the 
collectors, the seed and grain distinction is made very clear.  Collectors are often 
tasked by their employers (medium and larger scale traders), to find specific varieties 
of a certain quality type.  Collectors, often having lived in the ‘buying community’ 
much of their lives may seek out farmers known for producing good seed (even seed 
harvested separately in the field from grain), and may have ‘standing orders’   for ‘this 
type of bean’, or ‘this quality of sorghum’.  With such specific demand, farmer-
producers know in advance that they are producing ‘seed’ from the moment the crop is 
sown, and they manage the crop accordingly.  
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At the initial stages of study, researchers had assumed that the higher one goes up the 
seed chain, the less specific the seed-related knowledge, and the more ‘crude’ or 
poorly managed the seed and grain distinction.   This gross categorization proved not 
to  hold in a well-defined number of cases.  There are very large traders (e.g. 1000 Qtls 
sorghum any one season), who acquire their seed only from clearly defined agro-
ecological zones, and through direct contacts with large numbers of farmers: hence one 
trader in Chiro basically monopolizes the seed/grain supply over three full woredas. 
His scale is large but fairly uniform in terms of the varietal adaptability of the goods he 
puts on offer.  So, even as he bulks up, he aims not to mix varieties.  Further, those 
traders who deal with export and internally- commercial crops (haricot beans, wheat 
and maize) may also aim to maintain strong standards even as volumes rise.  Simply, 
this makes economic sense:  losses become too great if too much grain has to be sorted 
out so as to deliver their high quality product.  Finally, there seem to be traders (often 
medium level, not the largest) who respond to select demands, usually dictated by the 
agro-ecological specificity (that is, need to adapt to harsh conditions).  For example, 
CARE reported a case from the woreda ‘Achar’ where a specific pearl millet variety 
(‘Dekuny’) was in high demand after the 2003 drought but apparently not locally 
available.  The trader serving the community provided seed from his storage houses, 
seed which had been separate and well-maintained throughout the year.  In some sense, 
this trader was serving not only to fill a possible seed availability gap during a stress 
period but also a ‘plant genetic resource’  gap.  This trader backup function for the 
community is an important one. 
 
So in sum, traders do distinguish seed and grain routinely, but to different degrees 
according to crop.  Minimally in these stress zones, all have basic knowledge of what 
types of varieties may be adapted for sowing.  In addition, when presented with site 
specific requests for ‘seed’, whether from government officials, urban dwellers or 
exporters, trader seed knowledge, and seed management can become a good deal more 
refined, and traders might even be ready to pay a ‘seed’ premium.   
 
Figures 3 and 4 sketch initial seed flows for two sites.  Both diagrams need to be 
further elaborated  but can presently serve to show that the seed/grain divide among 
traders partly depends on their position in the supply and purchase chain, as well as the 
customer base they aim to serve. 
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Figure 3  Flows of Seed/Grain (potential seed) in informal market flows: in Menz Gera 
woreda (Amhara - draft). 
 
The up-ward movement (acquired locally)  is for faba bean, lentil, chick pea, field pea, 
fenugreek, barley and a small amount of wheat. In contrast, sorghum and maize are 
completely acquired from outside the zone, as is the large majority of the wheat, which 
comes from Ataye (Ephratana Gidim), Addis Ababa, Debre Birhan and other places 
depicted by the down-ward movement.  
D. Medium level traders 
E. Big traders 
w To Addis Ababa (faba bean, lentil 
and fenugreek) 
w City dwellers 
w Farmers (major share) 
w Chercharis 
w May have 1 or 2 storage facilities 
w City dwellers 
w Farmers 
w Addis Ababa and Debre Birhan 
w “Chercharis” 
w May have multiple storage facilities  
and trucks 
 
w Cherchari (“Sebsabi”) 
w Gelbach (farmer collectors) 
w Medium level merchants (traders) 
w Urban dwellers 
w Big merchants/ traders 
w To all of the above actors and urban dwellers 
 
May be economically weak, with small 
landholdings  
 
Mostly seasonal (December-April) 
B. Farmers Collectors 
“Gelbach”  
A. Farmers  
C. “Cherchari”/ 
“Sebsabi” Retailers 
w City dwellers (grain selling) 
w Farmers (grain and seed) 
w Medium and big traders 
 
Work throughout the year (on   
Tuesday and Saturday) 
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Notes on figure 3: 
 
A. Farmers 
 
Farmers sell for all the hierarchies above them depending on the amount they hold and the 
profit margin they believe to get from each. When they deal in small amounts of grain, they 
may aim to sell directly to urban dwellers. With larger supplies, they may sell to other actors in 
the grain market system. 
 
B. “Gelbach” farmer collectors 
 
They collect grain from the surrounding farmers. They give often give premium prices for 
quality grain because it helps them mix high quality with those low quality grains so that their 
overall average price becomes more elevated.  In Menz Gera, it seems that collectors do not 
give special price for seed (in contrast to West Hararghe).  
 
“Gelbaches” do not work for a single trader in the town. Rather, they shift their customers 
based on the profit margin they obtain in each market day. But, to some extent there are some 
Gelbaches/farmer collectors who work with specific traders for a longer-term based their 
establishing certain levels of trust, particularly in relation establishing grain market price. 
 
Collectors are named as “Gelbach”, if they are from farming community and “Sebsabi”/ 
“Cherchari” if they are from the urban dwellers.  Note that direct links between Gelbach and 
Chercheri are relatively rare. 
 
C. “Cherecharis”/”Sebsabis” or retailers 
 
These are small town-based traders, who, using their own capital, purchase from farmers, 
medium and big traders. For maize, sorghum and wheat, they may buy from medium and big 
traders and sell to farmers and urban dwellers who purchase small amounts. In contrast, for 
barley, faba bean, lentil, chickpea, and fenugreek, they may purchase from farmers and 
sometimes from “Gelbaches”, and then sell ‘up’ to medium level and bigger traders. Local lore 
suggests that these retailers do not use balances, but rather use a dish believed to be equivalent 
with 1.5 kilogram (which, in practice, might vary from 1.35 to 1.4 kgs, so as to profit from 
non-standard measures).   
 
D. and E.  Medium and big traders 
 
Both medium level and big traders purchase sorghum and maize grain (not sown) primarily 
from Addis Ababa, Debre Birhan and Ataye areas. Wheat may be purchased from Debre 
Birhan area.  Those crops potentially used for seed, barley, faba bean, lentil, chick pea and 
fenugreek, are obtained from local markets (farmers, “Gelbaches”, and from “Sebsabis”/ 
retailers). Both medium and big traders transport barley, faba bean, lentil and fenugreek out of 
the immediate region, to Debre Birhan and Addis Ababa.  
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Figure 4  Flows of Seed/Grain (potential seed) in informal market flows in West Hararghe 
(Draft) 
 
 
The precise mapping of these chains differs by crop.  For instance, beans and coffee 
would start from farmer producers and go up and out of the region: there would 
generally not be re-sale downwards.  In contrast, sorghum, teff, maize and wheat have 
upward and downward flows, A to D and D to A. 
 
 
• Collectors link farmers and bigger merchants 
• Varieties at this level are relatively unmixed  
C. Medium level traders  
D.  Big traders  
• May get seed directly from farmers 
(level A) 
• May get grain from collectors or grain 
millers 
• May re-supply collectors with seed 
(during shortage) 
• May re-supply farmers directly (during 
shortage) 
• May sell to distant areas (cities, even 
abroad) 
• May sell down to medium level traders 
 B. Collectors: may   
serve 3-5 villages 
A.  Farmers who sell their own  
production as seed  
 
• May sell to neighbors directly 
• May sell at local markets themselves 
• May sell ‘up’ to collectors or directly 
to grain millers 
• May sometimes sell to bigger 
merchants (level C)  
“Kekabi” (“donkey ear”): they link farmers 
and collectors, they have no money of their 
own and serve a broker function 
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TRADERS’ ASSESSMENT OF SEED STRESS CONDITIONS 
The traders interviewed in the Hararghe area had a particularly long-term view of the 
seed/grain commerce within the high stress region (which is a classic seed aid area).  
The medium to larger scale traders, those with a regional and occasionally national 
seed/grain commerce view, had been working an average of 18 years in the trade, with 
a range of six to 40 years.   The collectors, those closest to farmers, with an ability to 
assess particularly local supplies, had been in the trade an average of slightly over 8 
years (with a range of 5 to 12 years).  As important, 10 of the 12 collectors had been 
living in their respective farming communities all their lives so had first-hand 
experience of the crop production fluctuations for a period of three to five decades.    
Seed Availability during  stress periods 
Traders were interviewed on the issue of seed availability during stress periods.  In 
terms of the types of stresses, all traders had conducted business during periods of 
extensive drought and insect and pest attack, and several had worked through isolated 
periods of civil strife.   
 
All traders, at all scales  mapping their extensive history, asserted that there was no 
time, not a single season, when seed was not available directly within the region or 
within reach of the region for all key crops.  (For the last four years of seed aid, the 
CARE senior project manager similarly confirmed that for his seed voucher programs 
in West Hararghe, 100% of the seed had been obtained locally).  So, in theory, through 
time, no seed had to be brought into the region in the form of aid. 
  
The confirmed availability of seed does not mean that there were not constraints within 
the seed system during times of stress. Among the stresses or changes signaled by 
traders, four were particularly important: 
 
• Volume changes in seed supply 
• Price fluctuations 
• Changes in geographic sourcing of seed 
• Changes in the scale of seed loans 
 
Changes in seed quality were also mentioned as a signal, but no clear trends emerged 
across crops or sites. Assessments were split as to whether quality was the same or 
worse, and in several cases for beans, ‘better’, as when a larger proportion of trader 
wares was obtained from the Nazret area. So changes in seed quality could potentially 
be used as a seed security stress signal, but in this specific case study, focus on their 
variable gave no particular insight. 
 
 Each of these is four main stress signals is briefly discussed below.   
 
Seed System Stress during periods of Crisis 
Insights on changes in seed security in the region during periods of stress were 
obtained exclusively through trader interview.  Given the limited field frames, cross-
check methods could not be employed to match trader recall against other forms of 
potentially objective data, for example, records from marketing information systems.  
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As such, findings below should be considered as ‘indicative’. The trends are real (and 
confirmed by many): however, the precise magnitudes of change (for instance in 
trading volumes or price) would need to be further verified through method 
triangulation. 
 
Volume changes in seed supplied  
Traders were asked to refer to the trading years in which they had firmest recall and to 
compare a specific stress season versus a specific non-stress season, and to highlight as 
much as possible seed-specific information. Most chose years related with the period 
between 2001 and 2004. 
 
Table 23 indicates the volume of the trader business (seed obtained) in a stress versus 
non-stress period.  The focus is on the three crops most involved in seed transactions.        
 
Unexpectedly, the findings showed that for the medium and larger traders, seed 
supplies substantially increase during periods of stress, directly in response to farmers’ 
demand. (Several even commented that they may not even work in the seed business in 
normal times, especially in relation to sorghum). This increase in supplies obtained 
occurred in 12 of the 17 cases examined in Table 23 – and most frequently in the case 
of maize.  The magnitude of these increases was generally very high: on average, these 
medium and larger traders more than tripled the volume of (potential) seed sold for 
each crop.   
 
For local grain collectors, the trend was the opposite.  The volume of seed they directly 
obtained from the countryside decreased for nearly every case examined (21 out of 23 
cases in examined in Table 23, or 30 out of 32 cases, if all crops are included).  These 
decreases were large – on average, seed volumes obtained by local collectors dropped 
by 65% in crisis years.  Collectors commented that local farmers during stress years 
prefer to keep the bulk of the harvests they obtain.  Hence ‘extra’ supplies for sale are 
greatly reduced.   
 
Table 23  In West Hararghe, cases where traders increased the amount of (potential) seed 
supply, compared to a normal season, by type merchant (medium/large traders, or 
smaller collectors), and crop.  
Medium to large grain traders Small grain collectors 
Crop N cases Increased 
sales in crisis 
% N cases Increased 
sales in crisis 
% 
Maize 6 5 83.3 6 1 16.7 
Sorghum 6 4 66.7 10 1 10.0 
Haricot beans 5 3 60.0 7 0 0.0 
Price Fluctuations 
Traders were also asked to recall price patterns, in specific stress and non-stress years.  
Note for most crops, medium and larger traders cited a routine 20 to 30 Birr/Qtl 
difference between seed and grain of the same crop, with such seed and grain 
difference translating to between 5 and 10 Birr at the collector level.  Again, intensive 
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seed market investigations would be well worth pursuing.  For now, more indicative 
trends appear in Table 24. 
 
Across the board, for all, prices significantly go up during stress periods, again 
focusing on the three major crops sown in the region.  Prices rise at a relatively higher 
rate as one goes up the trader chain, as larger traders also seek seed from distances 
relatively further away.  Interviews with larger traders suggest that transport costs are 
the biggest factor affecting seed price during crisis times, not rise in the price in the 
crop material per se.  Also of note is that traders indicated that substantial price 
fluctuations were often not related to any local crisis at all, but, as in the case of the 
export crop white haricot beans, global and national demand patterns largely shaped 
the local price changes.     
 
Table 24  For all traders and collectors interviewed, the percent increase in mean buying and 
selling prices for seed of different crops between a normal and a crisis year.  
Large grain traders Local grain collectors 
Price increase in crisis 
year (%) 
Price increase in crisis 
year (%) Crop n 
Buying Selling 
n 
Buying Selling 
Maize 8 92.8 79.6 7 49.4 44.0 
Sorghum 7 89.9 96.4 11 28.0 25.6 
Haricot beans 6 62.8 56.9 7 20.7 19.3 
       
 
 
As an ‘early warning system indicator’, it would be well worth examining seed and 
grain price differences more systematically.  This should be done at one point in time, 
through the course of an agricultural season, and across stress and non-stress seasons.  
Even during normal times, one would expect the seed price and grain patterns price to 
be substantially different.  Field evidence from elsewhere (western Kenya; Otsyula et 
al., 2004) shows that prices for potential seed rise steeply only during the period 
immediately prior to sowing (and may extend some four to eight weeks).  Unlike grain 
prices, seed prices do not rise during the hunger gap periods (and immediately pre-
harvest).  For this reason, standard price information collected on food commodities is 
not an adequate monitoring indicator for seed price trends.  Figure 5 conceptually 
suggests the seed and grain price trend differences. (Note that grain price trends are 
highly variable by crop and environment:  the pattern below is sketched mainly for 
didactic reasons 
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Figure 5   Trends in crop and seed prices in local seed/grain markets through season, 
showing seed price peaks at sowing time and grain price peaks before harvest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
……  beginning                                                 end season                       beginning   
          season                                                                                                 season 
 
Seed sourcing areas 
While collectors continue to source seed locally, even in stress times, medium and 
large traders, aiming to greatly scale up commerce, adopted several strategies so as to 
increase their seed supplies.  Some worked with a greater number of local collectors, 
some simply emptied their existing stores (and particularly for sorghum existing 
storage stocks were often deemed sufficient); some actively decided not to export from 
the zone, and, instead, given greater attention to locale clientele.  As stated by one 
trader: 
 
Instead of exporting during stress, I consciously decide to focus on local markets, and 
even sell my own stored wares there.  This might look like I am doing something 
‘good’ but it is also in my own self- interest.  I need to give priority to providing local 
farmers seed as they are the ones, who through their own next harvests, who guarantee 
my own future supplies. (Mohammed T., pers. comm., 2007) 
 
There were, however, a select number of cases where traders elected to go outside their 
normal zones to obtain seed they sense would be sufficiently adapted. In West 
Hararghe, traders mentioned obtaining larger proportions of their bean supply from the 
Central Rift Valley areas, and particularly sourcing Nazret; and for maize, select 
varieties were sought from Wollega, Nazret, Jijigga and even Addis Ababa.  
 
Scale of Seed Loans 
Finally we mention changes in the scale of seed loans.  Among the nine medium and 
larger-scale traders (that is business people with considerable financial standing within 
the community), only one, considered somewhat of a true ‘do-gooder among the poor’ 
gives seed load during normal times.  Simply, traders firmly state, that such loans 
generally are not need and not requested.  In contrast, during stress periods (and 2003 
was used as the reference point) seven of the nine gave substantial loans, with a single 
trader giving up to  50-60 quintals of seed reaching up to 500 farmers.  Sometimes 
these loans are paid back—and sometimes not. 
Seed Price 
Grain Price 
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Reflections on Stress Periods: Traders’ view 
Interestingly several of the traders interviewed questioned the entire rationale of 
bringing in seed aid, during purported stress periods.  
   
Stated one: “In fact, there is no situation we have experienced where you have to bring 
in seed.  I have never had to import it from elsewhere.  Those aid organizations that do 
this practice more often than not also come late, and then they come to purchase seed 
from us.”  (Gashaw, pers. comm., 2007) 
 
Stated another: “No aid should be given.  Traders can take care of fluctuations.”   
(Mohammed T., pers. comm., 2007).   
 
These comments may partially reflect a position of ‘self-interest’.  They may also 
contain a strong element of realism. 
 
TRADERS’ ROLE IN SEED AID 
Lastly, we turn to the specific role of traders in providing seed for relief work.  The 
role of traders in providing seed particularly for use in emergency direct seed 
distributions has been well documented and has been among standard practice in 
Ethiopia.  Because of Ethiopia’s great agro-ecological diversity, seed for aid, has long 
been sourced partly from local channels (at least since 1985; see Table 6, Chapter III).  
Procurement from local systems has also long been the norm, particularly for high 
stress areas, as the Ethiopian Seed Enterprise, supported by government policy, has 
given priority to crops and varieties which produce well mainly in medium to higher 
potential zones.  
 
This section briefly signals recent developments in emergency seed assistance which 
aim to expand the role of traders beyond their use as procurement intermediaries.  
 
Seed /Grain Traders, Seed Vouchers, and  Seed Vouchers + Fairs  
As indicated in the preceding Chapter V, on GO and NGO implementation, traders 
have been identified not only as ‘aid providers’ but also as a potentially important 
group of beneficiaries within emergency seed aid operations. Using a seed voucher or 
seed voucher and fair approach, NGOs in particular have sometimes sought to spread 
the benefits of seed procurement (and seed sales) among many in the community, 
including many traders. In one model, local traders on a given set of days will be asked 
to bring their seed supplies to select ‘fairs’, and farmer aid recipients will then choose 
the crops and varieties they want to sow themselves, using an aid voucher to reimburse 
the seller. In another model, farmer aid recipients, armed with vouchers, may 
themselves make the journey to select trader stores, again to choose from the crops and 
varieties on offer.  In both cases, a relatively greater number of traders (greater than in 
standard DSD operations) capture part of the seed aid market.  Traders associated with 
the voucher approach may be larger ones, but in some NGO implementation models 
(notably that of CRS), smaller-scale traders, women traders and even farmer sellers 
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(vending their home production) are encouraged to participate.  One supposition is that 
the more local the traders, the more likely that the voucher monies received will be 
recirculated within the local economies.  The seed voucher and fair approach has been 
spearheaded by the CRS worldwide and particularly in Africa, including Ethiopia 
(Bramel et al., 2004).  CARE, in Ethiopia and especially Hararghe, also has extensive 
experience in using the SVF approach, and more recently, the seed voucher approach 
alone.  
Traders as current vehicles to improve seed quality? 
One aspect of seed voucher approach is of particular interest for this analysis of seed 
security and seed stress, and the role of traders.  Here we highlight specific seed 
management requirements for traders involved in voucher aid operations.   
 
To reemphasize points briefly mentioned previously (Chapter V), seed quality issues 
are built into the seed voucher and seed voucher and fair system in several ways.  In 
the CRS approach, locally based farmer committees take charge of seed quality 
screening, and provide potential cus tomers with detailed information on variety 
features, seed production and storage conditions of crops and varieties put on offer.  In 
the CARE model, the onus of providing quality seed is put on traders themselves, pre-
fair, through a series of formal procurement and management stipulations.  As 
summarized in Box 9, CARE, requires that potential voucher seed be maintained in 
specific seed stores (clean, insect free), and in several cases, has requested traders keep 
batches of potential seed in separate locations.   
 
Box 9 Traders associated with CARE’s seed voucher program (* depending on market 
may vary from 30,000 to 100,000 Birr worth of  seed.)   
 
 
Formal Criteria Demanded  (Contract, selected items) 
• Those who have paid the current season tax for their license 
• Those capable of putting an insurance deposit (1000 Birr for one market, 5000 Birr 
for 3 markets or more) 
• Those capable of constructing sufficient seed warehouse (clean, insect free) 
• Those having a balance cleared by the Ethiopian grading and standardization 
authority 
• Those who can provide seeds of sufficient quantity and quality *etc. 
 
Other Criteria  (as guided by Project Manager) 
• Known by/local acceptance within community 
• Transaction with multiple crops (e.g. 5 to 6)  
• Ability to move to sites (have transport) if sites more distant 
 
 
 
In terms of looking at the evolution in ‘seed quality’, the CARE model has been the 
easier one to trace, as traders comment on their own changing practices. Through 
working over progressive seasons with CARE in their seed aid-seed voucher program, 
participating traders claim: 
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• to have a better sense of the specificity of variety adaptation; 
• to  have  mastered the logistics of seed storage (fumigating, sealing storage spaces, 
sorting inert material); and 
• to have gained greater appreciation of farmers’ seed demands, in contrast to food 
demands. 
 
One key trader even now aims to seek out actively the early-maturing varieties of 
especial interest to his west Harerghe client base (Berhnau Aberra, pers. comm., 2005).  
While CARE does ‘train’ traders in seed quality issues, it also engages in punitive 
action (i.e. withdraws contracts) from those who deliver substandard material.  Perhaps 
both thrusts are helping to improve seed quality standards of vast quantities of local 
materials.  
 
Traders as future vehicles to improve seed quality? 
The issue being raised here is if seed/grain traders, those business people who 
routinely supply farmers with the bulk of their off-farm sowing materials, might be 
more actively engaged in gradually improving the quality of local seed system 
material. 
 
One trader raised this issue herself in the context of helping farmers gain access to new 
varieties:  
 
Commented Asnaketch Tadesse:  “I know some of the new varieties, like the Katumani 
variety of maize.  Simply, they are just not available here.  If I were given two quintals, 
I could distribute these to many farmers I know—then collect the harvest—and then re-
distribute.” 
 
Her insights that the varieties are not readily available locally, [although they may be 
desired by farmers] are confirmed by senior Miesso woreda agricultural officials.  
 
So given that the general government systems, as well as ESE more specifically, have 
had difficulty meeting farmers’ demands for new varieties (in formats farmers find 
acceptable), perhaps alternate modes of routine distribution or sale might be tried.  
Giving test samples to stimulate farmer demand, and selling small, non-risk size 
packets are several of the approaches that have been proven useful elsewhere (Sperling 
et al., 1996). 
 
But beyond enhancing variety quality, the issue remains about whether traders can be 
encouraged to deliver better seed quality per se, routinely.  This is not to infer that the 
seed quality of normal farmer produce is bad (laboratory tests show otherwise). Simply 
this is to suggest that small improvements in quality can be achieved, and have been 
achieved via seed fairs and when associated with export crops.  Can incentives not be 
conceived to extend these known practices more widely?  
 
In brief, traders often serve as the backbone of the seed system in crisis times 
(including helping farmers to gain access to specific plant genetic materials).  Cannot 
their considerable commerce also be harnessed to gradually improve seed quality and 
variety quality during more stable periods?  
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SUMMARY: SEED/GRAIN TRADER INSIGHTS 
Seed/grain traders are key for stabilizing farmers’ seed systems during both normal 
and stress periods.  Farmers routinely rely on markets to fill seed gaps and traders may 
be sought as suppliers for select emergency operations (both DSD and SVF). 
 
• Trader at all levels, from collectors to large-scale traders, distinguish between seed and 
grain routinely, but to different degrees according to crop and according to their 
intended customer base.  When presented with specific requests for seed (from local 
clients, government or exporters), traders can greatly refine their seed management 
practices and often negotiate premiums when obtaining better quality and selling better 
quality materials. At a minimum, traders have solid knowledge of variety adaptation. 
 
• Traders’ assessments give strong insights into what happens to seed systems in periods 
of stress.  Mapping their extensive history in West Hararghe, across periods of 
drought, severe insect and pest attack and civil strife, traders (at all levels)  asserted 
that there was no time, not a single season, when sufficient seed was not available 
directly within the region or within reach of the region for all key crops.  Seed did not 
need to be brought in as a form of aid. 
 
• While in times of stress, seed availability is not generally a problem, traders did cite 
other signals which indicate seed system stress. These can be quickly and easily 
monitored at regional and more local levels.   
 
o Volume changes in seed supply 
o Seed price fluctuations 
o Changes in geographic sourcing of seed 
o Changes in the scale of seed loans 
o Seed quality shifts (both positive and negative) 
 
• In terms of precise trends, unexpectedly, among larger traders in West Harerghe, seed 
commerce and volumes obtained increased during periods of stress, as traders aim to 
capture increased demand.  Prices also increased from 50-100%, with the rises 
reportedly due more to increased transport costs than rises in the value of the planting 
material itself. 
 
• Experience with traders involved in the CARE seed voucher program shows that 
incentives can be put in place which encourage traders to improve seed (versus grain) 
management  across a short number of seasons.   
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MOVING FORWARD: RECOMMENDATIONS 
• Given that local markets, and traders are the backbone of farmer seed supply, much 
more attention should be given to ensuring that these markets can supply the kinds of 
seed farmers need.  One major challenge is how to leverage traders’ efforts to 
gradually improve the quality of seed on offer in normal market channels. 
 
o Seed/grain traders could be potentially powerful partners in helping to 
move new modern varieties widely within and among stressed farming 
communities.  Methods should be tested for directly linking formal sector 
seed supply with informal trader seed/grain sellers.  Distribution of variety 
samples (to stimulate demand); sale of small packets of seed; and more 
systematic sale of modern varieties in bulk are options that might be tested 
and closely evaluated.  
 
o Seed/grain traders are also potential partners in improving the seed quality 
per se of sowing materials put on offer to farmers.  While the quality of 
farmer seed overall is often shown to be quite adequate, procedures for 
(inter alia) segregating among varieties and reducing percentage of sub-
standard grains  could give farmer clients a better return for their purchases.  
Awareness-raising, capacity building and incentives might all be possible 
measures for encouraging gradual seed/grain quality improvements.  
 
 
• Seed/grain traders have unique insight into seed systems in stress and normal 
times.  This is particularly the case when assessing supplies, that is, seed 
availability.  Traders have particular skills in assessing seed availability, and their 
expertise should be incorporated as a feature within seed security assessments.  
Procedures for differentiating among traders and their assessment strengths are 
well established.   
 
• Indicators for seed market fluctuations need to be systematically built into seed 
security assessment data bases (e.g. volume changes in seed supply; seed price 
fluctuations).  These can potentially be used as seed security stress indicators for 
both regional and local field assessments and in early warning data bases.   
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VII: IMPLEMENTATION - DEMAND SIDE:   
FARMER AID RECIPIENTS  
 
This chapter looks at the effects of seed aid from the users or farmer recipients’ 
perspective.  It draws from intensive study in four sites, and interviews with 399 
farmers in all.11   The chapter traces farmers’ history with seed aid, the different kinds 
of aid received, and their evaluations of the usefulness of assistance.  In addition, it 
objectively analyzes the importance of the aid received in relation to local strategies 
for coping with stress, which include farmers acquiring seed on their own from local 
channels. 
 
The four intensive study sites differ markedly in terms of agro-ecology, farming 
systems, and implementer profile.  They also represent four different regions (see 
Chapter I on rationale for site selection).  Sites are intended to be indicative, and were 
selected in order to explore a range of different contexts and approaches to seed aid, 
rather than cover every zone that had received seed aid.   
 
Sites selected include: 
o Miesso and Chiro woredas in West Hararghe (Oromiya) 
o Raya Azebo woreda in Southern Tigray (Tigray) 
o Humbo woreda in Wolaita (SNNPR) 
o Gera Keya woreda in North Shoa (Amhara) 
 
The first two of these sites represent ‘classic’ seed aid scenarios, where chronic 
drought stress has led to low crop production and repeated emergency aid.  The latter 
two sites have also received repeated aid, though their primary stresses are different 
(population pressure and soil degradation, respectively).  A wide range of crops has 
been distributed across these sites by the government and different NGOs, using 
diverse approaches – DSD, seed vouchers, and cash for seed.  
 
To capture distinct insights , the chapter first presents findings site by site.  Cross-site 
comparisons are then elaborated to identify broader, more Ethiopia-wide trends. 
 
Methods  
This farmer recipient analysis is primarily based on farmers’ responses to detailed 
surveys, administered in 2006.  Additional information comes from focus-group 
discussions with farmers, and information collected from seed aid practitioners 
(presented in Chapter IV).  
 
                                                 
11
 Note the original survey was done among a larger sample, about 120 farmers at each site.   
Questionnaires showing strong evidence of interviewer bias  (i.e. too many comparable answers) were 
eliminated to ensure rigor. 
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The surveys asked farmers about their experience with seed aid, seeking details of all 
events they could recall.  Farmers gave detailed descriptions of the crops and varieties 
involved in recent seed aid events, the quantities received, and all other seed sources 
used that season.  Farmers also gave their opinion on many different aspects of seed 
aid (e.g. the appropriateness of varieties supplied, and longer-term impacts of aid).  
Thus, the surveys combined qualitative and quantitative data, using both closed and 
open questions.  Sampling was purposive, seeking out Farmers’ Association (FAs) and 
individual households that had received seed aid repeatedly. 
 
 
West Hararghe – Chiro and Miesso woredas (Oromiya) 
Context  
West Hararghe Zone provides a ‘classic’ example of a vulnerable region where a crisis 
can affect many households.  For instance, in 2002/03, 600 000 people, a third of the 
total zone population, were assessed to be food insecure.  Many households in the zone 
are chronically vulnerable, due to poor crop production and low asset ownership, and 
frequently receive assistance (Piguet, 2003).  Seed aid has occurred here since 1984 at 
least, and nearly every year since the mid-1990s.  
 
Mixed crop-livestock farming is the main activity, with sorghum, maize, and haricot 
beans the main crops (Storck et al., 1991).  Unlike elsewhere, the survey covered two 
woredas, Miesso and Chiro, as both receive frequent seed aid, yet represent distinct 
agroecologies:  Miesso in the lowlands, and Chiro in the densely-populated Chercher 
Highlands. Variable and uncertain rainfall affect both woredas, though Miesso is 
especially drought-prone, and land degradation is a major constraint in Chiro (ICRA, 
1996).  Surveys interviewed 77 farmers in Miesso and 40 in Chiro, thus 117 overall.  
 
Seed aid is a common intervention in West Hararghe.  Individual households received 
aid on as many as ten different occasions (sometimes more than once a season), and on 
average three times overall (Table 25).  Both government and a wide range of different 
NGOs have been active in the area, using DSD, as well as vouchers (with or without 
seed fairs) to provide seed.   
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Table 25 Number of times farmers in West Hararghe recalled receiving seed aid.  
Woreda 
Chiro 
(N=40) 
 
Miesso 
(N=77) number of times 
seed aid 
% of total % of total 
1 2.5 - 
2 40.0 33.8 
3 40.0 37.7 
4 5.0 19.5 
5 10.0 2.6 
6 - 3.9 
7 2.5 - 
8 - 1.3 
9 - - 
10 - 1.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Average 2.9 times 3.2 times 
 
West Hararghe: seed aid and other sources of seed 
Farmers detailed all seed sources used for two crops provided by a recent aid (Table 
26).  In only nine cases (7.7%) was seed aid their only source in that crisis season. So 
over 92% of seed aid recipients obtained at least some of the seed they planted from 
channels other than aid.  This makes it clear that, even in this highly-stressed region, 
the vast majority of aid recipients still had access to other sources of seed.  
 
Table 26  Number of farmers for whom seed aid supplied all the seed sowed for two crops 
in a specific seed aid season.  
Woreda Measure 
Chiro Miesso Both 
Number of farmers 40 77 117 
Cases where aid supplied all seed  5 4 9 
% of total 12.5 5.2 7.7 
 
Most of the cases where seed aid supplied 100% of farmers’ seed were for haricot bean 
and maize.  Many farmers do not save seed of these crops, but rather purchase seed 
when needed from local markets.  Home storage of haricot beans can reduce seed 
quality (due to Bruchid problems) and local markets provide specific varieties that 
fetch the best prices, while short-season maize is normally only sown when long-
season sorghum plantings have failed.  Thus seed for these crops is locally available – 
seed aid here simply takes the place of market purchase for some farmers. Farmers’ 
own seed channels still provide much of the seed for both these crops.  
 
“I usually have a small amount of seed in stores and the government adds.  If 
I do not get seed, I can sell a goat or hen... So with seed aid, I now have 
livestock offspring.” – West Hararghe farmer 
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Table 27 summarizes 201 different seed aid events, giving the relative contribution of 
different sources to what was actually planted in the season seed aid was received. 
Seed aid met 49.3% of seed needs for West Hararghe farmers for the crops it provided 
(in Miesso, this was 42.8%).  Thus, seed aid recipients still obtained over half their 
seed from other sources in the informal or local seed system:  a third of all plantings 
came from their own stocks, while local markets were also important, particularly in 
Miesso, where markets supplied 19.6% of seed.   
 
Seed aid, especially DSD, assumes that vulnerable farmers have no available seed in a 
crisis.  Table 27 shows that the assumption here is incorrect.  Both traders and farmers 
interviewed in West Hararghe indicated that seed has been available locally over all 
the last drought seasons recalled (including the harsh 2003 season).  Farmers (and local 
traders) in West Hararghe have well-developed strategies for coping with seed 
insecurity (McGuire, 2007).  Seed aid could support seed security here by helping 
farmers to access appropriate seed.   
 
There are three reasons why 49.3% is a high estimate of seed aid’s contribution to 
overall seed security.  Firstly, seed aid generally provides one or two crops per 
household, though West Hararghe farmers grow a wider range than this:  crops not 
provided by seed aid would still need to be sourced from the local system. Secondly, 
the households not targeted by seed aid also must rely on their own sources for seed.  
Finally, some farmers might over-state the importance of seed aid in interviews for 
strategic reasons, possibly hoping for future assistance.   
 
Table 27  Importance of seed aid, in relation to other sources of seed for the same crop 
during a specific seed aid season in Chiro and Miesso woredas in West Hararghe.   
Woreda 
Chiro (n=68) Miesso  (n=133) Both  (n=201) 
 
Seed Source 
% of all seed planted % of all seed planted % of all seed planted 
Seed aid 59.0  42.8  49.3 
Home stocks 28.6  34.8  32.3 
Local market 10.2  19.6  15.8 
Gift 1.6  2.5  2.1 
Exchange 0.6  0.2  0.3 
Extension 0.0  0.0  0.0 
Other source 0.0  0.2  0.1 
All sources 100.0  100.0  100.0 
 
West Hararghe: crops supplied by seed aid  
Table 28 shows seed aid by crop.  In West Hararghe, maize and haricot beans comprise 
the majority of seed aid, with 44.8 % and 33.1 % of all seed supplied, respectively.  
Though sorghum is the dominant crop in the region, a much smaller amount is 
supplied.  
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Table 28 Details of recent seed aid in West Hararghe, showing proportion of all seed aid 
received by crop, and the proportion of each crop’s seed coming from aid.  
Crop N of cases Crop’s proportion 
of all aid (%) 
Seed aid as 
proportion of crop 
planted (%) 
Maize 88 44.8  43.3  
Haricot bean 58 33.1  56.4  
Sorghum 32 13.0  41.2  
Barley 8 3.6  68.4  
Chickpea 3 1.0  100.0  
Faba bean 3 1.7  100.0  
Lentil 6 0.7  80.0  
All crops (*) 201 100.0  49.3  
(* Totals include small amounts of other crops not shown here.) 
 
For each crop, Table 28 also shows the proportion of what was planted in the crisis 
season coming from seed aid .  The local system still supplied the majority of  maize 
and sorghum, the main local crops, in a crisis season, as aid only covered around 40% 
of sowings of these two crops.  Aid provides a high proportion of seed for chickpea, 
faba beans, and lentils, though sample sizes and total amounts are small in these cases.  
However, some of these crops may not normally be saved by many farmers, such as 
chickpea.  Farmers hope they do not have to plant chickpea, as this usually means their 
main cereal sowings had failed.  So it is unsurprising that seed aid supplied all the 
chickpea seed for the three cases recorded. 
 
West Hararghe: crop varieties supplied by seed aid 
 
Table 29  The proportion of Modern and Farmer Varieties supplied by seed aid for each 
crop in West Hararghe. 
Crop N of cases Modern Variety (%) Farmer Variety (%) 
Maize 88 52.3 47.7 
Haricot bean 58 86.2 13.8 
Sorghum 32 40.6 59.4 
Chickpea 3 0 100.0 
Barley 8 0 100.0 
Faba bean 3 33.3 66.7 
Lentil 6 66.7 33.3 
Groundnut 2 0 100 
Teff 1 0 100 
All crops 201 56.7 43.3 
 
Table 29 shows that a slightly higher proportion of seed aid comes as modern varieties 
than as farmer varieties.  DSD emphasizes MVs more:  for the 86 cases with DSD, 54 
(62.8%) involved MVs; in contrast, the 115 cases involving vouchers had MVs on 60 
occasions (52.2%).  With vouchers, farmers have a degree of choice, and opt for a 
different mix of crops and varieties than DSD provides.  Seed aid, especially DSD, 
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sometimes is used for promoting new MVs to farmers; BoARD officials in the region 
confirmed that they used seed aid as a way to get hold of MV seed for farmers.  This is 
a clear example of where seed for emergency relief blurs with seed for development.  
As Chapter V points out, distributing MV seed to a few farmers in a stress period may 
not be the best way to promote them. 
 
West Hararghe: seed availability 
Despite repeated stress, the evidence here indicates that the major crops are still 
available locally.  Farmers routinely seek seed from neighbors or from local traders to 
meet household-level shortfalls.  The vast majority of farmers (95%) felt that there 
would be enough seed available in local markets for them to purchase, if they had the 
means to do so (vouchers or cash).   
 
There is very little formal seed supply in West Hararghe, especially in Miesso, since 
the ESE has limited capacity in lowland seed production.  Woreda BoARD say they 
receive little MV seed for developmental programs, and emergency seed is one way to 
get seed to pass on to farmers.  Seed aid here may not be explicitly about addressing 
seed insecurity per se, but about accessing MV seed for promotion.  
 
"People don't want or need seed aid.  They want new varieties.  The only time 
they see the people from the Ministry of Agriculture is when they come and 
ask ‘who needs seed relief?’” – W. Hararghe farmer 
 
West Hararghe: approaches compared 
In addition to DSD, some NGOS, such as CARE and IRC, used vouchers (sometimes 
in conjunction with fairs).  Comparing DSD with vouchers: 
 
• Chickpea and sesame were more frequently supplied by DSD, while haricot bean, 
sorghum, and barley were more often provided by vouchers.   
 
• Farmers receive significantly more crops with vouchers (2.1 crops on average) than 
with DSD (1.5)12. 
 
• As indicated above, DSD practice leaned more strongly towards supplying MVs 
than voucher practice (which focused on FVs).  
 
Thus, when farmers can choose crops and varieties with vouchers, they sought a wider, 
and different range of crops.  It is interesting to note that some farmers sought Belg 
crops (teff, barley) with vouchers, or long-season crop varieties for planting with the 
early Belg rains (e.g. sorghum FVs such as ‘Abdelota’).  These crops are clearly 
intended for sowing the following season, rather than the season when seed aid was 
supplied (with the late Meher rains).  This suggests that some farmers may not use 
vouchers to meet immediate needs, but rather strategically prepare for the coming 
season.  
 
                                                 
12
 A similar pattern was seen with number of varieties received: mean of 2.2 with vouchers, and 1.5 with 
DSD.  Trends statistically significant (p<0.001) across both woredas. 
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West Hararghe: farmer preferences 
Farmers in West Hararghe were split over preferring DSD or vouchers as a seed aid 
approach.   Of those who preferred vouchers, many said they appreciated being able to 
choose the crops and varieties themselves.  Some farmers distrusted traders, or found 
going to market time-consuming, and said they preferred DSD.  Note it is difficult to 
get frank opinions from farmers in an interview setting, as the quote below indicates:  
many are hesitant to criticize any assistance they receive. 
 
“The seed was given late.  But I do not want to complain.  If I am given seed 
free I must not complain. I am poor.  I have to take what I am given.” – West 
Hararghe farmer 
South Tigray – Raya Azebo Woreda 
Context  
The second study site, Raya Azebo in South Tigray, is also a fairly ‘typical’ example 
of a vulnerable, drought-prone farming system.  Rural livelihoods depend on mixed 
farming, with sorghum, teff, maize, and barley the most important cereals.  In good 
seasons, the area is productive, but rainfall onset and extent is erratic, particularly for 
the Belg rains, affecting crop production.  As it faces recurring environmental stresses, 
and is far from major centers, Raya Azebo is considered among the more vulnerable 
woredas in Tigray to food insecurity (Negusse et al., 2006).  
 
Raya Azebo has received seed aid on many occasions since the mid-1980s.  Seed aid 
was given to at least some of the 108 farmers surveyed virtually every year since 1997, 
with the earliest reported case in 1986.  REST and the BoARD are the main 
organizations involved in seed aid in the woreda.  DSD is used, but in recent years 
REST has started to provide cash for seed, following the encouragement of one of its 
donors (Entremonde).  With this, farmers are given money (recently, 112 Birr/ 
household, about US$12.50) to purchase seeds on the local market.  Farmers in this 
sample recalled receiving aid on average three times, though seed aid reached 
households as often as seven times (Table 30).   
 
Table 30 Number of times farmers in Raya Azebo, Southern Tigray recalled receiving 
seed aid.  
Raya Azebo 
(N=108) 
 
Number of times 
seed aid 
% of total 
1 3.7 
2 25.0 
3 46.3 
4 17.6 
5 6.5 
6 - 
7 0.9 
Total 100.0 
Average 3.02 times 
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South Tigray: seed aid and other sources of seed 
Table 31 shows that there were only 12 cases (11.1% of the sample) where seed aid 
provided all the seed for two crops sown.  So nearly 90% of aid recipients had at least 
some seed from another source in an emergency season for one of their major crops.   
 
Table 31  Number of farmers for whom seed aid supplied all the seed planted for two 
crops in a specific seed aid season in South Tigray. 
Measure Raya Azebo 
Number of farmers 108 
Cases where aid supplied all seed  12 
% of total 11.1 
 
For an individual crop, Raya Azebo farmers received (or purchased) over 22 kg of 
seed, on average.  Table 32 shows proportions supplied by different sources in the seed 
aid season, covering 176 cases across a range of crops.  Seed aid provided 62.3% of 
the sowed seed for these crops, with 24.5% coming from home stocks, and 13.1% from 
the local market.  A larger proportion of seed came from aid in Raya Azebo than in the 
other study sites.  This may be because many farmers received cash; 76% of the seed 
provided by aid was purchased on the local market.  If this is accounted for, local 
traders actually supplied more than 60% of the seed planted.  Cash for seed aid may 
simply be substituting for seed purchases farmers would otherwise have made.  
 
Table 32  Importance of seed aid, in relation to other sources of seed for the same crop 
during a specific seed aid season in Raya Azebo woreda in South Tigray.   
Raya Azebo (n=176) Seed Source % of all seed planted 
Seed aid 62.3 
Home stocks 24.5 
Local market 13.1 
Gift 0.0 
Exchange 0.2 
Extension 0.0 
Other source 0.0 
All sources of aid crop 100.0 
 
South Tigray: crops supplied by seed aid  
Table 33 breaks down the amount of seed aid supplied by crop.  The vast majority of 
seed aid is either teff or chickpea, representing 78% and 19% of all aid. Other 
important crops in the region, such as sorghum, maize, and haricot bean, were supplied 
in very small amounts.  This may reflect the timing of seed aid, coming too late for the 
sowing of Belg cereals or too late even for fast-maturing maize or sorghum.   
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Table 33  Details of recent seed aid in Raya Azebo, showing proportion of all seed aid 
received by crop, and the proportion of each crop’s seed coming from aid.  
Crop N of cases Crop’s proportion 
of all aid (%) 
Seed aid as 
proportion of crop 
planted (%) 
Teff 127 78.2  57.8  
Chickpea 44 19.2  84.5  
Maize 1 0.6  79.3  
Sorghum 2 0.9  73.8  
Haricot bean 1 0.4  100.0  
Barley 1 0.7  50.0  
Totals  176 100.0  62.3  
 
 
Of the teff sowed in the aid season, 57.8% came via seed aid, with the balance coming 
from home stocks or local markets.  In contrast, 84.5 % of chickpea seed came through 
aid.  Similar to West Hararghe, chickpea is not a major crop in South Tigray, but is 
mainly planted after other crops fail.  Therefore many farmers would not have seed 
stocks in their home.  Seed aid provides relatively high proportions of seed for other 
crops in Table 33, though overall quantities are small.  As mentioned above, cash 
provides most of the seed aid here, so most teff seed is purchased locally.  Most of the 
teff planted in a stress season came from farmers’ own stocks or the local market 
(purchased by farmers on their own, or with cash from seed aid); only 14% of teff 
came in from outside the area (with DSD).  
 
South Tigray:  approaches compared and varieties supplied 
Farmers obtained more seed with cash (26 kg, on average) than with DSD (16 kg); 
these differences were most pronounced with teff.  Whether farmers had DSD or cash 
for seed, their own home stocks or local markets provided broadly similar proportions 
of all the seed planted.  
 
Farmers using cash to buy seed got a slightly, but significantly, wider range of 
varieties than with DSD (averages 1.12 and 1.04, respectively).  However, the key 
difference with cash over DSD was choice and flexibility.  Cash for relief allows 
farmers to strategize.  As explained by one farmer:   
 
“’Manga’ takes longer to mature than ‘Buni’ [Both are local teff varieties]. If 
the rains are good, I sow the former, and if poor I go for the latter.” – Raya 
Azebo farmer  
 
With cash relief, farmers can delay choosing which variety until they know the rainfall 
patterns, and select the appropriate variety.   
 
DSD and cash differ markedly around the range of crops and types of varieties 
supplied (Table 34).  DSD gave out a wider range of crops, and strongly (>90%) 
leaned towards MVs.  In contrast, only 17% of the crops farmers purchased themselves 
with cash for seed were MVs.  Farmers largely purchased teff and chickpeas, 
presumably for immediate sowing.  A few purchased sorghum and barley, crops not 
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supplied with DSD.  These are usually sown with Belg rains.  Hence such purchases 
show that some farmers do not use seed aid to meet immediate needs but rather to 
prepare for the next season.   
 
Table 34  The proportion of Modern and Farmer varieties supplied for each crop 
according to approach of seed aid used (DSD or cash) in Raya Azebo, South Tigray.  
DSD CASH Crop 
N cases Modern 
variety (%) 
Farmer 
variety (%) 
N cases Modern 
variety (%) 
Farmer 
variety (%) 
Teff 104 97.1 2.9 117 18.8 81.2 
Chickpea 46 80.4 19.6 36 13.9 86.1 
Maize  7 42.9 57.1 0 - - 
Sorghum 0 - - 5 0 100.0 
Haricot bean 7 100.0 0 1 100.0 0 
Barley 0 - - 5 0 100.0 
Faba bean 1 100.0 0 0 - - 
Wheat 1 100.0 0 0 - - 
Oil crops 1 100.0 0 0 - - 
Cotton 7 100.0 0 0 - - 
Total 174 90.8 9.2 164 17.1 82.9 
 
 
Three quarters (78%) of Raya Azebo farmers preferred cash to DSD.  This was for 
several reasons.  One was seed quality:  for example, many complained about 
receiving a chickpea variety via DSD from Gojjam, which failed to germinate.  With 
cash they can go to local, trusted sources of seed.  Also, cash gives farmers choice and 
flexibility, allowing them wait until rains have established before choosing appropriate 
varieties (as seen with teff FVs).  Some, however, complained of inflated prices when 
using cash aid to buy seed.  In general, not much is known about the effect of 
cash/vouchers on markets.   
 
This site shows that, even in a chronically-stressed area, significant quantities of 
locally-adapted seed are available from local markets.  Most of the seed purchased via 
relief was teff and chickpea, though this may reflect cash arriving late in the season, 
rather than a particular desire for these crops.  When given a chance to buy seeds, 
farmers select different crops and varieties (often FVs) from DSD, and strategize 
according to immediate rainfall patterns, and to their own needs.   
 
Wolaita – Humbo Woreda (SNNPR) 
Context 
The Wolaita Zone is one of the most densely populated areas of Ethiopia.  The area is 
known for ‘green famine’, where very small holdings mean that production does not 
always meet food needs (Tadesse, 2002).  Humbo woreda, in south-east Wolaita, is 
mostly lowland and of mid-altitude agro-ecologies.  Maize, beans, and sweet potatoes 
feature in a very diverse crop repertoire.  Food aid occurs regularly in Humbo, is a 
significant source of annual consumption, especially for poorer households (Famine 
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Early Warning System, 2006).  Officials here are concerned with dependency.  As one 
official noted  
 
“Humbo never misses any aid, including seed aid, but no significant change is 
observed.” – aid implementer, Wolaita 
 
Records show that seed aid has occurred in Humbo at least since 1986, and at an 
intensive level since 1997, following El Niño.  Apart from the government, WVE, the 
Red Cross, and IMC have supplied aid.  Main approaches used in the area include 
DSD (with and without revolving seed), as well as seed vouchers and fairs.  The 113 
farmers surveyed recalled receiving seed aid an average of 3.59 times, with over 27% 
receiving aid five times or more, and one farmer recalling ten different seed aid events 
(Table 35).  There is serious concern about ineffective targeting and fear that seed aid 
is mis-used, so both government and WVE, the main NGO in Humbo, have started 
asking farmers to sign an agreement that they will plant the seed, and not sell vouchers 
on to someone else.  This atmosphere of control or regulation around seed aid may 
have influenced their responses to the survey.  
 
Table 35 Number of times farmers in Humbo woreda, Wolaita recalled receiving seed 
aid.  
Humbo 
(N=113) 
 
 
Number of times 
 seed aid 
% of total 
1 8.8 
2 22.1 
3 24.8 
4 16.8 
5 15.9 
6 4.4 
7 2.7 
8 2.7 
9 0.9 
10 0.9 
Total 100.0 
Average 3.59 times 
 
Wolaita: seed aid and other sources of seed 
For 16 cases (14.2%), seed aid provided all the seed used for the two crops given 
(Table 36).  Thus, over 85% of the farmers who received seed aid still got at least some 
of their seed from non-aid sources. 
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Table 36  Number of farmers for whom seed aid supplied all the seed planted for two 
crops in a specific seed aid season in Humbo, Wolaita. 
Measure Humbo 
Number of farmers 113 
Cases where aid supplied all seed  16 
% of total 14.2 
 
Table 37 summarizes 130 specific cases of seed aid, showing the proportions of all 
seed sowed provided by different sources.  Seed aid provided 59.9% of all seed sowed 
in the aid season, with home stocks and local markets each providing about 17%.  To 
interpret these figures it is important to note that seed aid is often used in Humbo to 
promote MVs of maize or sweet potato.  Second, many farmers signed a commitment 
to plant the seed received, so may be over-stating importance of seed aid.  Finally, 
Humbo farmers grow many crops, though seed aid only supplies one or two crops.  
Thus, in reality, seed aid likely meets much less than 59.9% of a household’s seed 
needs.  
 
Table 37  Importance of seed aid, in relation to other sources of seed for the same crop 
during a specific seed aid season Humbo woreda in Wolaita.   
Humbo (n=130) Seed Source % of all seed planted 
Seed aid 59.9 
Home stocks 17.2 
Local market 17.7 
Gift 1.8 
Exchange 0.7 
Extension 2.8 
Other source 0.0 
All sources of aid crop 100.0 
 
Wolaita: crops supplied by seed aid  
Table 38 shows crops and varieties supplied by aid.  Maize and chickpea are the most 
important, though haricot bean and teff are also significant.  The small mass of sweet 
potato cuttings understates their importance in seed aid.  In fact, promoting large 
numbers of sweet potato cuttings has been a regular feature of seed aid in Wolaita, 
including in Humbo.  FAO, in particular, has funded a number of large-scale 
distributions since the 1990s, supplying many millions of sweet potato cuttings as 
emergency aid.  This use of vegetatively-propagated species for an emergency is very 
unusual, and the quality of cutting provided by aid has been unusually uneven (anon., 
pers. comm., 2005).  Private businesses usually supply cuttings to aid providers, 
though local markets also sell sweet potato cuttings.   
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Table 38  Details of recent seed aid in Humbo woreda, Wolaita, showing proportion of all 
seed aid received by crop, and the proportion of each crop’s seed coming from aid.  
Crop N of cases Crop’s proportion 
of all aid (%) 
Seed aid as 
proportion of crop 
planted (%) 
Maize 62 35.4 41.4 
Chickpea 28 34.2 84.8 
Haricot bean 10 12.3 90.1 
Teff 13 15.0 94.5 
Sweet potato 13 1.8 51.2 
Sorghum 4 1.4 100.0 
Total 130 100.0 59.9 
 
Seed aid supplied 41.4 % of sowed seed for maize, the main crop (Table 38).  Figures 
are higher for other crops, but some of these (such as chickpea or teff) are less 
significant in the local repertoires, and may not be saved by all farmers in a normal 
year (Famine Early Warning System, 2006).   
 
Table 39 breaks down recent seed aid by MV and FV.  Overall, MVs dominate seed 
aid in Humbo woreda:  72.3% of aid comes as MVs in Humbo.  This is especially 
striking for maize, where F1 hybrids are often promoted over open-pollinated ones.  
Most of the sweet potato varieties supplied were ‘Gadissa’.  This is an MV variety 
(Awassa-83) released long in the past and well-established in Wolaita, so some farmers 
regard it as a local type (Million Tadesse, 2002).  DSD also supplied cash crops such 
as cotton, fruit, vegetables, and sesame, which are not normally associated with 
emergency relief. Table 39 again shows how seed aid in Humbo overlaps with 
development goals around the promotion of new crops and varieties.  
 
Table 39  The proportion of Modern and Farmer varieties supplied for each crop in 
Humbo woreda, Wolaita.  
Crop N cases Modern variety (%) Farmer variety (%) 
Maize 62 100.0 0 
Chickpea 28 39.3 60.7 
Haricot bean 10 20.0 80.0 
Teff 13 53.8 46.2 
Sweet potato 13 76.9 23.1 
Sorghum 4 50.0 50.0 
Total 130 72.3 27.7 
 
Wolaita: comparing DSD and vouchers 
Many Humbo farmers have experienced both DSD and SVF.  How do they compare 
these approaches?  Slightly more than half (55%) preferred to be given seed directly, 
rather than to purchase the seed with vouchers or cash.  Some preferring DSD felt the 
seed from DSD had better yield potential than seed from traders.  It may be that these 
individuals are thinking of MVs (hybrid maize, cash crops) that are only supplied by 
DSD.  In a separate question, farmers were significantly more positive about the 
quality and yield potential of seed from SVF than from DSD, so there is not any 
Farmer Aid Recipients 
 98 
obvious difference with respect to seed physical quality between the two approaches.  
Local traders usually can supply seed of acceptable quality, and certainly better quality 
than the sweet potato cuttings supplied by DSD in 2004 (which dried out before 
delivery and failed to produce).  On a different note, some farmers, particularly 
women, preferred DSD as it involved less travel, negotiation, and bureaucracy to 
obtain seed than did the voucher approach.  Clearly, for some, the more 
straightforward the transaction the better. 
 
The 45% preferring vouchers highlighted the ability to choose crops and varieties 
themselves.  Farmers using SVF chose maize and sweet potatoes far less frequently 
than DSD had supplied, opting instead for chickpea or haricot beans.  Some farmers 
also preferred the greater quantities available with vouchers:  vouchers DSD supplied 
19.1 kg per crop, significantly more than DSD (8.9 kg). 
 
Finally, there is no evidence of any restrictions to seed availability in local markets.  
Farmers recounted being able to obtain seed for all staple food crops using vouchers. 
 
North Shoa –Gera Keya Woreda (Amhara) 
Context 
The final site is Gera Keya woreda, a remote region in the highlands of North Shoa 
Zone.  Though not a classic drought-prone region, it nevertheless is vulnerable as 60% 
of land is sown to Belg crops, and the Belg rainfall is becoming less dependable.  
Other acute stresses include frost, hail, and water-logging, which can lead to harvest 
failure, while land degradation is a chronic challenge.  Gera Keya has received regular 
assistance, including seed aid since at least 1985.  The main crops here are barley and 
wheat, followed by beans (Integrated Food Security Program, 2000).   
 
Surveys interviewed 61 farmers in Gera Keya.  As elsewhere, most of this sample had 
received seed aid more than once, averaging 3.15 times, and on as many as seven 
occasions.  The BoARD and WVE were the sole organizations providing seed aid here, 
and DSD was the only approach used.  
 
North Shoa: Seed aid and other sources of seed 
Seed aid here was the sole source of seed on 20 occasions (32.8% of the sample; Table 
40).  This is a higher proportion than elsewhere, though this represents only one crop, 
compared with two crops in other sites. This is because Gera Keya farmers almost 
never received more than one crop for seed aid.   Table 40 shows that more than two 
thirds of farmers had other seed sources for the crop supplied. 
 
Table 40  Number of farmers for whom seed aid supplied all the seed planted for two crops in 
a specific seed aid season in Gera Keya, North Shoa. 
Measure Gera Keya 
Number of farmers 61 
Cases where aid supplied all seed  19 
% of total 31.1 
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On average, Gera Keya farmers each received 51.3 kg of seed, some getting over 100 
kg.  Table 41 traces seed sources for 61 cases, showing that seed aid provided 52.4% 
of the seed sowed in the emergency season for the crop supplied.  Home stocks also 
contributed a high proportion (37.9%) of seed planted, with these 61 farmers saving 
over two tons of seed.  High quantities reflect the dominance of wheat here, which has 
a very high sowing rate (>150 kg ha-1).  However, it is still notable that ‘emergency’ 
aid is being given to farmers who still have so much home-saved seed – 37.9% is the 
highest proportion of all four research sites.   
 
Table 41  Importance of seed aid, in relation to other sources of seed for the same crop during 
a specific seed aid season Gera Keya woreda, North Shoa.   
Gera Keya (n=62) Seed Source % of all seed planted 
Seed aid 52.4 
Home stocks 37.9 
Local market 8.8 
Gift 0.9 
Exchange 0.0 
Extension 0.0 
Other source 0.0 
All sources of aid crop 100.0 
 
North Shoa: crops supplied by seed aid 
Three quarters of all seed supplied in Gera Keya is wheat (75.5%), with chickpea 
comprising much of the rest (Table 42).  For wheat, seed aid provides 48% of the seed 
in an aid season.  Though a much higher proportion of seed for chickpea comes from 
aid, this is a minor crop, sowed mainly when others fail, so farmers are unlikely to 
save much in anticipation of a poor year.  
 
Table 42  Details of recent seed aid in Gera Keya woreda, North Shoa, showing 
proportion of all seed aid received by crop, and the proportion of each crop’s seed 
coming from aid  
Crop N of cases Crop’s proportion 
of all aid (%) 
Seed aid as 
proportion of crop 
planted (%) 
Wheat 40 75.5 48.0 
Chickpea 14 17.2 81.6 
Faba bean 1 1.6 45.5 
Barley 1 1.6 55.6 
Total (*) 61 100.0 52.4 
(* totals include small amounts of other crops not shown here). 
 
Table 43 shows that nearly all (98%) seed aid is MV in Gera Keya, mostly wheat.  
Officials claim that FVs are unavailable in the market, though farmers in the woreda 
grow a diverse range of FVs of wheat and barley (Integrated Food Security Program, 
2000).  Also, in one part of Gera Keya, intensive surveys showed that only 6% of 
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farmers sow MV wheat exclusively, with the rest mixing FVs with MVs (Molla, 
2006).  It may well be that some FVs are no longer appropriate for conditions in Gera 
Keya (as some officials say), but this would be an unusual situation, and would need 
further investigation.  In any case, the complete emphasis on MVs with DSD in Gera 
Keya is striking.  
 
Table 43  The proportion of Modern (i.e. formally released) and Farmer varieties 
supplied for each crop in Gera Keya woreda, North Shoa.  
Crop Total Modern variety (%) Farmer variety (%) 
Wheat 40 100.0 0 
Chickpea 14 92.9 7.1 
Faba bean 1 100.0 0 
Triticale 3 100.0 0 
Teff 1 100.0 0 
Barley 1 100.0 0 
Lentil 1 100.0 0 
Total 61 98.4 1.6 
 
 
Table 43 shows that seed aid in Gera Keya clearly emphasizes MVs and new crops.  In 
some cases, DSD in Gera Keya supplied crops that were completely new to the area, 
such as Triticale, grass pea, or enset.  Seed aid here appears to be driven by factors 
possibly in addition to those addressing farmers’ seed insecurity.  This sample includes 
two Farmers’ Associations (FAs), one (Tsehaysina) which received seed aid much 
more frequently than the other (Gumer).  Aid to Tsehaysina was almost exclusively 
wheat, in large quantities, while Gumer farmers received small amounts of a wide 
range of crops (including wheat).  Such marked differences in seed aid strategy 
between two FAs in the same woreda are not easily explained by objective differences 
in seed security at the FA level.  There are farmer co-operatives present in the area, but 
it is unclear how much they have influenced seed aid supply. 
 
The assumption that local seed is unavailable in Gera Keya needs to be reviewed.  
There are ample home stocks, and clearly a resilient seed system for the major local 
crops.  However, the strong orientation towards promoting new varieties and crops 
deflects from any attention to local seed availability, whether in home stores or local 
markets.  
 
Comparisons Across Regions 
All sites: number of seed aid events 
The nearly 400 farmers interviewed across the four regions received seed aid on 
average over three times, some recalling up to ten separate seed aid events (Table 44).  
The repeated use of seed aid in all these regions is noteworthy.  This gives a clear 
example of the problem of dependency, where farmers have come to expect that an 
‘emergency’ intervention will occur most years.  
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Table 44 The maximum and mean number of seasons respondents recalled receiving seed 
aid in each study region.  
Region 
Measure Oromiya (Miesso/ 
Chiro) 
Tigray 
(Raya 
Azebo) 
SNNPR 
(Humbo) 
Amhara 
(Gera 
Keya) 
All 
Regions 
N farmers surveyed 117 108 113 61 399 
Maximum number 
of times seed aid 
10 7 10 7 10 
Mean number of 
times seed aid  
3.08 3.02 3.59 3.15 3.35 
 
All sites: contribution of seed aid to all seed planted 
Farmers received or purchased slightly more than ten kg of seed for each crop 
addressed by seed aid (Table 45).  Gera Keya is the exception here, where over 50 kg 
of seed was distributed, which reflects the high seeding rate of wheat, but also the clear 
emphasis on MV in this site.  Across all sites, seed aid provided slightly more than half 
the seed of the aid crop that was sown in the intervention season.  However, the actual 
contribution of seed aid to local seed security will be much lower than the percentages 
in Table 45:  much of the seed aid in the latter two sites is for MV promotion; farmers 
grow a range of crops not covered by seed aid; and seed aid vouchers or cash may 
simply have financed actions (getting seed from local markets) that farmers were going 
to undertake anyway.    
 
Table 45  Tracing specific cases of seed aid, with quantities received, as well as uses and 
other sources of seed for the aid crop and season.  
Region 
Measure Oromiya (Miesso/ 
Chiro) 
Tigray 
(Raya 
Azebo) 
SNNPR 
(Humbo) 
Amhara 
(Gera Keya) 
All 
Regions 
N seed aid events 
measured * 
201 176 139 62 578 
Total seed aid received 
in sample (kg) 
2384.0 4019.1 1483.7 3163.5 11050.2 
Mean amount received 
per crop (kg) 
11.9 10.7 10.7 51.3 19.0 
Aid as proportion of 
that crop’s seed (%) 
49.3 62.3 59.9 52.4 55.4 
(* some farmers detailed two separate instances of seed aid, so the sample size here is greater 
than the number of individual farmers surveyed) 
All sites: seed sources used in emergency 
While some farmers may face challenges with seed access, availability is only a 
problem in rare cases.  As Table 46 attests, even in an ‘emergency’ situation, seed aid 
supplies around half (55.4%) of the seed planted for the crop supplied.  Home stores 
still supply 30.1% of seed, and markets 12.8%.  The widespread use of vouchers or 
cash means that, in reality, local markets supplied much more than 12.8% of seed – 
over 60% in the Tigray case, for example.  
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Table 46 For crops given in seed aid, the proportion of all seed of that crop planted in the 
aid season from different sources, across four study regions.  
Region 
Oromiya 
(Miesso/ 
Chiro) 
Tigray 
(Raya 
Azebo) 
SNNPR 
(Humbo) 
Amhara 
(Gera Keya) 
All 
Regions 
Seed source for aid 
crop  
n=201 n=176 n=139 n=62 n=578 
Seed aid (%) 49.3 62.3 59.9 52.4 55.4 
Home stocks (%) 32.2 24.5 17.2 37.9 30.1 
Local market (%) 15.7 13.1 17.7 8.8 12.8 
Gifts (%) 2.1 0.0 1.8 0.9 1.0 
Exchange (%) 0.3 0.2 0.7 0.0 0.5 
Extension (%) 0.0 0.0 2.8 0.0 0.4 
Other sources (%) 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
All sites: crops and varieties supplied in seed aid 
Table 47 shows that MV promotion is often a goal of seed aid – it occurs 60% of the 
time in practice.  In Humbo and Gera Keya, in particular, it seems to be the main goal 
of aid.  While promoting MVs to farmers can be very useful, MVs may not always be 
appropriate following a crisis, or in chronically-stressed contexts.  It is significant that 
when farmers are given the choice, through vouchers or cash, they choose a much 
higher proportion of FVs for themselves, as well as a wider range of crops overall.  
This was especially the case in West Hararghe (Chiro/Miesso) and in Tigray. 
 
Table 47 Proportions of crops distributed by recent seed aid in each study region, broken 
down by Modern Varieties (MV) and Farmer Varieties (FV).  
Region 
Oromiya 
(Miesso/ 
Chiro) % 
Tigray 
(Raya 
Azebo) % 
SNNPR 
(Humbo) % 
Amhara 
(Gera Keya) 
% 
All 
Regions 
% Crop 
MV FV MV FV MV FV MV FV MV FV 
Maize 52 48 100 0 100 0 - - 72 28 
Teff 0 100 42 58 54 46 100 0 43 57 
Chickpea 0 100 45 55 39 61 93 7 49 51 
Haricot bean 86 14 50 50 20 80 - - 76 24 
Sorghum 41 59 0 100 50 50 - - 38 62 
Wheat - - - - - - 100 0 100 0 
Sweet Potato  - - - - 77 23 - - 77 23 
Barley 0 100 0 100 - - 100 0 10 90 
Lentil 67 33 - - - - 100 0 71 29 
Total* 57 43 42 58 72 23 98 2 60 40 
(* Totals include crops not shows here, such as Triticale (Amhara), and groundnut (Oromiya)). 
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All sites: farmer opinions on seed aid by approach 
Sample of farmer quotes: 
 
“Poor farmers prefer vouchers.  I prefer vouchers. You know my daughters 
and sons may see money in my hand, and we have problems.  So better I get 
the voucher so I do not spend money.” 
 
“With vouchers, you are tied to 1 or 2 traders – with cash you can select the 
seed you really need.” 
 
“I like DSD, if it is crops and varieties I know.” 
 
“The seed of our ancestors was very good, but this new seed [DSD] we just 
don’t have confidence in it.” 
 
“Seed aid helps us get new varieties.  That is a good thing.” 
 
“A good farmer, even in the very worst year, will have seed.  I do not need to 
go to the market, and I do not need seed aid.”  
 
[On revolving funds] “Why should I pay for varieties I don’t know?  I am 
already taking a risk.”  
 
Farmers’ preferences for how they received seed aid were divided fairly evenly 
between DSD and buying their own seed with cash or vouchers (Table 48).  Tigray 
farmers preferred to buy their own seed (reflecting their recent experience with cash), 
while farmers in Gera Keya only knew DSD.  Some of the reasons behind these 
preferences relate to how seed is delivered:  some farmers would rather avoid the 
trouble of traveling to, and bargaining with, traders, and would rather have the seed 
brought to them.  In contrast, others appreciate being able to decide which varieties 
they purchase for seed.  This desire for control may also be why 80% of farmers across 
all sites preferred cash over vouchers in order to purchase seed.  However, some 
farmers prefer vouchers to cash, as they are so poor that they fear the cash would be 
spent for other purposes.  
 
Table 48 Farmers’ preferred means to obtain seed aid in each study region.  
Region Preferred 
means of 
getting seed 
Oromiya 
(Miesso/ 
Chiro) 
Tigray 
(Raya 
Azebo) 
SNNPR 
(Humbo) 
Amhara 
(Gera Keya) 
All 
Regions 
DSD 56.4 % 21.5 % 55.0 % 91.8 % 183 
Buy own (cash 
/ vouchers) 
43.6 % 78.5 % 45.0 % 8.2 % 171 
N responding 117 107 69 61 354 
 
 
Farmers clearly do not feel availability would be a problem:  in the ‘classic’ 
chronically drought-prone sites (Miesso/Chiro in West Hararghe, and Raya Azebo in 
South Tigray), over 95% of farmers (n=225) felt that seed would be available if they 
had been given the means to purchase it.   
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Farmers’ opinions of seed aid event differed according to whether they had DSD, or 
bought seed with vouchers or cash.  Across the four sites, a higher proportion of 
farmers who bought seed felt that: 
• They had the correct crop for the emergency 
 
• They had the correct variety for the emergency 
 
• The seed quality was at least as good as the seed they normally use 
 
• The yield was at least as good as the yield of seed they normally use 
 
• Seed delivery was on time for their needs.  
 
However, a higher proportion of farmers who bought their own seed felt that they had 
to travel too far to get it.   
 
These findings show that, when farmers can choose their own seeds with cash or 
vouchers, they are better able to select appropriate crops and varieties, responding to 
specific rainfall events or field conditions, for example.  Over 90% felt that the seed 
they purchased was as good, if not better, than their normal seed, and they were also 
highly positive about yield.  Vouchers or cash also supplied seed on time more often 
than did DSD.  Overall, farmers are quite positive about receiving support to buy their 
own seed.  However, Table 48 shows that many farmers still prefer DSD.  Some feel 
that buying seed from markets involves too much hardship or travel time.  Others 
complain about cheating from traders over price or quantity.  Others complain about 
the involvement of local FA leadership, who they claim collect their vouchers, 
purchase the seed, and then redistribute it on their behalf. Whatever approach is used, 
it is important to have safeguards to ensure that farmers are dealt with fairly, that 
barriers to individual participation are addressed, and that farmers have a full and free 
choice in the seed they acquire. 
 
Enduring impacts 
Finally, farmers gave their views on the long-term impacts of repeated seed aid in their 
area.  One key impact of seed aid is the delivery of novel crops or varieties to an 
affected region, whether as part of a program of MV promotion, or simply because 
seed aid links traders to other actors, such as crop researchers, in the seed chain.  Table 
49 shows farmers’ views about this type of impact.  Though only 20% stated that seed 
aid had supplied a new crop, over 70% of farmers associate seed aid with the supply of 
a new variety to the area.  Most of these farmers say they are still using this variety.  
For some, this was the most significant, and useful, outcome of repeated seed aid.  For 
instance, one Humbo farmer, who received aid five separate times since 1996, felt he 
only really benefited when he was able to get a teff variety through a voucher, as teff 
could withstand moisture stress.  
 
Farmer Aid Recipients 
 105 
Table 49 Farmers’ views on long-term impact of seed aid, across each study region.  
Region 
Impact of seed aid Oromiya (Miesso/ 
Chiro) 
Tigray 
(Raya 
Azebo) 
SNNPR 
(Humbo) 
Amhara 
(Gera Keya) 
All 
Regions 
Yes 13 % 30 % 23 % 13 % 20 % Supplies a 
new crop? No 87 % 70 % 77 % 87 % 80 % 
Yes 63 % 72 % 74 % 84 % 72 % Supplies a 
new variety? No 37 % 28 % 26 % 16 % 28 % 
 
More general opinions about the impact of seed aid were harder to obtain.  Farmers 
tend to be cautious, and few wished to be critical in an interview setting.  Surprising 
site-specific effects were highlighted.  For instance, in Tigray, farmers say that cash 
aid saves them from exploitation by local money-lenders, who may lend 1 Birr at 
sowing time, but expect 4 Birr repayment six months later.  However, overall, no 
conclusive patterns of long-term changes were identified, for instance in practices or 
seed sourcing, or in farmers’ relationships with others.  In some 400 interviews, 
obtaining new varieties was the single clear positive impact; and widespread concerns, 
from farmers, traders, and aid implementers, were cited as the single clear negative 
impact. 
 
 
SUMMARY:  FARMER INSIGHTS 
• Farmers receive seed aid repeatedly.  The average household sampled received 
seed aid 3.35 times, with a high of 10 separate seed aid receipts. There is little 
evidence that recurring seed aid decreases their vulnerability.  
 
• Seed aid supplied about half the seed a household actually planted, for the crop 
supplied, in any given emergency season.  This was the case across all four regions 
sampled.  The seed aid figure should be interpreted as elevated for three reasons:  
 
o Aid was frequently given specifically to introduce a new variety or even a 
new crop so farmers may not have parallel local stocks;   
 
o Seed is distributed in some regions as a ‘third’ season, after the normal 
rains (so farmers already sown their stocks in the ‘season before’). 
Chickpea, in particular often given for such later planting. Many consider 
this a crop of ‘last resort’ and do not have their own stocks. 
 
o Seed aid usually provided one or two different crops, but farmers generally 
grow a range of species.  Therefore, seed aid’s contribution to overall 
household seed supply is less than 50%. 
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• Fourteen percent of aid recipients relied on seed aid for 100% of their sowing 
needs (for the crops distributed).  Even in an emergency season, seed aid recipients 
obtained over 30% of their seed from their own stocks, with another 12% coming 
from markets.   
 
o For their staple crops, such as maize, wheat, or sorghum, a higher 
proportion of seed came from the local system (own stocks and markets).  
 
o In Tigray, cash for seed was a common seed aid approach, and ‘seed aid’ 
obtained from the market.  In this site, over 60% of the seed planted in an 
aid season came from local markets.     
 
• Seed aid provides a mix of Modern Varieties (MVs) and Farmer Varieties (FVs).  
Across all regions (with 578 cases examined) 60% of seed aid cases involved MVs 
and 40% FVs. 
 
o The balance of MV/FV varied between sites:  in the Tigray site, 58% of 
cases involved  FVs; in the Amhara site, only 2% involved FVs. 
 
o The balance also varied by approach:  DSD tended to emphasize Modern 
Varieties.  When given a choice (with SVF, or cash), farmers opted for a 
much higher proportion of Farmer Varieties, and a wider range of crop 
species. 
 
• In some places, such as Humbo and Gera Keya, seed aid largely serves to promote 
MVs.  This approach seems to give priority to development goals (and might be 
reviewed in terms of its ability to address seed security for a vulnerable 
household). 
 
• Over 95% of farmers indicated that seed was available in their respective regions in 
periods of stress. (in concurrence with traders’ assessment of seed availability, see 
Chapter VI). 
 
• Farmer preference for aid approaches, was not directly linked to the problem 
identified (i.e. seed availability, seed access, for seed quality).  Rather preference   
varied, by region and the way that an approach (DSD, cash, voucher, or SVF) was 
actually implemented.  Generally those wanting to buy their own seed highlighted 
that they preferred having choice of crops and varieties.  Generally, those 
preferring DSD found transactions with traders difficult, or sought access to 
modern varieties. 
 
• Overall, no conclusive patterns were identified of long-term changes linked to seed 
aid (for instance possible changes in seed sourcing practice, or in farmers’ 
relationships with others).  In some 400 interviews, obtaining new varieties was the 
single clear positive impact identified; and widespread dependency, from farmers, 
traders, and aid implementers, were cited as the single clear negative impact. 
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MOVING FORWARD: RECOMMENDATIONS 
• Even though farmers are ‘recipients of assistance’, it is important that they be treated 
as active, not passive players in this aid process.  Procedures need to maximize 
farmers’ ability to strategize even during an emergency, and especially in vulnerable 
areas.   
 
Concretely, this might include  
 
a) Farmers should have right to say ‘no’ to any one type of crop and variety, 
especially if not previously used in system  (such as MVs). A range of crop and 
variety options should routinely be put on offer. 
 
b) There should be vigorous efforts to get seed aid out early.  Early knowledge 
of what crops and varieties might be on offer increases farmers’ flexibility to 
respond to changing conditions (e.g. rainfall). 
 
c) Overall standards for ‘fair dealing with farmers’ should be reviewed, no 
matter what the approach.   
 
This might involve: 
o maximizing information to farmers on expected procedures in advance 
o increasing competition among providers (traders and sellers)  
o setting up procedures for ‘farmer feedback’ to refine aid processes 
o setting up transparent procedures for allowing farmers to redress 
grievances: —in cases where the aid process  or aid product is significantly 
substandard.    
 
• For the supply side (implementers) and from the user side (farmers), learning has 
to accelerate in seed aid practice—towards more effective forms of relief and 
recovery.
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VIII: CONCLUSIONS  
This report has presented an overview of emergency seed aid in Ethiopia.  It has 
reviewed  its history, the policies shaping seed aid, and examined how the practice  
unfolds on the ground,  in four separate regions (Amhara, Tigray, SNNPR, and 
Oromiya), and from the perspectives of implementers (GO, NGO and traders) as well 
as  recipients (farmer seed-aid receivers). . 
 
Each chapter includes it own summary and recommendations for ‘moving forward’  
(improving practice) in regard to the specific theme presented.   Below, the six central 
thrusts needed to focus and sharpen seed aid in Ethiopia are re-emphasized.  
 
1. PUT SEED SECURITY ON THE AGENDA AS DISTINCT FROM 
FOOD SECURITY 
 
Intervening in seed systems represents serious business.  Seed is the input at the heart 
of agricultural production and determines what farmers grow, when and if they will 
harvest.  As seed is often replanted, even short-term seed-related interventions can 
have effects over many seasons. Good seed-system assistance can help; poor assistance 
can make farmers even more vulnerable. 
 
Those professionals intervening in seed systems must have comprehensive 
understanding of what seed security might entail and how to achieve it. Investigations 
have clearly shown that achieving seed security is different from achieving food 
security. The two are linked, but far from the same. 
 
In Ethiopia, seed security has to be put on the development, emergency, and chronic 
stress agendas as a central theme in its own right.  This needs to happen at the policy 
level, in national planning and all along the chain down through to the district (woreda 
) and Farmer Association-level implementation.   
 
More specifically in reference to emergency aid: 
 
Seed aid has to be given a separate identity, distinct from food aid practice.  
 
Seed aid has to be removed from the ill-defined cluster of ‘Non-Food- Items (NFI).  
Seed-related interventions demand explicit concepts, expertise and planning.  The 
shopping list of NFI often translates into simplistic supply side operations (tallying the 
amount of seed aid which should be given). 
 
 
2. DEVELOP POLICY AND STRATEGY FOR SEED SECURITY 
SUPPORT FOR THREE MAIN CONTEXTS  
 
Seed system- related assistance is taking place in three main contexts in Ethiopia; in 
areas characterized by acute stress (e.g. flood or short-term civil strife);  in areas 
suffering chronic stress  (e.g. areas of repeated drought, or ‘green famine’), and in  
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medium to higher potential zones where initiatives to intensify agriculture are 
paramount.  In terms of farming and seed systems, these contexts largely represent 
distinct challenges and opportunities.  
 
For each context, there needs better definition of:  a) the goals to be achieved; b) the 
strategy for achieving them; and c) the support policies needed to enable effective 
action.  Such strategic thinking might best spearheaded at the national level. 
 
At present: 
o Acute aid (and repeated acute aid) is being implemented mostly in chronic 
stress areas; 
 
o Acute (emergency) aid is being used as an important vehicle for moving 
new, modern varieties (which, when used alone, is a developmental type of 
assistance); 
 
o The seed system support component for chronic stress areas is near-
completely undefined. 
 
Given the overlap in reality between acute and chronic stress contexts, novel 
approaches explicitly promoting ‘developmental relief’ might also be considered.  
 
 
3. SUPPORT PROCESSES FOR REAL SEED SECURITY ASSESSMENT:  
EMERGENCY AND CHRONIC    
 
It is hard to implement effective seed system response if the seed security context is 
not well understood, in normal as well as in stress periods. At present there are no seed 
security assessments conducted at any level in Ethiopia.  Rather, food and crop supply 
assessment missions, food security assessments, or no assessments at all are used to 
justify seed–related responses.  At its most common, a drop in harvest is directly 
linked to a lack of seed, and seed is delivered in a region.  So across the board, in stress 
periods, seed availability is usually assumed to be a problem, and direct seed 
distribution is assumed to be the solution.  In contrast, actual field evidence, presented 
within this report and elsewhere, from farmers and from traders, shows seed to be 
widely available in crisis periods under the large majority of circumstances. 
 
Advances, particularly in the last five years, have allowed experts to understand better 
the three prime dimensions of seed security, that: seed has to be available; farmers 
need to gain access to it; and the seed quality must be sufficient to promote healthy 
seed systems.  Methods have also been developed to assess such seed security in the 
short and  long-term (acute and chronic contexts).  So, insecurity does not just involve 
one problem and one potential response.   
 
Capacity to assess seed security and to implement such assessments has to built widely 
in Ethiopia, from national to district (woreda). Further internal policy initiatives as 
well as donor influence, have to encourage that such seed security assessments (as 
distinct from food security assessments) become standard requirements for subsequent 
action. 
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More specifically:   
 
i. Seed Security expertise has to strengthened with the MoARD and has to 
guide emergency, safety net, as well as more developmental decisions. 
. 
ii. Seed security indicators have to be integrated into early warning system data 
bases. 
 
iii. Seed security assessment methods have to be implemented at the field level. 
 
iv. Seed security awareness raising (as distinct from food security) has to be 
encouraged widely—so as to shape policy, national level strategy and local 
implementation. 
 
v. Political environments need to encourage realistic seed security assessments.  
(Seed need figures will continue to be inflated if such figures are routinely 
cut and seed aid continues to be the conduit to obtain new varieties). 
 
The report contains specific guidance on developing seed security indicators and seed 
security field method procedures (see also CIAT/CRS, 2007). The knowledge exists to 
move forward on seed security assessment, even in the short-term. 
 
 
4. ESTABLISH  PROCEDURES TO MATCH THE TYPE OF RESPONSE 
TO ASSESSMENT RESULTS 
 
Seed-related responses are now supply-driven and shaped mainly driven by current  
institutional philosophy and institutional capacity.  They are not primarily driven by 
seed security problems encountered on the ground.   
 
o The GoE generally uses a Direct Seed Distribution (DSD) approach. 
 
o The NGO implementers have taken the lead in testing non-DSD 
approaches, cash, vouchers, seed vouchers and fairs,  although some still 
also favor DSD, particularly to promote new varieties. 
 
Among governmental and non-governmental organizations, capacity needs to be built 
to implement the range of appropriate responses or to forge links with specialized 
partners with such capacity.   
 
More specifically:   
 
Developing greater response capacity will involve:  
o establishing a two-way learning among practitioners about the intricacies of 
different approaches 
o explicit in-field training on approach implementation;  
o awareness raising within government and donor circles of the variety of 
response options; 
o financial support for more targeted action; 
o policy support for more targeted action. 
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5. DEVISE NATIONAL GUIDELINES TO IMPROVE PRACTICE 
 
Seed aid is not a logistical exercise (and in many cases should not involve procurement 
and delivery at all).  Given the consequences of poor intervention, there is a need to for 
basic Ethiopian guidelines to shape and promote ‘better seed aid practice’.     
 
Guidelines for seed relief exist at the United Nations level and guidance for in-the-field 
implementation has recently appeared in varied forms (see Sperling et al., 2006a-e).  
The challenge is to develop Ethiopian-specific better practice principles.   
 
Box 7 presented an initial list of better practice principles suggested by Ethiopian 
professionals.  The list needs to be expanded and might best be discussed in national 
fora, with strong regional representation and representation from key stakeholder 
groups.  Such guidelines would be indicative, and non-binding, so debate and 
consensus are important for achieving subsequent advances on the ground.        
 
 
6. PUT INCREASED EMPHASIS ON STRENGTHENING 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN CHRONIC STRESS  ZONES 
 
Finally, even thought the focus on this report as been on emergency aid, the real spurs 
for such aid, repeated over 34 years, have been chronic stresses, natural, as well as 
man-made.  
 
At a fundamental level, crop development for chronic stress areas needs far more 
attention in the Ethiopian research and development systems. Chronically-stressed 
areas are often ‘low-potential’, and require types of technologies that recognize the 
high levels of risk (and large distances from markets and infrastructure).  In terms of 
priorities:  
 
i There is a need to review technologies that perform under stress and under 
farmers’ management for high-risk conditions.  Full input packages should not 
be assumed in these cases.   
 
ii Barriers to the development of these technologies need to be explicitly 
identified and addressed.  Inter alia, more resources need to be directed to 
research for lowland ecologies; and seed production for lowland crops needs to 
improve and become more demand-responsive.  
 
As evidenced within this report, all six thrusts have an associated clear set of activities 
at the national through to local levels.  All involve policy and implementation changes. 
There are no quick solutions for restructuring and refining seed aid in Ethiopia, and a 
significant overhaul is what is needed.   
 
There are, however, multiple concrete steps which can be implemented even now, 
which can launch or accelerate positive seed security changes among vulnerable 
farmers.  Some positive changes — such as refining emergency response — can be 
envisioned in the short-term (1-3 years).  Others will demand more long-term and 
concerted action.  New strategies for addressing seed security in chronic stress need to 
be developed, tested and implemented. 
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ANNEXES 
List of Persons Consulted / Contacts 
List of People Contacted 
 
1. Addis Ababa and International     
Name  Organization 
Ali Adam Ethiopian Seed Enterprise, Addis Ababa 
Shukri Ahmed FAO, Rome 
Amare Mengistu FAO, Ethiopia  
Asfaw Mekuria  DPPA, Addis Ababa 
Steve Ashley  Food Security Consultant, Norwich, UK 
Assefa Tofu  World Vision Ethiopia, Addis Ababa 
Asmare Ayene CARE Ethiopia, Addis Ababa 
John Augsberger USAID, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance 
Ayenew Arega Ag. Inputs, Quality Control, MoARD, Addis Ababa 
Bekele Dinku  Head of Agricultural Inputs, MoARD, Addis Ababa 
Belay Simane  Institute of Development Research, Addis Ababa 
University 
Brhane Gizaw Head of Food Security, MoARD, Addis Ababa 
Rod Charters FAO, Ethiopia 
Derese Getachaw Sociology & Anthropology, Addis Ababa University 
Demissie Mitiku Ethiopian Institute for Agricultural Research, D/Zeit 
Demissie Fantaye Political Science and International Relations, Addis 
Ababa University 
Fasil Kelemewerk Ethiopian Institute for Agricultural Research, Addis  
Fasil Reda Ethiopian Institute for Agricultural Research, Nazret 
Fikre Markos  Head of Crop Protection, MoARD, Addis Ababa 
Fikre Mekuria MoARD, Addis Ababa 
Gebregziabher Dori USAID, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance 
Getachew Belay Ethiopian Institute for Agricultural Research, D/Zeit 
Getachew Desta  Ethiopian Seed Enterprise, Addis Ababa 
Getinet Gebeyehu Consultant, Ethiohorn Consult 
Girma Aboma  Poverty Action Network of Civil Society in Ethiopia 
(PANE) 
Patrick Gordon DPPA, Addis Ababa 
Gure Kumssa Catholic Relief Services, Addis Ababa 
Henri Josserand FAO, Rome 
Afurika Juvenal  CARE Ethiopia, Addis Ababa 
Legesse Dadi   Catholic Relief Services, Addis Ababa 
Mattewos Hundie Chair of Agricultural Task Force, MoARD, Addis Ababa 
Mesay Kassaye Self help 
Mesfin Shiferaw Head of Relief Co-ordination, DPPA, Addis Ababa 
Million Belihu USAID, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance 
Annexes 
 119 
Moges Bekele Catholic Relief Services, Addis Ababa 
Seid Ahmed Ethiopian Institute for Agricultural Research, Addis 
Shimeles Adugna DG, Ethiopian Committee for the Red Cross 
Tekie Alemu  Economics, Addis Ababa University 
Workneh Negatu Institute of Development Research, Addis Ababa 
University 
Yimer Assen FAO & Federal MoARD, Addis Ababa 
Yonas Sahlu  Ethiopian Seed Enterprise, Addis Ababa 
  
 
2. West Hararghe 
Name  Organization 
Abdisa Regassaa BoARD, Miesso 
Ashenafi Alem  Food Security, BoARD, Miesso  
Aynalem Birhan Extension, BoARD, Miesso 
Bezuwerk Alemeshet Crop Production, BoARD, Miesso 
Birhanu Abera Trader, Asebe Teferi 
Daniel Tadesse Food Security, BoARD, Miesso 
Etefa Gefu EIAR, Miesso Research Center 
Hailu Merga CARE West Hararghe 
John Abdu International Rescue Committee 
Kiros Tsegaye CARE West Hararghe 
Miliion Terefe EIAR, Miesso Research Center 
Tigeneh Shiferaw West Hararghe Zonal Administration 
Wondale WARDO, Chiro 
Zewdu Ayele ILRI/IPMS 
 
3. North Shoa 
Name  Organization 
Abiy Hailegebrial   North Shoa Agricultural Office 
Asfaw Getachew Ethiopian Rural Self-Help Association (ERSHA) 
Atlabachew Ashalew Gera Keya  
Ayalew Adgeh North Shoa Zone Rural Development Office 
Damtew Lulseged Gera Keya Agricultural Dev Office 
Endrias Bernardu Gera Keya  
Kassa Wolde Berhan Rural Development Agriculture Office 
Mulugeta Kebede MOA- Gera Keya 
Tadele Taye World Vision Ethiopia, Gera Keya 
Tesfaye Bekele World Vision Ethiopia, Gera Keya 
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4. Wolaita 
Name  Organization 
Abraham Ambole BoARD, Humbo 
Abraham Asha CONCERN Worldwide, Soddo 
Amanuel Robel BoARD, Soddo 
Asfaw Marime World Vision Ethiopia, Humbo 
Bahiru Asfaw Action for Development 
Bezuneh Gebremedhin Wolaita Zone Rural Development Government Office 
Mesfin Ketena World Vision Ethiopia, Humbo 
Taye Buke Rural Development, Humbo 
Tensae Dubale WKHC-TDA 
Tesfaye Sime Wolaita Zone Rural Development Government Office 
Zegeye Wondimu BoARD, Humbo 
 
5. Tigray 
Name  Organization 
Abbadi Girmay TARI, Mekele 
Alem BoARD, Raya Azebo 
Alem Birhane ADCS, Tigray (CRS) 
Alem G/Tsadik ADCS, Tigray (CRS) 
Amannel CRS, Mekele 
Amare Belay TARI, Mekele 
Ataklitie Hailu       REST, Tigray 
Ayele taye  BoARD, Raya Azebo 
Belay BoARD, Raya Azebo 
Beyene Demtsu TARI, Mekele 
Birhane G/hiwet DPPA, Tigray 
Dagnew Menan REST, Tigray 
Debas BoARD, Raya Azebo 
Haftu Adhana BoARD, Raya Azebo 
Fereweini Asefa DPPC, Tigray 
Fiseha Bezabih Crop Production, BoARD, Tigray 
Haile Fiseha Raya Azebo Woreda Head 
Haileslasie Desta World Vision Ethiopia, Tigray 
Kahsay G/medhin Co-operative Planning, Tigray 
Kahsay Equar BoARD, Raya Azebo 
Mebrahtu Tsegay REST, Tigray 
Solomon Alene Early warning & aid, DPPC, Tigray 
Tsegay Mebrahtu REST, Tigray 
Zemichale Bagale Orthodox Church 
 
 
